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Two decades ago, Professor Richard Epstein fired a shot at the
administrative state that has gone largely unanswered in legal
scholarship. His target was the “permit power,” under which
legislatures prohibit a specified activity by statute and delegate to
administrative agencies the discretionary power to authorize the
activity under terms the agency mandates in a regulatory permit.
Accurately describing the permit power as an “enormous power in the
state,” Epstein bemoaned that it had “received scant attention in the
academic literature.” He sought to fill that gap. Centered on the
premise that the permit power represents “a complete inversion of the
proper distribution of power within a legal system,” Epstein launched
a scathing critique of regulatory permitting in operation, condemning
it as a “racket” for administrative abuses and excesses.
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Epstein’s assessment of the permit power was and remains
accurate in three respects: it is vast in scope, it is ripe for
administrative abuse, and it has been largely ignored in legal
scholarship. The problem is that, beyond what he got right about the
permit power, most of Epstein’s critique was based on an incomplete
caricature of permitting in theory and practice.
This Article is the first to return comprehensively to the permit
power since Epstein’s critique, offering a deep account of the theory
and practice of regulatory permits in the administrative state. This
Article opens by defining the various types of regulatory permits and
describing the scope of permitting in the regulatory state. From there it
compares different permit design approaches and explores the
advantages of general permits, including their ability to mitigate many
of the concerns Epstein advanced. This Article then applies a
theoretical model to environmental degradation problems and
concludes that if certain conditions are met, general permits can
effectively respond to many of the complex policy problems of the
future. Finally, this Article adds to the scholarship initiated by Epstein
by proposing a set of default rules and exceptions for permit design
and suggesting how they apply to complex policy problems.
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This is a racket (no lesser word will do) . . . .

– Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution

INTRODUCTION
Every law student eventually encounters the classic statutory
2
interpretation puzzle: “No vehicles allowed in the park.” The
exercise is designed to lead to questions such as whether the
legislature really meant no vehicles, of any kind, ever. If so, could the
legislature have been more emphatic and said something like
“absolutely no vehicles of any kind ever allowed in the park under
any circumstances”? Recognizing that it would be nonsensical not to
allow, say, a fire truck into the park to stop the merry-go-round from
burning down, would it help for the legislature to add something like
3
“except fire trucks, ambulances, and law enforcement vehicles”?
Although statutory language making a prohibition unequivocal or
listing exemptions might clarify legislative intent, the puzzle reveals
that administration of the statute must of necessity rely on iterations
1. Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407,
416 (1995).
2. The American Bar Association describes the “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical as
“a classic of law-related education” and suggests judges use it to educate people about what is
involved in judicial interpretation of statutes. Am. Bar Ass’n, No Vehicles in the Park,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/initiatives_awards/constitution_day/
lessons/lessons_1/no_vehicles.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
3. For discussion of the inevitability of exemptions to rules that prohibit or regulate
activity, see generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (1982); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163 (1984).

RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2014 5:18 PM

136

[Vol. 64:133

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

of judicial interpretation and legislative revision. A court might hold,
for example, that a child’s electric tricycle is not a vehicle, and if the
legislature disagrees it must amend the statute.
An alternative approach, common in the modern administrative
4
state, is for the legislature to enlist an administrative agency and
specify something like “no vehicles in the park, except as allowed in a
permit issued by the park agency pursuant to park agency rules.”
Although such legislation does not avoid questions of statutory
interpretation—we still need to know whether a child’s electric
tricycle is a vehicle—the provision for a park agency permit opens the
door to the innumerable theoretical and practical dimensions of
administrative law.
For example, administrative law scholars would eagerly engage
theoretical questions about the power of the agency to define the
term “vehicle” in rules, the agency’s policy for how to define them,
whether courts should defer to the agency’s definition, how judicial
review ossifies the park agency, and whether certain vehicle industry
5
or park advocacy interests have captured the agency. Furthermore,
practitioners representing various interest groups would likely engage
in drafting comments on park agency rules regarding vehicle permits,
challenge park agency permit rules and other actions in court, and
represent parties in park agency enforcement proceedings.
Ironically, however, one of the most under-theorized questions
in administrative law is the lynchpin of these theoretical problems and
of utmost practical importance to administrative law practitioners:

4. The term “administrative state” is traced to political scientist Dwight Waldo’s epic
book published in 1948. See DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1948). Although there is no
universally recognized definition, for our purposes the administrative state’s most important
attribute is reliance on administrative agencies for law making and decisionmaking—that is, a
system of governance relying on legislative delegation of discretionary authority to
administrative agencies led by unelected officials appointed by the elected executive and
exercising that authority through rules, adjudications, permits, and other mechanisms. Agencies
fitting this description have existed in our federal system since it was founded. See generally
JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). We refer to the modern
administrative state to reflect the proliferation of this model of governance throughout federal,
state, and local governments in the twentieth century with increasing involvement by the courts
in policing agency action through judicial review. See id. at 1–27.
5. See JACK M. BEERMAN, INSIDE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY
1–2 (2011) (describing what administrative law encompasses and its focus on “sources of agency
power, the constitutional limits on that power, the procedural requirements for the exercise of
agency power, and the availability and scope of judicial review of agency action”).
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continuing with the park scenario, how should the legislature and the
park agency design the agency’s permits? Administrative permits are
ubiquitous in modern society. Thousands of local, state, and federal
agencies have a hand in administering a vast system of permits
ranging from mundane building permits to permits covering the
6
operation of sprawling industrial facilities. Plans for everything from
a backyard deck to an interstate highway are swept up in this
permitting system, and there is no hope of moving forward on them
without having the necessary agency permits in hand. The vast
breadth and depth of permitting in modern American society has
7
even captured the Supreme Court’s attention on several occasions.
Yet, as Professor Richard Epstein pointed out in the mid-1990s,
despite being the “focal point of enormous public discontent,” the
permitting system “has received scant attention in the academic
8
9
literature.” His observation is no less true today.
Epstein expressed deep concerns with what he called the “permit
power,” the root attribute of which is its reversal of “the classical
American view . . . that all that is not prohibited is permitted, which
sets the initial presumption in favor of liberty—not in favor of
10
government action.” Although he did not advocate a “permit-free
11
society,” Epstein dwelled at length on the sharp contrast between
the tort system and its injunction remedy, which requires the party
claiming injury to prove its case before a court will prohibit continued
12
harm, and the permit system, under which “the individual citizen
becomes a supplicant before the government in all cases, whether or
13
not any real threat of harm exists.”
When legislatures
change the default rule from “permitted-until-judicially-prohibited”
to “legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted,” they
14
create an “enormous power in the state” that in Epstein’s view,
6. For some dazzling statistics on the variety and number of regulatory permits by which
America is inundated, see infra Part I.B.
7. See, e.g., Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439–49 (2014) (discussing the
attributes of air pollution permitting); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2007)
(discussing the attributes of water pollution permitting).
8. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407.
9. For a survey of the minimal coverage the permit power has received in legal
scholarship, see infra Part I.B.
10. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 409–12.
13. Id. at 412.
14. Id. at 413.
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“results in a complete inversion of the proper distribution of power
15
within a legal system.” The shift in the locus of power from courts to
agencies, Epstein warned, turns the fate of much of the public and
private affairs of the nation over to “specialized bodies which often
have a strong ideological position on the issues that come before
16
them time after time.”
Epstein described the potential for agency abuse of the permit
power in ominous terms. Given what he claimed to be the “utter lack
of substantive standards by which permits can be denied,” he
portrayed the permit power as “a stranglehold on individual
17
behavior” repugnant to basic principles of due process of law. He
warned that agencies, whose “ostensible expertise . . . is little more
18
than a pretext for a strong one-sided commitment,” would inevitably
entrench and abuse the permit power by promulgating elaborate sets
of administrative procedures, imposing onerous conditions for the
granting of a permit, manufacturing excuses for delay, retaining the
power to revise or terminate permits virtually at will, adopting
amorphous substantive standards that justify any outcome the agency
prefers, and piling up the need to obtain multiple permits for the most
19
mundane of activities. His bottom line: “[t]his is a racket (no lesser
20
word will do).”
Really? Is the permit power that bad? To be sure, the permit
power is at its core about legislatures demanding that public and
private actors seek permission from administrative agencies before
they engage in proscribed activities. If that is enough for one to
condemn the permit power, there is nothing more to say—Epstein
wins the day. But Epstein based the weight of his critique on how
agencies will actually exercise the permit power, not merely its
existence, and thus must ground his argument in the reality of permit
power practice. For this purpose, however, he employed a caricature
of permitting that bears little resemblance to permitting in action
today. This is not to say that the parade of horrors Epstein postulated
cannot happen—like any government power, the permit power must
be closely monitored—but the reality is that the permitting system

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 413.
See id. at 415–17.
Id. at 416.
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has evolved into a far more flexible, nuanced, and innovative
institution in the modern administrative state than Epstein’s dismal
21
vision would suggest is possible.
No doubt agencies abuse the permit power in specific cases and
there is room for improvement in the permitting system as a whole,
but the actual experience of permitting as practiced by agencies is rich
with evidence that the problems motivating Epstein’s pessimistic
assessment are neither inevitable nor insurmountable. The question
Epstein’s critique raises, therefore, is not as much whether to employ
the permit power as an instrument of public policy, but how to design
permits so as to avoid falling into the traps he identified as reason to
pull back from the permit power in general. As Epstein articulated:
22
“we cannot (and should not) strive for a permit-free society.” But his
concession inevitably leads one to ponder what the numerical limit of
permits should be and what form these permits should take.
On this query, Epstein offered few clues, and administrative law
scholars in general have failed to engage these questions. Epstein
23
proposed a “modest reformation of the law of permits” that would
limit the universe of government permits to those contexts in which
“some permissible justification exists that would allow the
government entity to obtain injunctive relief, subject to the same
24
limitations that are routinely applied to private plaintiffs.” Under his
scheme, in other words, the scope of the permit power would be
defined by the scope of private injunction law. This seems a modest
proposal only in that it takes few words to describe the simple rule for
25
a complex world. Epstein predicted this approach would “isolate
thousands of . . . instances of the permit power that should be
26
consigned to relative oblivion.” Still, there would be some permits.
And more realistically, it is probably safe to assume that Epstein’s
proposal, which has gained no traction since he launched it, likely
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

For this account, see infra Part I.
Epstein, supra note 1, at 407.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 421–22.
Our language is a reference to Richard Epstein’s book. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1997).
26. Epstein, supra note 1, at 422. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate Epstein’s
prediction that his harm-based rule would largely eviscerate the scope of permitting in modern
society. We point out, however, that many permitting regimes, such as those authorizing water
and air pollution and waste disposal, regulate types of harms that could fall well within judicial
injunction powers, and these permitting regimes thus would remain on the books under
Epstein’s rule.
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never will come to be. So there will continue to be lots of permits.
What should they look like?
This Article is the first to develop a comprehensive theory of
regulatory permit design. Some permitting programs are designed
around the agency engaging in extensive fact gathering and
deliberation particular to the individual circumstances of an
applicant’s proposed action, after which the agency issues a detailed
permit tailored just to that applicant’s situation. These are referred to
27
herein as “specific permits.” Other programs have the agency issue a
permit on its own initiative, with no particular applicant before it, that
defines a broad category of activity and allows the entities engaging in
that activity to take advantage of the permit with little or no effort on
their part, and limited agency review of specific facts in any particular
case unless the agency finds good cause to condition or withdraw the
28
general approval. These are referred to herein as “general permits.”
Across the hundreds of permitting programs in federal, state, and
local regulatory authorities, we would expect to find a spectrum of
approaches from extreme specific permit design to extreme general
permit design. Our question of interest is where on this spectrum a
particular permitting program should fall given its policy goals,
practical implementation context, and background concerns with the
permit power.
Indeed, a gaping omission from Professor Epstein’s critique of
the permit power is the idea that there is a spectrum across which
permits can be so flexibly designed. In particular, general permits
have become the dominant permit model in many fields of
29
regulation. Their core feature—the agency’s issuance of a permit in
advance to authorize an activity generally, while retaining the power
to withdraw the general approval in specific cases—responds to
Epstein’s central complaint that the permit power flips the proper
order of governance on its head. True enough, specific permits follow
the “legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted” model
Epstein finds so unappealing. But general permits follow a model
Epstein did not include in his critique—the “administrativelyapproved-unless-administratively-prohibited” model. Although not

27. For the details of specific permitting, see infra Part I.C. This kind of permit is also
referred to as an “individual permit.” Id.
28. For the details of general permitting, see infra Part I.C. The term “general permit” is
widely used to describe this kind of permit. Id.
29. See infra Part II.C–D.
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fully restoring matters to his ideal model of “permitted-untiljudicially-prohibited,” general permits offer the permitting power an
option Epstein did not consider and that we believe can respond to
many of his concerns.
By no means, however, are we suggesting that concerns about
the permit power are trivial or that general permits obviate them
entirely. Permitting unquestionably is an enormous enterprise of the
administrative state. Hundreds of statutes spanning a wide range of
different regulatory fields authorize federal, state, and local
administrative agencies to establish and operate permitting programs
taking up vast time and financial resources of agencies, regulated
30
entities, and other interests. Permit design choices thus are vitally
important to effective, efficient, and equitable administration of
31
agency authorities. No doubt the permit power can be arbitrarily
administered and abused, but even a responsibly administered permit
32
program can impose substantial costs on public and private actors.
And even if a permit program can be delivered with low costs, a
poorly designed program, regardless of whether it employs specific or
general permits, can thwart public policy goals and unnecessarily
33
impede private enterprise.
There are also good reasons to believe permit design will be of
increasing importance as new kinds of regulatory programs are
quickly emerging around looming problems such as climate change,
biodiversity loss, and globalized trade, and these problems’ broad and
34
diverse sets of environmental, economic, and social harms. A
coherent theory of regulatory permit design thus is not only long
overdue, but urgently needed.
To build such a theoretical foundation for regulatory permit
design, we start in Part I by positioning regulatory permits within the
30. For examples, see infra Part I.B.
31. For an examination of permit design options and their consequences, see infra Part II.
32. For example, the costs of obtaining and complying with the federal Clean Water Act’s
permitting program, which regulates placement of fill material in navigable waters and wetlands,
have been estimated to exceed $1 billion annually. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
721 (2007) (discussing attributes of the permitting program).
33. Residential-solar-power-panel installers, for example, point to complex state and local
permitting requirements as adding unnecessary expense and posing significant obstacles to
widespread adoption of residential solar power. See More Than a Third of U.S. Solar Installers
Say
Permit
Requirements
Limit
Growth,
CLEAN
POWER
FINANCE,
http://www.cleanpowerfinance.com/about-us/media-center/press-release/more-than-a-third-ofu-s-solar-installers-say-permitting-requirements-limit-growth (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
34. See infra Part III.
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administrative state. We define what a regulatory permit is, outline
the scope and scale of permitting in the regulatory state, and explain
the different types and characteristics of permits. Part II compares the
pros and cons of the specific permit and general permit approaches,
and models the conditions under which general permitting is most
likely to offer significant advantages over specific permitting,
including mitigating many of Epstein’s concerns. Using examples
from a variety of contexts, Part III applies the theoretical model built
in Parts I and II in concrete policy settings, concluding that general
permits, if carefully designed and administered, could be deployed
and used to effectively respond to many of the complex policy
problems looming in the future. We close by proposing a set of
default rules and exceptions for permit design and suggesting how
they apply to such problems.
Before we move on, however, it is important for us to emphasize
the scope and limitations of this Article’s project. First, it is not our
goal to respond point-by-point to Professor Epstein’s critique of the
permit power. Rather, our premise is that a reasoned debate about
the permit power requires a robust account of its central medium for
exercising the power—permits. Our primary objective, therefore, is to
provide that account. Second, we acknowledge that the permit power
is but one of many powers available to the administrative state,
including taxes, penalties, regulatory standards, exemptions,
incentives, and monitoring. A comprehensive assessment of how the
permit power compares to these other powers and how the
mechanisms behind issuing permits compare to those of other powers
is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, given how little attention
legal scholars have paid to the permit power, our main objective is to
articulate the theory and practice of permitting so that such
comparisons can begin to be made on deeper levels than they have
been. Finally, given how expansive the permit power has become, and
how much variety there is in permitting designs, we cannot cover the
entire landscape of permitting. Topics such as enforcement, public
participation, permit terms, amendment and revocation procedures,
inspections and monitoring, and judicial review deserve more
attention than we can give here. Hence, we focus on what we believe
is the most important feature of permitting design—choosing where
to land on the spectrum between general and specific permits. This
choice drives most of the remaining decisions that matter in
permitting.
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I. THE PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS OF REGULATORY PERMITS
To reach an informed assessment of the nature, scope, and
impact of the permit power, one should have a robust account of what
distinguishes it from other government regulatory instruments, such
as fines, inspections, and taxes. It thus strikes us as useful to start by
unpacking the features of the permit power’s distinct delivery mode—
permits. It is, after all, the permit power.
Yet for all his worrying about the permit power, Epstein had
little to say about permits. His postulated world of permit power
abuses included only fleeting references to the permits involved. His
permit examples—drawn mostly from zoning, building codes, and
35
environmental regulations —served merely as the medium for his
critique of the permit power. We learn almost nothing about the
permits themselves, except that they were the channels for abuse of
power. What forms did they take? What were their terms? What were
their procedures and conditions? From Epstein’s examples, we get
very few of these details; instead, we get horror stories, such as a fire
department’s conditions for school doors leading to disrupted
36
classrooms, and tales of a local planning commission’s excessive land
37
use exactions. To be sure, the permit power can be carried too far in
some cases, leading to abusive agency practices, but by cherry-picking
from the annals of permitting-gone-bad, Epstein set up a straw man, a
caricature designed to make the permit power look more ominous in
theory than it must necessarily be and more abused in practice than it
is in fact. Hence, in revisiting the permit power, we start at the
beginning.
A. What Are Permits?
Exactly what constitutes a regulatory permit in the
administrative state is not self-evident. For example, the
38
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) refers to permits only once—
39
including the term “permit” in the definition of a “license.” A
license is one form of “agency action,” which includes “the whole or a
40
part of any agency rule, order, license, sanction, [or] relief.” One
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See generally Epstein, supra note 1.
See id. at 416.
See id. at 419–21.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 551(8).
Id. § 551(13).
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might reasonably conclude that because permits are included only
under the definition of licenses, they are thus neither a part of nor the
result of a rule, order, sanction, or relief. But this conclusion turns out
not to be accurate, as the term “order” is defined in the APA to
41
include the act of licensing; the term “sanction” includes the
42
“requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license;” the term
43
“relief” includes the “grant of . . . [a] license[;]” and the term “rule”
44
includes certain kinds of “approval.” Agencies issue orders through
45
46
“adjudication” and issue rules through “rule making.” Hence, given
that permits are one form of licenses, in theory an agency could
engage in adjudication to issue an order to grant a permit, issue a
sanction to revoke or suspend a permit, or grant relief to issue a
permit; or an agency could engage in a rule making to issue a rule
establishing an approval of a permit. All of these actions could be
described as acts of permitting. But what is a permit? All that can be
extracted from the APA on that score is from the definition of
license, which, in addition to agency permits, includes “the whole or
part of an agency . . . certificate, approval, registration, charter,
47
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.”
The APA’s structure of agency actions, although convoluted,
thus provides several core concepts for further articulation of
regulatory permits consistent with this catch-all “form-of-permission”
concept. First, permits are a type of statutorily authorized
discretionary agency action. Which type of agency action they are is
not entirely clear from the APA—it seems that permits can take
48
several forms. But there is no room for doubt that, however issued,
permits are administrative actions rather than actions of legislatures
or courts, and that there is some degree of discretion involved in how
49
the agency acts. Second, permits are a “form of permission.” The
APA does not specify how permits differ from the other forms of
permission included in the definition of license. It is clear, however,
that a permit must involve some process and standards for an agency
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 551(6).
Id. § 551(10)(F).
Id. § 551(11)(A).
Id. § 551(4).
Id. § 551(7).
Id. § 551(5).
Id. § 551(8) (emphasis added).
See infra Part I.C.
5 U.S.C. § 551(8).
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to grant (or deny) permission to a regulated entity to engage in what
would otherwise be a statutorily restricted activity. Third, permits
must fit into a broader range of agency and legislative regulatory
measures spanning from unconditional exemption from regulation, in
which case no permission is needed, to unconditional prohibition of
approval, in which case no permission can be obtained. Finally,
permits, as a form of administrative rulemaking or adjudication under
50
the APA, are subject to the APA’s rules of judicial review.
These four features allow us to situate permits in a broader
spectrum of forms-of-permission models represented in the following
table comparing five combinations of the baseline rules regarding
whether permission is needed and available, the institutional modes
for implementing the baseline rules, the forms the permission (or
nonpermission) can take, and the availability of APA judicial review
(or a state equivalent).
Table 1. Permits as a Form of Permission
Rule
Mode
Form
Review

No Permission Needed

Permission
Required

No Permission Allowed

Administrative

Legislative

Legislative

Statutory
Exemption

Regulatory
Exemption

PERMITS

Regulatory
Prohibition

Statutory
Prohibition

Non-APA

APA

APA

APA

Non-APA

We defer for later the question of why a legislature or agency
would opt for one or another of these permission models. For now we
are only sorting out their differences for a better understanding of
what lies within the “permits box.” We also recognize that the entire
category of forms-of-permission regulatory instruments fits within a
larger universe of regulatory delivery options including fines, taxes,
standards, subsidies, inspections, monitoring, reporting, and a host of
others. Many times a combination of instruments, including or not
including one of the forms of permission, is deployed. Hence there is
something to be learned about permits by comparing them to, say,
taxes. But we believe the appropriate starting point for learning about
permits comes from first comparing them to their closest cousins,
50. Id. §§ 701–706.
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exemptions and prohibitions, and then comparing the variations that
fit within the permit box itself.
Taking the forms-of-permissions comparison first, at one end of
the forms-of-permission spectrum shown in Table 1 is the statutory
exemption: a legislatively specified activity that is excluded from the
need to obtain permission from the agency under the statutory
regime. A statutory exemption could be explicit or implied, and its
scope could be subject to agency and judicial interpretation. Once
defined, a statutory exemption serves as the form of permission and
thus removes the specified activity from the need to take any
additional steps to establish compliance with the law. A regulatory
exemption accomplishes the same outcome, but it is specified by the
agency pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority. At the other
end of the spectrum lie prohibitions: the statutory prohibition is a
legislatively specified activity not eligible for permission, and a
regulatory prohibition is an activity the agency has, pursuant to
legislatively delegated authority, excluded from eligibility for
permission. This leaves permits occupying the middle ground, where
a statute authorizes an agency to grant permission to a proposed
activity—an activity that would otherwise be prohibited—and some
degree of discretion over the process and standards used to grant that
form of permission.
Distilled to its essence, therefore, a permit can be defined as: an
administrative agency’s statutorily authorized, discretionary,
judicially reviewable granting of permission to do that which would
otherwise be statutorily prohibited. We intend this definition to be
both formal and functional. The definition demands that the act of
permitting (1) be explicitly delegated or implied by statute, (2)
administrative, (3) discretionary, and (4) judicially reviewable, and
that (5) it provide an affirmative grant of permission (6) allowing an
act that would be otherwise statutorily prohibited. Regardless of what
a form of permission is called—permit, license, certificate, exemption,
or something similar—all six elements must be satisfied for it to be a
permit, and if all six elements are satisfied, it is a permit.
Consider the role of discretion. If a statute specifies all the
qualifications (such as age or residency) that are needed for
permission to perform an act (such as hunting or driving), leaving it
solely to the agency to “check off the boxes” for an applicant to
receive permission to perform the act, there is no permit because the
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agency has no discretion to exercise regarding its issuance. If,
however, the statute leaves some judgment to the agency as to
whether a qualification is met (for example, whether the applicant is
of good character), the element of discretion is satisfied and the form
of permission is a permit.
Similarly, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to enforce a
statutory prohibition against an actor is administrative and
discretionary, and functionally allows what is otherwise prohibited by
statute. Nevertheless, prosecutorial discretion does not usually take
the form of an affirmatively issued grant of permission—it is an
internal agency decision not to act—and it is not usually subject to
52
53
judicial review, so it is not a permit. If, however, the agency
promulgates a formal policy announcing the general conditions under
which it will not enforce a statutory prohibition, and if doing so
54
subjects the agency to judicial review, under our definition, that
would be a permit.

51. Forms of permission of this variety are vast in number. For example, Michigan and
Texas each individually issued over one million hunting permits in 1994 alone; the 1994 total
across all states was over fifteen million. See AM. FIREARMS, Hunting License Holders, Sales,
Revenues, http://www.amfire.com/statistic.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (listing firearm statistics
in all fifty states for 1994, the last year for which comprehensive statistics are available). Of
course this aggregate number only captures a small number of state firearm-related permits,
given that it only tallies hunting licenses and does not account for gun licenses, background
checks, and conceal-carry permits, some of which may involve exercise of discretion.
It is possible that even for generally ministerial licensing decisions like driver’s and
hunting licenses, there can be discretion on the margins. For instance, the DMV employee who
determines whether a teenager has passed the driving test has to make some judgment about
whether the relevant standards have been met. Generally, however, the ministerial nature of
licensing decisionmaking will dominate—undermining the possible identification of the
resulting decisions as permits.
52. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
discretion.”).
53. For discussions of nonenforcement as an important agency policymaking instrument,
see Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 16–19 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1644–65 (2004). See also David M. Uhlmann,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 168 (2014)
(discussing the prosecution of permit violations).
54. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (reserving the question whether express
nonenforcement policies are reviewable); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671,
676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (general nonenforcement policy expressed through a full rulemaking or
universal policy statement may be reviewable).
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As with prosecutorial discretion, rising attention has been given
55
to the proliferation of waiver provisions in regulatory statutes.
Broadly speaking, waivers are “statutory grants of the power to waive
56
statutory requirements.” Although this definition appears to have
some overlap with the definition of permits, not all waivers will also
be permits. For example, if the waived statutory requirement is an
affirmative duty to act (for example, to pay a tax), the waiver is not of
an act otherwise prohibited by statute and thus is not a permit. By
contrast, waivers from zoning and building code restrictions—known
as special exceptions and variances—relieve the applicant of having
57
to follow prohibitions, and thus are permits.
One final example drives the point home: patents. A patent gives
the inventor a form of permission not previously enjoyed—the right
to enforce the patent—and thus the patent process looks something
like the permit process. In addition, a patent fits most of the elements
of a permit as a statutorily authorized, administrative, discretionary,
and affirmative grant of permission (to enforce the patent) that is
subject to judicial review. A patent does not, however, allow an act
that is otherwise prohibited by statute—an inventor is free to market
the invention without having patented it. A patent, therefore, is not a
permit.
These are not merely nice distinctions. Legislatures, courts,
agencies, and interest groups pay close attention to the language and
structure of statutes to discern precisely what forms of permission or
other regulatory instruments an agency may use. For example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has, on several
occasions, gotten into hot water with courts for exempting specified
activities from Clean Water Act (CWA) statutory prohibitions when
the courts have found that the statute authorizes only permits as the
form of permission, even when the difference between the permits
58
and statutory exemptions seems nuanced. Most recently, for
example, a court rejected the EPA’s administrative exemption of
“discharges of a water transfer” from CWA pollution discharge
55. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013) (discussing the proliferation of “big waiver” theory).
56. Id. at 276.
57. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 157–75 (2d. ed. 2007).
58. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377–80 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (rejecting the EPA’s exemption of agricultural discharges but suggesting the statute
authorizes general permits).
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prohibitions, which would have relieved those discharges of the need
to obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permits—and thus exempted millions of water transfers from
regulation—on the ground that “courts have consistently held that
the EPA does not have statutory authority to create NPDES [permit]
59
exclusions.” Hence, both form and function matter when it comes to
defining when an administrative act is or is not permitting, and to
60
evaluating the consequences thereof.
Although his description of what constitutes a permit was not as
developed as ours, we suspect Epstein would agree with what we have
outlined above as the definition of a regulatory permit. As the next
Section shows, we also agree with him that permits are ubiquitous in
American society, touching everything “from a dog house in the back
61
yard to a nuclear power plant,” and yet, permits are largely absent
from academic teaching and scholarship.
B. The Ubiquity of Permits in Modern Society (and Their Absence in
Legal Scholarship)
Permitting is one of the workhorses of the administrative state
from top to bottom, and for centuries it has reached into every corner
62
of life in America. For example, since its enactment the CWA has
59. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 08-cv-5606, 08-cv8430, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).
60. As decisions like these reveal, the form of permission an agency may use and how it
designs that form of permission—whether as a general permit or as a specific permit—
implicates doctrines of judicial review of agency statutory and regulatory interpretation that lie
outside the scope of this Article. See generally Kevin Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 355 (2012) (discussing regulatory interpretation and judicial review).
61. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 407.
62. For example, § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known as the Refuse
Act, has since 1899 outlawed the discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state,
into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water.” 33
U.S.C. § 407 (2012). Having thus provided a broad general prohibition, the statute authorizes
the Army Corp of Engineers to issue permits for such discharges. The specific language reads:
[T]he Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers
anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any
material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under
conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is made to him prior to
depositing such material; and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof
shall be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawful.
Id. (emphasis added). For a thorough history of this and other water pollution regulations,
including accounts of state permit programs dating back to the early 1900s, see generally
William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State,
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145 (2003); William L.
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been a veritable engine of permitting across the nation. The CWA’s
64
NPDES permit program, under which the EPA and delegated states
regulate discrete sources of water pollution, is an illustrative example
of the vast scope of the modern administrative permitting scheme. As
of October 2013, the EPA’s online database listed over 750 active
general NPDES permits covering both huge classes of industries
(mining facilities, concentrated animal feeding operations, and
seafood processors just to name a few) and huge numbers of facilities
(each individual general permit can itself cover over 30,000 discrete
65
facilities). Nationally, roughly 6800 major pollution sources and
44,000 nonmajor sources are required to hold a specific NPDES
permit, and over 133,000 nonmajor sources are authorized by a
66
general NPDES permit. In addition, the EPA estimates that there
are over half a million sources of stormwater discharge pollution
67
authorized under CWA general permits at any given time. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), discussed in detail below, also
has a hand in CWA permitting, with approximately 74,000 discrete
activities per year receiving authorization through general permits the
Corps administers under section 404 of the CWA for placing fill in
navigable waters and wetlands, plus thousands of specific permits for
68
more significant fill activities. All told, in any given year roughly
750,000 sources of water pollution in the United States are required
to obtain or maintain permit authorization under these various CWA
regulatory programs. And that is just from one federal statute.
State permitting schemes can be just as, if not more, robust and
wide-reaching as their federal counterparts. For example, states
exercise vast permitting powers through occupational licensing
Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and
Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (2003).
63. We do not in this Section explain the details of the regulatory programs mentioned. For
an overview of the CWA, see THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed.
2011).
64. See NPDES Home, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes (last
visited Oct. 6, 2014).
65. NPDES General Permit Inventory, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/
npdes/permitissuance/genpermits.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
66. Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://echo.epa
.gov/node/19 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
67. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97290, STORMWATER
PERMITS: STATUS OF EPA’S REGULATORY PROGRAM 1–3 (2012).
68. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97223, THE ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2
(2012).
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programs. Today, nearly a third of American workers must obtain a
69
state occupational license to perform their jobs legally. States, large
and small, have occupational licensing requirements for dozens of
professions including locksmiths, beekeepers, auctioneers, interior
70
designers, fortune tellers, tour guides, and shampooers.
Permitting schemes permeate local governmental regulatory
programs as well. For example, food trucks operating in Washington,
D.C., are subject to the permitting authority of three discrete D.C.
governmental agencies. The result is that a single truck can be
71
required to maintain as many as seven permits. Sometimes local
permitting schemes can even outstrip the scope of their state or
federal counterparts. For example, the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene’s (DOH’s) permitting scheme covers a
vast swath of activities. Although the agency is just one of dozens in
New York City with permitting authority, the DOH’s scheme
requires permits for, among other things, manufacturing frozen
desserts (different permits are required for wholesale and retail
frozen-dessert manufacturing), operating bathing establishments
(different permits are required for those with and without pools) and
72
petting zoos, and exhibiting exotic animals.
The variety of activities for which the DOH requires a permit is
staggering, but its scope is dwarfed by that of the building permits
issued by local governments. Before the recession of 2008, local
governments nationwide regularly issued a total of over one million
building permits per year, and even in the years following the 2008
73
recession, they issued well over five hundred thousand per year.
We could continue to dazzle with statistics like these for pages.
To drive the point home, consider that the EPA estimated that, were
it immediately to apply the strict letter of the Clean Air Act to the
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, over six million discrete
69. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014).
70. See id. at 1104–10 (detailing the professions subject to licensing in Florida and
Tennessee).
71. See D.C. FOOD TRUCK ASS’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://dcfoodtrucks
.org/myths.html (last visited July 13, 2013) (discussing common myths associated with food
trucks).
72. See License, Permit, and Course Information, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/licenses/permit.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(listing the types of licenses and permits under the New York Health Code).
73. New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 2014),
http://www.census.gov/construction/bps/pdf/table1a.pdf.
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emission sources spread throughout the nation would need to obtain
74
air pollution permits. The EPA attempted to avoid the strict
interpretation of the statute, which the agency argued would lead to
absurd results, by regulating only the very large sources first and
postponing action on smaller sources while it devised a regulatory
75
strategy for them. In effect, this so-called “tailoring rule” approach
gave small emission sources a temporary regulatory exemption. The
Supreme Court, however, found the very possibility that six million
carbon dioxide sources might eventually require Clean Air Act
permits a “patently unreasonable” interpretation of the statute, and
thus found that the EPA could not regulate them at all unless a
76
source were subject to permitting requirements for other pollutants.
The EPA’s failed attempt to ease its way into a massive permitting
program thus illustrates the potential scope of the permit power.
Suffice it to say that permits seem firmly entrenched as a central
way the administrative state does business and there is little prospect
of them going away any time soon. Hence it is a bit of a puzzle—at
least it is to us (and Professor Epstein)—that permitting is scarcely
mentioned in administrative law teaching and scholarship materials.
Although it is true that a law student might read cases that involve a
permit, the law school curriculum is virtually devoid of permitting as a
topic of study. Amid dozens of courses on litigation and transactions
in virtually every law school’s offerings, one would strain to find
courses approaching anything like “Permitting in the Administrative
77
State” or “Securing and Challenging Permits.” Even courses that are
about the administrative state leave permitting as a focused topic of
78
study out in the cold. In short, even a law student who focuses his or
74. Operating Permits Burden Reductions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/nsr/documents/20100413piecharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). For the EPA’s explanation
of why it chose not to immediately regulate these sources, see Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516–18
(June 3, 2010). Consistent with the theme of this Article, the EPA examined how to use “permit
streamlining” tools such as general permits to ease the regulatory impact of subjecting these
sources to Clean Air Act permitting. See CLEAN AIR ACT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO EPA
ON AIR PERMITTING STREAMLINING TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR GREENHOUSE
GASES (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/pdfs/ghg-permit-streamliningfinal-report.pdf.
75. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516–18.
76. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
77. We reviewed the course offerings of ours and several dozen other law schools and
could find no such course.
78. For example, although one leading administrative law textbook includes a chapter on
agency licensing cast broadly, such as federal broadcast station licensing and state occupational
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her curriculum choices on administrative law and a regulated field
such as environmental law could easily graduate with very little
exposure to regulatory permitting systems and the design of permits.
Although permits receive more attention in legal scholarship, the
focus of most work is on particular permitting programs, most
79
prominently environmental regulatory program permitting, but also

licensing, the main thrust of the chapter is to cover formal adjudication, which represents a
small portion of the world of permits. RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN
& JODY FREEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. VII (6th ed. 2011). There is no attention given
even in that text to the design of permits. Other administrative law texts have no coherent unit
on licensing at all, much less on permit design. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD RAKOFF,
CYNTHIA FARINA & GILLIAN METZGER, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011). Similarly, neither of the two leading texts used in firstyear “regulatory state” classes now popular in law schools devotes any attention to agency
permitting. See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN & EDWARD L. RUBIN, THE REGULATORY STATE
(2010); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
(2010). The same story is largely true outside of administrative law course materials. For
example, of the dozen or so textbooks on environmental law and natural resources law—two
fields knee-deep in permitting regimes—a few texts devote some pages to particular permitting
programs. See, e.g., ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 806–909 (3d
ed. 2012) (CWA permits); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY 539–68 (4th ed. 2010) (CWA permits). Only one such text includes
any substantial discussion of permitting in general as its own theme. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN
NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA KLASS, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 710–39 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing coverage of permitting proceedings,
specific permits, and general permits).
79. Permitting under the CWA receives considerable coverage in legal scholarship. See,
e.g., Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, The Army Corps of Engineers and Nationwide Permit
26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp Reclamation?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1991); Terence J.
Centner, Challenging NPDES Permits Granted Without Public Participation, 38 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011); Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of The Clean
Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 35 (2009); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES
General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 410 (2007); Andrew
King, Leading the EPA to Stormwater: The Long Road to Construction Stormwater Regulation
and the Role of Numeric Effluent Limitations, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 335 (2011); Chris
Reagen, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to Undermine The Clean Water
Act, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 307 (2011). The Endangered Species Act’s permitting program is
also a focal point. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 293 (2007); Patrick Duggan,
Incidental Extinction: How the Endangered Species Act’s Incidental Take Permits Fail to Account
for Population Loss, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,628, 10,628 (2011); J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for
Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345, 345 (1999); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat
Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 279, 279 (1998). One insightful article that digs into the anatomy of permitting in
general more than most involved a comparative study of the environmental permitting of two
similar BMW production plants, one in Germany and the other in the United States. See Molly
Elizabeth Hall, Pollution Havens? A Look at Environmental Permitting in the United States and
Germany, 7 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
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80

covering a broad diversity of fields including land use permitting,
81
82
speech permitting, and cancer drug production permitting.
Although this kind of work surely contributes to better
understandings of how different permitting programs operate and
perform in different contexts, it is not directed at developing a theory
of permitting and permit design.
A broader take on permitting is found in the emerging body of
scholarship focused on how permits fit into the increasing
“privatization” of the administrative state through the introduction of
market-based instruments, private organization standard setting, and
83
similar mechanisms. Permitting design could both affect and be
affected by this privatization trend, but the scholarship on the topic
does not examine permitting design in any broader sense and is more
concerned with theories of privatization than with theories of
permitting systems.
There is also a body of scholarship examining the prevalence of
statutory and regulatory exemptions and waivers in some regulatory
84
fields. As close cousins to permits, knowing more about the design
and impact of exemptions and waivers can help inform the theory and

80. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Buchsbaum, Federal Regulation of Land Use: Uncle Sam the
Permit Man, 25 URB. LAW. 589 (1993).
81. See generally, e.g., Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence,
What Permits are Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381 (2008).
82. See generally, e.g., Richard Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations
Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2009).
83. See generally Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative State, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) (examining programs under which public
functions, such as standard setting, are delegated to private organizations); Jessica Owley, The
Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1091 (2013)
(examining environmental-permitting programs that rely on private markets to manage
environmental harm mitigation).
84. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 55 (examining the widespread use of waivers); Kara
Cook, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA Should Use a Watershed-Based
Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 451 (2010)
(examining the EPA’s failed attempt to exempt pesticide applications from CWA permitting);
Paul Kampmeier, Enough is Enough! Stormwater Discharged from Man-Made Pipes, Ditches,
and Channels Along Logging Roads Is Not Nonpoint Source “Natural Runoff”, 43 ENVTL. L.
757, 757–61 (2013) (examining an EPA exemption from CWA permitting for runoff from
logging operations); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 264, 331–33 (2000) (examining a variety of exemptions enjoyed by the
agricultural production industry); Michael Vandenbergh & Kevin Stack, The One Percent
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1387, 1394–96 (2011) (examining a variety of exemptions
premised on the lack of significant harm). Some of that discussion has been general, but it has
also focused on why we would have exemptions and on the distinctions between adjudication
versus rulemaking. See generally, e.g., Aman, supra note 3; Schuck, supra note 3.
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design of permits. Nevertheless, exemptions and waivers are not
permits, so there is a limit to how much assistance this type of
scholarship can offer. Overall, therefore, it is no exaggeration to say
that Professor Epstein’s observation two decades ago, that the permit
85
power had “received scant attention in the academic literature,”
remains true to this day.
C. Types of Permits—From General to Specific
Permits are everywhere and seem to take on many sizes and
shapes. To be sure, all permits have certain characteristics: among
other things, they apply to specified regulated actions and actors,
have a specified duration, and impose enforceable conditions on the
regulated entity. But the range of possible permit designs seems
boundless, producing permits for everything from backyard decks to
food trucks to vast industrial complexes. How does one make sense of
a world in which permits cover so much of American society? Indeed,
that world turns out to be quite complex.
In our typology of forms of permission, permits are situated
between regulatory exemptions and regulatory prohibitions. As such,
the universe of possible configurations of permits defines a
continuum that stretches between those two opposing models. At the
extreme boundaries of permitting, permits do not look much different
from either exemptions on one end or prohibitions on the other. The
permit power’s differences from exemptions and prohibitions at its
edges, however, are significant nonetheless.
For example, imagine that a statute authorizes an agency to
implement regulatory exemptions, permits, and regulatory
prohibitions with respect to a particular category of activities, such as
water pollution. The statute instructs the agency to decide which
permission form to use for different types of water pollution sources
based on the cumulative harm to environmental resources a type of
source, if not regulated, is expected to produce when all such sources
86
are taken into account. Based on this standard, the agency could
85. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407.
86. This is one of the standards used in many statutes authorizing general permits.
Although a harm continuum like the one in our hypothetical statute can provide one rationale
for moving across the forms-of-permission spectrum from exemptions (targeted at the lowest
harms) to general permits to specific permits to prohibitions (targeted at the highest harms), it is
not the only possible policy rationale and is often ignored in practice. For example, agricultural
pollution is a leading cause of water resources degradation but is exempt in many of its forms,
largely for political reasons, from permitting under the CWA and other environmental laws. See
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array its regulatory instrument options based on a harm continuum
with exemptions at one end for very low harm levels, prohibitions at
the other end for very high harm levels, and permits for the
intermediate harm levels. In such a system, permits thus must be able
to handle everything from low to high levels of harm, suggesting that
permitting must be a flexible regulatory instrument.
For example, say the agency expects Type X sources to produce
extremely low levels of cumulative harm. For that situation the
agency might simply declare that Type X sources are exempt from the
need to obtain permission. Type X source harms could be more than
trivial in some cases, however. In this case, the agency could, by its
own initiative, issue a permit that any Type X source could take
advantage of by simply filling out a one-time form with basic
information such as just the name of the owner and the location of
the source. Only if the agency determines, perhaps through an
inspection or citizen complaint program, that a particular Type X
source poses unusual risks would the agency require that source to
undergo more extensive assessment. This approach is representative
of the general permit, the example offered here being an extreme
version in that all it requires for the action to qualify for the permit is
a one-time filing of information anyone could easily find in a phone
book.
On the face of things, it looks as if the only difference between
an exemption and a general permit is the filing of the form in the
latter. But there is more to it than that. Under the exemption
approach, Type X sources simply do not register in the agency’s
regulatory program—the agency will not know, for instance, how
many there are, where they are, or who owns them. Under the permit
approach, the agency knows all this information and thus can use it
for its regulatory purposes. The agency could, for example, develop
and make public maps of Type X source locations or conduct periodic
visits to Type X sources. Over time, moreover, the agency could add
requirements to the form, such as reporting annual output, adding an
annual fee, or requiring more frequent filings. In short, the
requirement that one meet some condition or take some action,
although minimally burdensome, could lead to a slippery slope of

Ruhl, supra note 84, at 293–316. For a discussion of the harm continuum and other rationales in
more detail, see infra Parts II, III.
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additional requirements ending in Professor Epstein’s vision of
87
administrative reigns of terror.
At the other end of the permit continuum—where that slippery
slope leads—is the boundary between permits and prohibitions. Here
the agency can make a similar choice for Type Y sources, which are
expected to impose extensive cumulative harm if left unregulated, as
it can at the other end of the continuum. One way to avoid Type Y
harm would be to flatly prohibit Type Y sources. Problem solved. But
if Type Y sources also produce significant economic or other benefits,
a prohibition might not be the optimal approach when all costs and
benefits are considered. Alternatively, therefore, the agency could
provide that all Type Y sources are prohibited unless they obtain a
permit from the agency. To obtain this kind of permit, however, a
Type Y source must, among other things, prepare a comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis weighing all possible environmental, economic,
and social effects expected from its particular facility, employ
expensive pollution control technology, mitigate all unavoidable
harmful effects, submit to inspections, perpetually monitor impacts,
and file monthly reports. This approach is representative of the
specific permit, and this example shows how a specific permit imposes
potentially extensive and expensive requirements.
As a practical matter, the conditions for obtaining and
maintaining this kind of permit could become so extensive and
expensive as to effectively prohibit Type Y sources, making the
permitting regime look like a prohibition. For example, although it is
possible in theory to obtain all the permits necessary to construct a
new major gasoline refinery in the United States, it is a mind-boggling
undertaking. The EPA once issued a 135 page “guidance” just to
explain the inner workings of but one requirement for permitting a
88
refinery under the Clean Air Act. Although permitting complexities

87. As we discuss later in connection with our case study of permitting under the CWA,
some general permits do not require even the filing of a simple form, making them look
indistinguishable from exemptions except in terms of the orientation of the form of
permission—that is, exempted activities are unregulated whereas activities authorized by
general permit are regulated. Although the distinction may seem semantic when applied to this
kind of general permit, we discuss in Parts II and III reasons why it makes a difference to
agencies and regulated entities whether an activity falls on the exemption side or the permit side
of the line. See infra Parts II, III.
88. See E. RESEARCH GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/456-B-00-001, Petroleum
Refinery MACT Standard Guidance (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/
petrefine/mactdoc1.pdf (explaining the maximum-achievable-control-technology standards for
petroleum refineries in the United States).
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are not the sole factor, it should be no surprise that no major refinery
has been constructed anywhere in the nation since 1977. This has not
been because of excess refining capacity—the United States must
89
import refined gasoline to meet demand. A more current example
comes from the controversial Keystone XL shale oil pipeline,
proposed to run from Canada to the Gulf Coast refineries, which the
U.S. State Department’s analysis concludes will require over ninety
“major
permits,
licenses,
approvals,
authorizations,
and
consultation[s] by federal, state, and local agencies prior to
90
implementation of the proposed Project.”
For Epstein, a legislative or administrative prohibition may be
bad enough—it violates the permitted-until-judicially-enjoined
principle. But the agglomeration of federal, state, and local agencies
issuing the dozens of burdensome specific permits that would be
needed for a major refinery or pipeline is Epstein’s nightmare,
opening the door to all the administrative excesses and abuses he
predicted. Of course, these are extreme examples. Plenty of work gets
done in the nation notwithstanding the dark cloud of permitting that
hangs overhead. Even so, relying on the specific permit model can
impose nontrivial costs on social and economic actors, and the
potential for agency abuse of power in the administration of the
permitting program cannot be ruled out. Although a flat prohibition
also imposes costs, the prohibition, once in effect, does not rely on
continuing agency administration and thus the abuse of power
concern is not present.
Hence the differences between exemptions and general permits
at the one end of the permit spectrum, and between prohibitions and
specific permits at the other end, are by no means inconsequential.
Ironically, however, they are dwarfed by the differences between
general permits and specific permits. General permits at the far end
of the spectrum look like exemptions, and specific permits at the
other end look like prohibitions. Thus, the distance between general
permits and specific permits is almost the same as the distance

89. When Was the Last Refinery Built in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(June 25, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=29&t=6. The United States regularly
imports anywhere from several hundred thousand to more than a million gallons of gasoline per
day. Weekly U.S. Imports of Total Gasoline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WGTIMUS2&f=W.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT—KEYSTONE XL PROJECT tbl.1.9-1 (2014), available at http://keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/documents/organization/221152.pdf.
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between exemptions and prohibitions. In other words, just as
exemptions and prohibitions are diametric opposites, so too are
general permits and specific permits. Yet both are permits that
represent agency exercise of the permit power. To be sure, obtaining
a specific permit, like the kind described above, sounds like an
enormous and expensive hassle, whereas obtaining a general permit
that asks for only a name and an address is a piece of cake. Yet even
the simple general permit fits the criteria that Epstein and we agree
are the defining traits of permits: discretionary, administrative
granting of permission to do that which is otherwise prohibited by
statute.
Epstein’s critique of the permit power, however, failed to
account for this broad a range of what fits inside the permits box in
the forms-of-permission spectrum, and the space it thus allows for
designing a permit to fit its regulatory context. Again, if one objects in
principle to any instance in which discretionary administrative
permission is required to do that which is otherwise prohibited by
statute, the differences between general and specific permits do not
matter—they are both part of “the racket.” But if one accepts that a
permit-free society is impractical and thus is concerned with how the
permit power is actually implemented, the differences between
general and specific permits, and how agencies make use of them,
may matter.
Indeed, given how close general permitting can come to an
exemption, Epstein overstated the case by portraying all permitting as
following the legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted
model. He overlooked general permitting, which adds the
third and potentially important administratively-permitted-until91
administratively-prohibited model.
Although this leaves the
permitting and prohibiting functions in the hands of agencies rather
than courts, general permits restore the default rule to a state of
permission and require some action by the agency to shift to a
prohibition in particular cases. As Figure 1 below suggests, this
approach looks much closer to Epstein’s ideal model of permitteduntil-judicially-prohibited than it does to the legislatively-prohibited
until-administratively-permitted model he condemned. General
permits thus call into question how deeply into the permit power

91. General permitting was well entrenched in various permit systems by the time Epstein
offered his critique. See, e.g., Addison & Burns, supra note 79 (discussing the CWA section 404
general-permitting program, which was added as part of the 1977 amendments to the statute).
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Epstein’s critique penetrates. A more robust analysis of the breadth
of permit design possibilities is needed to think more clearly about
the permit power in application.
Figure 1. The Spectrum of Permits
Exemptions
No Permit
Needed

General

PERMITS

Specific
Prohibited Until
Permitted

Permitted Until
Prohibited

Prohibitions

No Permit
Allowed

Transition

To facilitate that study, we use examples taken from one of the
more well-known permitting programs in environmental law—section
92
404 of the CWA. True to the permits model, section 301 of the
CWA establishes a broad category of prohibited activity, declaring
93
the “discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”
There are decades’ worth of judicial opinions and reams of agency
94
rules and guidances expounding on the meaning of those ten words.
For purposes of understanding the structure of the section 404 permit
program, however, it suffices to explain that the CWA defines
“pollutant” to include a long list of items including everything from
95
incinerator residue to sand, and defines “discharge of any pollutant”
to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a
96
point source.” Continuing down the definitional trail, the CWA
defines “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United
97
States” and defines “point source” to mean “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or
98
may be discharged.” In lay terms, you cannot use pipes and ditches
to dump pollution into lakes and rivers.

92. It is not necessary for our purposes to plumb the intricate details of the section 404
program; rather, we use it to flesh out the structural differences between specific and general
permits. For thorough coverage of the section 404 program, see generally WETLANDS LAW AND
POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).
94. See H. Michael Keller, Regulated Activities, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra
note 92, at 105–11 (discussing section 301 of the CWA).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).
96. Id. § 1362(12).
97. Id. § 1362(7).
98. Id. § 1362(14).
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But yes you can, if you get a CWA permit. The prohibition
clause of section 301, recited above, appears after the proviso:
99
“Except as in compliance with . . . .” One of the several “in
compliance with” opportunities section 301 specifies is found in
section 404, which provides that the Secretary of the Army, acting
100
through the chief of the Corps, “may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill
101
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”
Section 404 thus completes the four ingredients necessary for
exercising the permit power: the Corps, an administrative agency,
may exercise its discretion under section 404 to grant permission to
do that which is otherwise prohibited by section 301.
Section 404 articulates a few more features of this permit regime
that are important for our purposes. First, another agency has its
hand in the process. Section 404(b) provides that the Corps’ decisions
about where to allow disposal sites must follow environmental and
102
other guidelines established by the EPA. Second, true to the formsof-permission spectrum, section 404(f) provides several statutory
exemptions, called “non-prohibited discharges,” including such
activities as “normal farming,” dam repairs, and construction of farm
103
stock ponds. Third, section 404(e) establishes a general permit
option “for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged
or fill material if the Secretary determines that the activities in such
category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse
environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only
104
minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment.”
On its face the section 404 permit program might appear narrow
and mundane—it seems to be concerned with dumping dredged soil
and sand into lakes and rivers. But as with many permit programs,
there is more there than meets the eye. Through a long and often
99. Id. § 1311(a).
100. Id. § 1344(d) (2012).
101. Id. § 1344(a). The other major CWA permitting program administered by the EPA is
known as the NPDES program, covering discharges not covered by section 404. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (2012). The Supreme Court has drawn a sharp line between the two programs, such that
a particular type of discharge falls into one program or the other, but not both. See Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). We discuss the NPDES
program at various points infra.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b); see Mark T. Pifher, The Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and
Practicable Alternatives Analysis, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 221–26.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f); see Keller, supra note 94, at 131–38.
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1)–(2).
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tortuous history of judicial and administrative interpretations, the
geographic reach of section 404 includes not just navigable waters,
105
but also wetlands having a “significant nexus” to navigable waters.
Although it is not necessary for our purposes to plumb the depths of
what “significant nexus” means in this context, it is important to note
that the extension of section 404 jurisdiction to wetland areas that
meet the “significant nexus” test transformed section 404 from a
dredging and fill regulatory provision to one of the federal
106
government’s major land use regulation programs. It is not an
exaggeration to observe that “no landowner or developer can
107
proceed without awareness of wetlands protection law.”
Indeed, consistent with Epstein’s assessment of the permit
power, the section 404 program has received scathing criticism for its
extensive reach and impact on land development. Justice Scalia, for
example, once claimed that “[t]he burden of federal regulation on
those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated
‘waters of the United States’ is not trivial. In deciding whether to
grant or deny a permit, the [Corps] exercises the discretion of an
108
enlightened despot.” The focus of most of this criticism, however,
has been on the Corps’ work involving specific permits—what the
109
agency refers to as an “individual permit.” The vast majority of
permitting under section 404, however, takes place through the
Corps’ numerous general permits, which cover activities such as the
105. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 741–42 (2007) (establishing the “significant
nexus” test). The details and implications of Rapanos are far too complex to cover here. For a
series of articles explaining the significant nexus test and some of the confusion it has caused,
see generally Symposium, Rapanos v. United States, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T (2007). For
the pre-Rapanos history of the administrative and judicial interpretations of the geographic
scope of section 404 jurisdiction, which was itself complex, see Mark A. Chertok & Kate
Sinding, Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands: “Waters of the United States,” in WETLANDS LAW
AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 59–92.
106. Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An
Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 1–17.
107. Margaret N. Strand & Lowell Rothschild, Wetlands: Taming the Swamp Monster, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: FROM
BROWNFIELDS TO GREEN BUILDINGS 589 (James B. Witkin ed. 2011).
108. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721. For his bleak assessment of the Corps, Justice Scalia relied
heavily on David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by
Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RES. J.
59 (2002). Some of the findings of the Sunding and Zilberman study, however, have been
contested in other work studying the Corps’ performance. See generally Kim Diana Connolly,
Survey Says: Army Corps No Scalian Despot, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,317 (2007) (examining the
Corps’ permitting program performance record).
109. See Connolly, supra note 108, at 10,317 n.4.
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placement of navigation aids and erosion control structures, permits
110
the Corps has actively been using since 1977. The use of general
permits by the Corps is by design and meant to avoid the kind of
111
problems Epstein associated with permit power abuse. As one
congressional study of section 404 permits concluded, general permits
“are a key means by which the Corps seeks to minimize the burden
and delay of its regulatory program: they authorize a landowner or
developer to proceed with the covered activity without having to
112
obtain an individual, site-specific permit in advance.” Although
more than half of its general permits require advance notification to
the Corps for some or all covered activities, others require only afterthe-fact notification. The result has been that the Corps handles the
113
and
vast majority of its permitting through general permits
processes them far more efficiently and cost-effectively than is
possible for specific permits.
Section 404 thus illustrates the flexibility inherent in the permit
power once the full breadth of permit design options is taken into
account. However, with over 90 percent of the demand on the section
404 permit program handled under general permits requiring a small
amount of paperwork, or even none, and anywhere from zero to at
most a few weeks’ time to work through the permitting system, does
114
the Corps truly look like an “enlightened despot”? Does the section
404 general permit program smack of a “racket”? Why, if the Corps
wished to abuse the permit power, would it funnel so much of the
115
section 404 permit program through general permits? These are
questions one would not think to ask without a firm grasp of the full
dimensions and design options available under the permit power. So

110. The Corps’ general permit program began in 1977 with the agency’s promulgation of
five general permits covering specified activities such as utility-line crossings and minor road
crossings. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,121, 37,146–47 (1977). Congress amended the CWA in 1977 after
the Corps promulgated its first set of general permits, essentially codifying the approach the
Corps took. See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 17
(2009).
111. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
112. COPELAND, supra note 68, at 2.
113. Id. at 2 (“Approximately 74,000 activities per year (representing 92 percent of the
Corps’ regulatory workload) were authorized by nationwide and other general permits.”).
114. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2007).
115. Indeed, surveys of applicants for the Corps’ section 404 permits generally reveal them
to be happy customers. See Connolly, supra note 108, at 10,325–61 (compiling and assessing
survey results).
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that we may fully address them later, therefore, in the next Section we
continue with section 404 as the case study for unpacking and
comparing the characteristics of general and specific permits.
D. Design Options
There are three levels of analysis across which to compare
general and specific permits as alternative design options. The first
level focuses on the permitting system, which consists of the
regulatory apparatus and process the agency constructs in order to
issue the permit. The second level of analysis focuses on permit
administration, which pertains to how a particular project, subject to
the regulatory prohibition, avails itself of the permitting system to
obtain permit approval. At a macro scale, from the agency’s
perspective the fundamental distinction between general permitting
and specific permitting is that general permits are issued at the
permitting-system stage, whereas specific permits are issued at the
permit administration stage. That is, most of an agency’s work in
general permitting is in establishing the permitting system, whereas in
specific permitting, most of the agency’s work is in permit
administration.
The third level of analysis concerns how the agency manages the
transition between general and specific permitting as it searches for
the appropriate balance among the general and specific permitting
characteristics. There are two modes of transition—a “continuum
mode,” in which the agency can more or less move incrementally
between the two extremes as it chooses, and a “discontinuity mode,”
in which moving between the extremes at some point triggers sharp
thresholds regarding the features of one or more of the characteristics
of the permitting system or permit administration.
Table 2 shows how these three levels of analysis fit together,
detailing each of the key features of permitting systems and permit
administration, describing how they vary between the extremes, and
showing the transition mode for each. As explained above, at the
extreme, a general permit is kept distinct from an exemption by its
regulatory orientation and the discretion an agency retains under the
terms of the permit to build more into the process for issuing a permit
on a case-specific basis. For the first distinction, general permits are
regulatory and exemptions are not. For the second distinction, in the
case of permits, but not exemptions, the agency might include in the
permit’s terms demands for information, closer scrutiny of the
proposed project, and performance conditions, among other things.
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Exemptions thus are better thought of as safe harbors—the agency
cannot identify a specific project or action that meets an exemption
and pull it back into the regulatory program on a case-specific basis—
whereas general permits can expand in regulatory scope.
Because general permits have the flexibility of being more or less
general, an agency can adjust many parameters along a continuum to
move away from the quasi-exemption effect of general permits at the
extreme. In doing so, however, the agency runs the risk that as more
parameters move in the direction of specific permitting attributes, at
some point there will be sufficiently particularized agency action that
some features of the permitting system and permit administration
must flip into what are distinctly specific-permitting procedures.
Questions pertaining to whether this flip is desirable, and the
circumstances under which one approach is superior to the other, will
be discussed later in this Article in Parts II and III. First, in the
remainder of this Section we dig deeper into what Table 2 reveals in
terms of the system and administration of regulatory permits.
Table 2. Permitting Systems, Permit Administration, and Transitions
General Permits

Transition

Specific Permits

Permitting System
Agency issues permit

Discontinuities

Applicant requests permit

High agency assessment burden

Continuum

No agency assessment burden

Low regulatory infrastructure

Continuum

High regulatory infrastructure

High promulgation requirements

Discontinuities

Low promulgation requirements

Permit by regulation

Discontinuities

Permit by order

Permit Administration
No factual submission burden

Continuum

High factual submission burden

No agency assessment burden

Continuum

High agency assessment burden

No negotiation of terms

Continuum

High negotiation of terms

Low agency discretion

Continuum

High agency discretion

No public participation

Continuum

High public participation

No agency order

Discontinuities

Requires agency order

No judicial review

Discontinuities

Judicial review available

1. Permitting Systems. We propose five essential characteristics
of permitting systems across which general and specific permitting
differ. The first characteristic is the determination of which party
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initiates the permitting approval process—agency or applicant. In
general permitting at its extreme, the agency issues a general permit
available for all qualifying projects, whereas in specific permitting,
applicants must approach the agency to request a permit.
A second factor is the substantive assessment burden the agency
assumes when establishing the system. In general permitting systems,
to issue a general permit, the agency usually must make substantive
findings about the merits of a general permit it intends to issue, such
as whether the permitted activities are likely to cause significant harm
to protected interests. Setting up a specific-permitting system, by
contrast, involves no agency substantive findings at the extreme—
those are all saved for later during permit administration.
On the other hand, the reverse is true for the third factor—
regulatory infrastructure. Once a general permitting system is
established, it requires relatively little procedural and substantive
infrastructure to move to the permit administration phase. Once the
general permit is issued, minimal additional agency involvement is
required for permit administration. Again, the opposite is true of
specific permitting—which backloads the substantive work to the
permit administration phase, and thus mostly involves erecting an
extensive regulatory infrastructure to support permit administration.
The fourth differentiating characteristic involves promulgation
requirements of the two permit types. Given all that is bundled into a
general permit, the general-permitting system must incorporate
extensive promulgation requirements, such as environmental and
other impact assessment steps, public notice and comment, and
judicial review. Because specific-permitting systems are principally
focused on setting up procedures and standards for later permit
administration, they impose far less of this promulgation burden.
The fifth characteristic is the administrative action by which the
permits are issued. Because general permitting packages much of the
agency’s work at the permitting-system stage, the prototypical
general-permitting system uses rulemakings as its workhorse. In other
words, general permitting involves establishing a rulemaking system
for issuing permits in the form of general promulgations. Specificpermitting systems, because they defer the heavy lifting of permit
issuance to the permit administration stage, use particularized agency
orders as the permit-delivery mechanism. The point of the specificpermitting system, therefore, is to set up the procedures and
standards for running permit administration to issue permits.
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The Corps’ implementation of section 404 permitting aptly
illustrates these distinctions between general- and specific-permitting
systems. Although the Corps’ “nationwide permits” system (a
general-permitting system) produces a simplified and streamlined
permit administration burden for agencies and applicants alike,
promulgating the general permits is a significant burden for the
116
agency. As section 404(e)(1) provides, to issue a general permit, the
Corps must make specified substantive findings about an identified
117
category of activities otherwise prohibited under section 301 —in
other words, that the activities are similar in nature and will have
minimal separate and cumulative effects on the environment. Both
required findings have been points of contention in the Corps’
118
implementation of general permitting. Because the point of general
permitting is to avoid having to make these substantive findings about
each discrete project within the activity category during permit
119
administration, the Corps has established a rulemaking process for
120
issuing general permits and regularly publishes its nationwide
121
general permits in the Federal Register. The Corps’ promulgation
116. For a general overview of the nationwide permitting program, see Davison, supra note
79, passim; William E. Taylor & Kate L. Geoffrey, General and Nationwide Permits, in
WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 151.
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2012) (requiring that the Corps must “determine[] that the
activities . . . are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment” before issuing permits).
118. Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 151, 154–57. The regulations governing proposed
general permits required the Corps to assess “[a]ll factors which may be relevant to the
proposal” including:
[C]onservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands,
historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use,
navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation,
water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs,
considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the
people.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2011).
119. See Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 683 F.3d 1155,
1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A general nationwide permit . . . must undergo that extensive process at
the time the permit is promulgated, rather than at the time an applicant seeks to discharge fill
material under such a permit.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 13-cv-1239, 2013
WL 6009919, at *15 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2013) (“[T]he entire point of the general permitting
system is to avoid the burden of having to conduct an environmental review under [the National
Environmental Protection Act] when a verification—as distinguished from an individual
discharge permit—is sought.”).
120. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.1–.6 (explaining the process for distributing general permits).
121. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (most recent publication of nationwide
permits).
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of each general permit involves compliance with a myriad of impact
122
assessment and public process requirements, and is subject to
judicial review regarding whether the permit satisfies the section
123
404(e) standards as well as all of the promulgation requirements.
Assuming the Corps completes the nationwide permit
promulgation process and withstands any judicial review, the end
result of this permitting system in operation is a ready-made form of
permission—a general permit. It warrants emphasizing, however, that
one should not mistake “general” as meaning “nonregulatory.” There
is no reason why a general permit cannot be a robust regulatory
instrument. The Corps’ suite of nationwide permits, for example,
covers a broad spectrum of activities from relatively trivial projects,
such as minor dredging projects, to more extensive projects, such as
124
certain kinds of mining operations.
Each nationwide permit
incorporates particularized conditions the Corps deems appropriate
to the intensity of the permitted activity, such as the amount of soil
dredged or the areas excluded from eligibility, and all nationwide
permits incorporate a set of general conditions, such as requirements
125
to comply with other applicable laws. Although the level of intensity
of these conditions may be a matter of contention between various
126
interests, our point is that there is plenty of room in general
permitting for agencies to exercise the permit power. The key design
feature of general permitting is that most of the permit power is
exercised by the agency at the permitting-system stage, rather than at
the permit administration stage.
By contrast, the Corps’ permitting system for specific permits,
known as its “individual permits” program, consists entirely of
122. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b); see Sierra Club, 2013 WL 6009919, at *13 (“Under the general
permitting system, the Corps conducts an extensive environmental review and provides the
public with notice and an opportunity to comment regarding categories of construction activity
that the Corps seeks to designate as having minimal impact on waterways within specified
geographical regions.”). See generally Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 157–58 (describing
compliance with, for example, the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Endangered Species Act,
the National Historic Preservation Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act).
123. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 453 F. Supp. 2d
116 (D.D.C. 2006) (describing the nationwide permitting system and rejecting a trade
association’s claims that several nationwide permits had been improperly promulgated).
124. Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 160–69.
125. Id. at 169–80.
126. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (addressing tradeassociation claims that several nationwide permits had been improperly promulgated because of
overly restrictive conditions); see generally COPELAND, supra note 68, at 8 (discussing criticisms
by environmental-protection and industry groups).
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procedural regulations and permit issuance standards. The core of
the procedural regulations consists of explanations of the Corps’
checklist for completeness of a permit application, public notice and
128
hearing procedures, and process review of the application. The
regulatory framework also specifies substantive criteria for permit
issuance under the EPA’s 404(b)(1) guidelines, what the Corps calls
its “public interest review” criteria, and other applicable statutes
requiring agencies to conduct impact evaluations when issuing
129
permits. Although it undoubtedly is helpful to the regulated
community for the Corps to provide these detailed procedural and
substantive regulations, the regulations do not independently provide
any form of permission—permission must await the permit
administration phase.
2. Permit Administration. Once one grasps the differences
between general- and specific-permitting systems, the manner in
which general and specific permit administrations differ is fairly
straightforward. Ideally, administration of a general permit in its
purest form should (1) not require submissions from the regulated
entity seeking the permit authorization; (2) not require further
substantive assessment by the agency; (3) not involve further
negotiation between a regulated entity and the agency; (4) not
involve further exercise of discretion by the agency; (5) not involve
further public participation; (6) not require an agency order; and (7)
not be subject to further judicial review. In essence, the permit has
already been issued as part of the permitting system, with assessment,
negotiation, discretion, public participation, and judicial review
applied at the macro level, so all that is left is for the regulated entity
to use the permit at the micro level. Administration of specific
permits, by contrast, is the opposite: the regulated entity submits a
voluminous set of application materials, the agency engages in a
rigorous assessment, the parties negotiate toward mutually acceptable
terms, the agency makes discretionary decisions about what is
acceptable under the statutory regime, the agency seeks public input
at various stages, the agency issues an order setting out its final
decision, and the order may be the subject of judicial review. In

127. For a general overview of the individual-permits program, see Stephen M. Johnson,
Individual Permits, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 191.
128. Id. at 193–96.
129. Id. at 196–201.
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essence, all that the specific-permitting system accomplishes is setting
the administration process in motion with governing procedures and
130
standards, so that all the work is in the permit administration stage.
This is precisely how the Corps has configured its generalnationwide and specific-individual permitting administrations under
section 404. As one court recently described the nationwide permit
program’s administration:
Many projects undertaken pursuant to a general permit do not even
need to be brought to the Corps’ attention . . . . Even when a general
permit requires that the Corps provide pre-construction
verification, . . . the Corps’ role is limited to determining whether the
project in question does or does not satisfy the terms of the general
permit, and if not, what steps the party seeking verification must
take to bring their project within the ambit of that authorization.
This type of check-in is far less involved than the probing assessment
of the particular facts, circumstances, and environmental
consequences of a specific project proposal that precedes a Corps
determination of whether or not an individual discharge permit
should issue. Put another way, under the nationwide permit system,
the Corps has already done an environmental review on a general
categorical basis and has already given its imprimatur to discharges
that result from the type of construction activity at issue under
specified circumstances. When a prospective permittee files a preclearance notice, the only thing left to be done is for the Corps’
district engineers to verify that the planned project does, in fact, fit
within the category of activities that the Corps has already
131
authorized.

130. Permit administration might also vary with respect to the need for periodic renewal or
revision of the permits. Permit issuance might be a one-time decision by the agency,
permanently authorizing the relevant activity. Alternatively, a permit might only be for a
limited period of time, requiring renewal by the permit holder and possible revisions by the
agency. The nature of the regulated activity might also, in practice, determine whether a permit
is perpetual or temporary. For instance, wetland permits under section 404 authorize the
disposal of dredge or fill material in wetland areas. Once the disposal has occurred, the area
may no longer be considered a wetland and no further section 404 regulation applies. The
permit is therefore only needed once by the regulated party. On the other hand, emissions of
wastes into waters from a point source are often an ongoing activity. So long as the emitter
wishes to continue the regulated activity, it needs a permit on an ongoing basis, and renewals or
revisions may be required. The distinction between one-time and ongoing permits might make a
difference in whether parties face barriers to enter into a regulated activity and how significant
those barriers are. See infra Part II.A.
131. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 27 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citations omitted). Courts have divided over whether an individual actor’s reliance on a general
permit constitutes federal action triggering statutes such as the National Environmental Policy
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Processing of individual permits is another story. As the Corps
has concisely explained:
Processing such permits involves evaluation of individual, project
specific applications in what can be considered three steps: preapplication consultation (for larger projects), formal permit
application
review,
and
decision-making.
Pre-application
consultation usually involves one or several meetings between an
applicant, USACE staff, interested resource agencies (federal, state,
or local), and sometimes the interested public. The basic purpose of
such meetings is to provide for informal discussions about the pros
and cons of a proposal relative to its effects on the aquatic
environment while the applicant is still in the planning process. The
process allows for a consideration of potentially less
environmentally damaging alternatives available to accomplish the
project purpose, to discuss measures for reducing the impacts of the
project, and to inform the applicant of the factors the USACE must
consider in its decision-making process. Once a complete application
is received, the formal review process begins. The project manager
prepares a public notice (if required), evaluates the impacts of the
project and considers all comments received, addresses potential
modifications to the project if appropriate, and drafts or oversees
drafting of appropriate documentation to support a recommended
permit decision. The permit decision document includes a discussion
of the environmental impacts of the project, the findings of the
public interest review process, and any special evaluation required
by the type of activity such as determinations of compliance with the
132
Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.

Once again, these passages describe the extremes of general and
specific permitting—some general permits involve absolutely no
contact with the Corps, and some specific permits potentially involve
133
a long engagement. But not all of the Corps’ work takes place at
these extremes. Indeed, what makes the permit box so flexible is the
Act. Compare Spiller v. Walker, No. A 98 CA 255 SS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18341 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 1998) (finding federal action), with Ouachita Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Bostick, 938 F. Supp.
2d 32, 35–36, 45–46 & 46 n.7 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding no federal action as the project was
properly authorized under the nationwide permits).
132. Individual Permits, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FORT WORTH DIST. (last visited
Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.swf.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Permitting/Individual
Permits.aspx; see generally Johnson, supra note 127, at 191–202 (describing individual permits’
requirements and review procedures under CWA section 404).
133. Recall that the average processing time for general permits in one study was reported
to be 24 days, which includes those general permits with some verification process, whereas for
individual permits it was 187 days. COPELAND, supra note 68, at 2.
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range of possibilities between the extremes. The next Section
describes the mechanisms and consequences of transition from one
extreme to the other.
3. Transitions. A pure general-permitting program frontloads all
substantive decisions to the permitting-system stage, whereas a pure
specific-permitting system backloads them to the permit
administration stage. Illustrating the flexibility that exists for agencies
to move around within the permits box, however, the Corps has built
intermediate mechanisms into its permitting program. For example,
many of its nationwide permits require users to file a preconstruction
notification (PCN) with the Corps prior to taking advantage of the
134
general permit through on-the-ground project development. Under
this check-in process, the Corps then has a certain period of time to
review the PCN and either provide “verification” that the general
permit can be used as promulgated or with additional conditions
135
tailored to the particular project, or decide that the project must
136
exit the nationwide permit and obtain an individual permit. For
some nationwide permits, the PCN requires only a “notice of intent”
to use the general permit, whereas other nationwide permits require
additional information such as wetland delineation maps and impact
137
mitigation plans. The practical effect of the latter kind of PCN, of
course, is to shift more of the general-permitting process from the
permitting-system phase to the permit administration phase, creating
something of a hybrid between pure general and pure specific
permitting.
This brings us to the question of transition. The PCN process
illustrates how an agency can adjust some of the features of the
permitting system and permit administration across a smooth
continuum. For example, the amount of information required with
the PCN, the intensity of agency review, and the opportunity for
negotiation between the parties, can be tweaked incrementally. But
one can easily see how the PCN mechanism, if pushed too far toward

134. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.6 (2011) (“Nationwide permitees may, and in some cases must,
request from a [district engineer] confirmation that an activity complies with the terms and
conditions of an NWP.”).
135. Sierra Club, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
136. See Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 683 F.3d 1155,
1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the PCN verification process); Sierra Club, at *12–13 (same); see
generally Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 181 (same).
137. See Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 180.
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requiring applicant submission and agency assessment, could blur into
a specific-permitting system. To put it another way, a nationwide
permit relying on extensive and burdensome PCN requirements
simply would not be a general permit given its onerous case-specific
requirements. As a practical matter, users of the general permit
would not know their status until after an extensive submission
process and intensive Corps review process, possibly with extensive
negotiation between the parties over conditions. The Corps would
likely want to establish more extensive procedural and substantive
regulations for PCN reviews, and require reviewing officers to issue
decisions with extensive findings and justifications. There are
tradeoffs, in other words, as the agency moves across the permit
design spectrum.
Moreover, as a matter of law, at some points such a process
might cross a threshold from general to specific permitting for other
permitting features not amenable to a smooth continuum, such as the
availability of judicial review and public participation. For example,
courts might perceive the PCN decision as an agency order under the
APA, and thus require the process to undergo adjudicatory processes
not required of rulemakings. Precisely where that discontinuity would
138
occur is difficult to say, but its possibility does impose some drag on
the ease with which an agency can craft intermediate solutions
between pure general-permitting systems and pure specific-permitting
systems. We address these tradeoffs in more detail in Part III.
E. Hybrids and Other Variations
Before leaving our description of the dimensions of permitting in
the administrative state, we should acknowledge that agencies often
have experimented with innovative ways of configuring permits that
do not neatly fit onto the permit spectrum described above. Perhaps
the best example of how important innovative permitting design can
be to the success of a regulatory program is the Endangered Species

138. As noted previously, some courts have held that the act of verifying the applicability of
a nationwide permit, with no additional conditions added, does not convert the PCN process
into a specific permit order, but others have concluded that more intensive review of PCNs
could trigger more demanding processing requirements of the Corps. See supra note 131; see
also Jennifer Seidenberg, Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v.
Environmental Protection Agency: Redefining the Role of Public Participation in the Clean
Water Act, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 699, 718 (2006) (discussing a split among the courts as to when
public notice and comment is required for project-specific use of a CWA pollution general
permit the EPA issued for certain oil and gas operation activities).

RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2014 5:18 PM

174

[Vol. 64:133

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
139

Act (ESA). The congressional politics of the mid-1990s put the ESA
at the top of Congress’s hit list for agency reform. Seeing the writing
on the wall, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt set in motion an
administrative reform agenda that successfully staved off the
140
congressional assault, but which would forever transform the ESA.
Chief among these reforms was the reinvention of a previously littleused permitting program found in section 10(a) of the statute, known
141
colloquially as the habitat conservation plan (HCP) program. An
HCP permit provides an avenue for development projects to obtain
authorization to take a member of a protected species, usually
through habitat modification, in return for mitigation and other
142
measures assembled in a conservation plan. Although Congress
143
added the HCP program in 1982 when it amended the statute, the
144
HCP program had been essentially dormant through the 1980s.
Secretary Babbitt saw the HCP program as a win-win reform
opportunity, however, as he could offer landowners a palatable and
secure way out of their ESA problems—by giving the species some
conserved habitat as mitigation for the modified habitat, the

139. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
140. For a detailed contemporaneous review of the reform agenda items and
implementation, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of
the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 374–87 (1998).
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). For policy discussions of the HCP permit program
written when it was emerging from disuse under Secretary Babbitt’s visionary reform agenda,
see generally J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species
Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991);
Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991). For policy discussions
having the benefit of several years’ experience of program implementation, see generally
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1998) (detailing the strengths and weaknesses of HCPs); Eric
Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the
Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996) (same); Albert C. Lin, Participants’
Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996) (same); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A
Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997) (proposing compensation for
private landowners subject to HCPs).
142. For a “nuts and bolts” description of the HCP-permitting process, see Ruhl, supra note
79, at 376–96. A comprehensive guide is available at Endangered Species Act Document Library,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May 29, 2014), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
index.html#hcp (discussing the HCP-permitting process).
143. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
144. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only 12 HCP permits. DEFENDERS OF
WILDLIFE, supra note 141, at vi–xiii.
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landowner could move forward with the intended uses of the
145
property.
The Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) quickly began issuing
146
permits under the rejuvenated HCP program, which it has since
147
continued. Indeed, through the use of regional HCPs, beginning in
the 1990s large metropolitan areas and states began to solve their
ESA compliance problems through large-scale permits, some of
148
which covered up to hundreds of thousands of acres. The nature of
these regional permits is often hybrid-like, in that the FWS issues
what looks like a specific permit to the state or local entity, but the
terms of the “specific permit” set up a general-permitting regime
under which the state or local government administers what appears
to be a general permit for specified public and private land use
149
activities. Overall, these developments went a long way toward
150
allaying the property rights pushback against the ESA —illustrating
the importance of giving attention to permitting and permit design.
The FWS has continued to develop innovative hybrids of general and
specific permitting, including a permit that would authorize a variety
151
of activities along Florida’s beaches, a permit to facilitate utility-

145. For comprehensive and thoughtful insider accounts of Secretary Babbitt’s vision and
implementation of this phase of ESA reform, see generally John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy
at the Department of Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199 (2001); Joseph L. Sax,
Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary
History, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2375 (2000). For a brief history of the ramp-up of the HCP program
specifically, see Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative
Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 95 (2001).
146. By late 1997, FWS had issued more than 225 HCP permits. See DEFENDERS OF
WILDLIFE, supra note 141, at vi–xiii.
147. For a running tally, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECOS: Conservation Plans and
Agreements Database, ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://
ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
148. See Thornton, supra note 145.
149. For a contemporary account of the emergence of regional permitting in the early 1990s,
see Ruhl, supra note 141, at 1404–06.
150. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 322–23 (discussing skepticism regarding the
government’s ability to protect property rights and the development of HCPs).
151. See Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., http://
www.flbeacheshcp.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
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152

scale wind power generation across large regions of the nation, and
153
guidance on the design of large-scale hybrid “master permits.”
Examples like the FWS’s permit innovations demonstrate that
there is considerable space within the permits box for moving
between the extremes of general and specific permits and inventing
154
new combinations of permit attributes. The question thus becomes
how to navigate this space in a way that most effectively achieves the
goals of the relevant statute and avoids the pitfalls of the permit
155
power Professor Epstein identified. This question leads directly to
the topic of the next Section—the use of rulemaking versus
adjudication in agency decisions.
F. Rulemaking and Adjudication
The general- and specific-permitting processes, for purposes of
the APA, fall right on the border between rulemaking and
adjudication. When a permit becomes specific enough, it has to be
156
issued through adjudication to produce an agency “order.” The
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is an old chestnut in
the administrative law literature, and historically an important issue
in agency practice. From the New Deal until the 1960s, agencies
predominantly used adjudication for decisionmaking; in the 1960s and
1970s, in response to a series of critiques by academics, practitioners,
judges, and policymakers of adjudication, they moved more toward
157
rulemaking.
Since the 1970s, scholars and practitioners have
debated the pros and cons of each tool.

152. See Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Habitat Conservation Plan for
Commercial Wind Energy Developments Within Nine States, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,512, 42,512 (July
14, 2011).
153. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMITS
COVERING MULTIPLE PROJECTS OR PROJECT OWNERS (Apr. 30, 2013) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
154. See also David Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 376–80, 393–401 (1994) (discussing efforts by state agencies to
improve permitting through design innovations).
155. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part I.D.2.
157. Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 574 (1970); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s
Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139,
1145 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REG., July–
Aug. 1981, at 25, 25.
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Permits, as we have described them, fit uneasily in this
dichotomy. As many have noted, the border between a rulemaking
158
and an adjudication is not pellucid, and their definitions in the APA
159
are far from helpful. But permits—particularly general permits—
further emphasize the fact that there is truly a continuum between
rulemaking and adjudication. Permits are hybrid tools—general
permits may have more of the characteristics of rulemaking because
they are framed as a general statement about the performance
capabilities of a wide class of people, and specific permits may have
more of the characteristics of adjudications because they focus on the
160
rights of an individual actor. But given the ways in which different
permits can be “tweaked” to be more general or more specific in
character, it may be quite tricky to identify whether any one permit
program is more like rulemaking or more like adjudication. Although
scholars have on occasion briefly noted the possibility of hybrid forms
161
of rulemaking and adjudication, they have not engaged deeply with

158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 770 (1969) (“The line between
these two functions is not always a clear one and in fact the two functions merge at many
points.”); William D. Araiza, Limits on Agency Discretion to Choose Between Rulemaking and
Adjudication: Reconsidering Patel v. INS and Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 899,
908 (2006) (“Adjudicative and rulemaking procedures often feature similar characteristics, and
orders and regulations often have similar affects.”); Warren E. Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc
Approach – Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658, 658 (1957) (noting that
“the demarcation between the two has become somewhat blurred”); Bernstein, supra note 157,
at 610 (“One might say . . . that defining the differences between rule making and adjudication
defies comprehension and expression.”); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965).
159. The APA defines “rule making” as the “agency process for formulating, amending, or
repealing a rule,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012), and an “adjudication” as the “agency process for the
formulation of an order, id. § 551(7). Those two terms, in turn, are not well defined. Compare 5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy” including rate-setting and ratemaking proceedings), with § 551(6) (defining “order” as
“the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or
declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing”).
160. See Bernstein, supra note 157, at 613–15 (agreeing); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 924
(identifying the distinction that rulemaking “is typically a proceeding that is entirely open ended
in form, specifying only the class of persons or practices that will come within its scope, while
‘adjudication’ is a proceeding directed at least in part at determining the legal status of persons
who are named as parties, or of the acts or practices of those persons”).
161. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1398–99 (2004) (describing some possible intermediate examples such as negotiated
rulemaking, waivers of rules, and agency litigation strategies); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 924
(noting wide range of informal tools available to an agency to make policy that do not easily fit
into rulemaking-versus-adjudication categories); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 256–57
(describing adjudicatory exception process for oil price regulation in the 1970s that created
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what hybridity is and what it might mean for regulatory practice.
General permits in particular, allow us to engage deeply with those
questions. In the next Part we discuss some of the pros and cons of
general versus specific permits, and in doing so, identify different
ways in which our analysis of general versus specific permits matches
up with the historic depictions of the strengths and weaknesses of
rulemaking versus adjudication.
II. PERMIT-DESIGN TRADEOFFS: GENERAL VERSUS SPECIFIC
Why would a regulatory program use general or specific permits,
or grant a complete exemption from permit requirements? At heart,
these questions come down to two factors: the risk of harm the
permitted activity poses, and the level of burden the transaction costs
of a general- or specific-permitting program impose on the regulated
parties and the agency. Higher risk of harm generally justifies more
specific permit requirements. Conversely, more burdensome
transaction costs generally support more general permit
requirements. General permits are perhaps most useful when they
allow for reduced burdens on regulated parties or for reduced
political resistance for a regulatory program, without changing the
underlying substantive regulatory standards, and when the harm
posed by the actions covered by the general permit is minimal.
We play out these two factors through the following specific
permit design policy goals and attributes: permits as barriers to entry
into economic or other activity, permits as tools to gather information
for the regulatory agency, permits as tools to tailor regulation to the
specific circumstances of the permitted activity, permits as
enforcement tools, and the political constraints on permitting and
regulatory systems.
A. Permits as Barriers to Entry
Permits are generally pre-conditions to undertaking a regulated
162
activity. As such, they effectively act as barriers to entry for that
activity. These barriers to entry can be significant. Permitting can
impose substantial costs in the form of paperwork, information
broad categories of relief, similar to general permits). For a discussion of the difficulties
presented when multiple agencies take roles in adjudicatory, permitting, or hybrid processes,
see Bijal Shah, Hidden Administrative Coordination, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
162. But note the possibility that general permits might allow for activity to occur without
preclearance by the regulatory agency.
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gathering, legal fees, and administrative charges. Those costs will not
be evenly distributed, nor will they have even impacts on various
economic actors.
First, permitting costs often provide a substantial advantage to
incumbents in an economic field. Sometimes this is an artifact of the
underlying regulatory scheme that imposes stricter standards on new
entrants to a field than those on existing participants. But even if the
regulatory standards on their face apply equally to existing and new
participants in an activity, that does not mean that their burdens are
in fact equal. There will often be substantial fixed costs and
investments in a permitting system. For instance, there will be a
learning curve as an organization determines what aspects of its
operations require permitting, as it confronts how it needs to adjust
its existing or planned operations to comply with the relevant
regulatory standards, and as it collects information to complete the
163
permit applications and fills out and submits the permits. Once the
first permit has been obtained, it is likely to be much simpler and
easier to renew a permit because most of the information has already
been collected and developed, and the organization has learned how
to manage the permitting process. At the extreme, if a permit is only
required to enter into an economic activity, but then has an indefinite
duration, existing participants will never need to apply for a new
permit, and the permitting system will operate as a significant barrier
164
to entry.
Many scholars have noted the important political economy
surrounding regulatory barriers to entry. Existing regulated parties
will see barriers to entry as a way to create cartels, exclude new
entrants to the field, and allow the collection of monopoly rents.
Existing regulated parties will therefore be willing to pay substantial
165
amounts to obtain barriers to entry. These costs might take the form
of lobbying efforts to create or maintain regulatory barriers to entry

163. See Thomas J. Dean & Robert L. Brown, Environmental Regulation as a Barrier to the
Formation of Small Manufacturing Establishments: A Longitudinal Examination, 40 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 56, 71 (2000) (finding that firms in industrial areas with higher regulatory
burdens on average had larger size, and noting importance of “firm learning, past experience in
solving environmental problems” in determining costs of regulatory compliance).
164. This is largely the story of state occupational licensing boards, which have been likened
to cartels in all but name given, among other behaviors, the high barrier to entry the licensing
requirement erects. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 69.
165. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754–61 (1999) (describing this dynamic).
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(through the legislative or regulatory process); alternatively,
industries might be willing to pay significant costs in the form of
strengthened regulatory standards (such as higher pollution control
166
requirements) in return for obtaining these barriers to entry.
Second, not all regulated parties will be equally able to bear
permitting costs. The more that permitting costs are fixed (invariant
on the level of production by the firm), the more they are a burden on
small actors. This is often the case, for the reasons indicated above:
the costs of determining what permits are required and how most
effectively to secure them will often have a high fixed component, and
the difficulty of filling out forms and compiling the relevant
167
information will also often have a high fixed component. These
fixed costs may impose a significant economic burden on small
168
firms. To the extent that we are concerned about deterring or
reducing economic activity by small businesses, this is a significant
169
concern. Small businesses also tend to have substantial rhetorical

166. For a discussion of this dynamic in the context of environmental law, see, for example,
Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., Fall 1996, at 26, 27; Daniel
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 62–63 (1992);
Wiener, supra note 165, at 754–61.
167. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 59 (“Research suggests that smaller
organizations, without the specialized resources to cope with regulatory compliance obligations,
may be more severely impacted by regulations. The costs of discovering and interpreting
relevant regulations, dealing with regulatory agencies, and performing necessary paperwork
appear to have a large fixed-cost component that increases the scale necessary for effective
compliance. Smaller firms, without the ability to spread these administrative costs over higher
production volumes, incur a penalty in the form of higher per-unit production costs.”). With
respect to the costs of determining the nature and scope of regulations, costs can be fixed
because often “the cost of interpreting a regulation does not depend on who is interpreting it.”
C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions
from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 8 (2004). This is also true for the cost of
researching which regulations apply. Similarly, permits often impose “reporting and
recordkeeping requirements” in which a substantial amount of the cost is fixed: “the number of
reports required and the time necessary to complete the reports” often may not “vary with the
size of the business.” Id. at 9–10. In filling out permits or reports, the firm must “learn exactly
what the regulation requires, develop a form to collect the required information, train the firm’s
employees to collect the data, and develop a monitoring system to ensure that the company
complies.” Id. at 10.
168. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 56 (finding that firms in industrial areas with
higher regulatory burdens on average had larger size).
169. There are many claims that small businesses produce a disproportionate share of the
innovation and job creation in the American economy, but these claims are hotly disputed. See,
e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate
Capital”, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 85–86 (2006) (arguing that small businesses produce innovation
and jobs); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory
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appeal in politics, and thus imposing burdens on them might be
170
politically unappealing. Entrants in a new field may well be small
actors, for example, if they are entrepreneurs, rather than an
established company entering into a new field of business. Thus, fixed
permitting costs may both differentially harm small actors and deter
171
entry into an industry or other area of economic activity.
General permits are a way of reducing the fixed costs of
permitting by making those costs less significant without necessarily
172
relaxing the underlying substantive regulatory standards. They can
do that directly by reducing information requirements (for example,
173
by making permit applications simpler and shorter). They can also
do that indirectly by eliminating the need for agency approval before
the regulated activity commences (for instance, in the context of

Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 551–57 (1998) (rebutting claims that small
businesses produce innovation and jobs).
170. See, e.g., Tamara Keith, Small Businesses Get Big Political Hype. What’s the Reality?,
NPR (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/04/18/150822919/smallbusinesses-get-big-political-hype-whats-the-reality.
171. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 76 (noting possibility of constrained entry into
industrial fields with high regulatory burdens because of increased costs on small actors).
172. Id. at 72 (“Efforts to streamline environmental requirements at the federal, state and
local level would . . . reduce unit cost disparities created by administrative economies of scale
that appear to be inherent in environmental regulation.”).
Of course, one can also simply provide exemptions from the underlying regulatory
framework. This will not only eliminate the fixed costs imposed by a permit requirement, but
also fixed costs that might result from the substantive regulatory requirements. See Bradford,
supra note 167 (arguing that in general, exemptions for small businesses from regulatory
requirements will be cost-benefit justified because of the existence of fixed costs).
173. Scholars, judges, and agency heads in general agree that standards that are set through
rulemaking are more transparent, easier for outsiders to assess and comply with, and therefore
impose lower information costs on regulated parties and the public than standards that are set
through adjudication. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 158, at 911 (noting that rulemaking prevents
agencies from relitigating issues in every case); Baker, supra note 158, at 662 (noting that rules
provide “definitive guides to agency action”); Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163
(1986) (“The articulation of a generally applicable rule provides greater clarity to those affected
as well as greater uniformity in enforcement.”); Bernstein, supra note 157, at 584–85 (describing
difficulty of labor lawyers in keeping up with NLRB decisions and how these decisions change
policy); Magill, supra note 161, at 1396 (discussing advantages to rulemaking); Scalia, supra note
157, at 26 (noting that the prospective nature of rulemaking also leads to expansive statutory
interpretation); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 940–41 (describing difficulty of labor lawyers in
keeping up with NLRB decisions and how these decisions change policy); Peter L. Strauss,
Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the
Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1238–43
(1974) (discussing the lack of information available to the public from the Bureau of Land
Management’s adjudicatory system).
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notices of intent). General permits can even eliminate any need for
a permit application—such as when the regulated party may proceed
without any application or notice to the regulatory agency so long as
175
its activities do not exceed certain thresholds.
On the other hand, there may be times when we actually wish to
impose barriers to entry on certain activities through the use of
permit requirements. More costly specific permit systems can serve as
costly screens that deter activities that might have a significant
likelihood of producing high social costs but have low social or
176
private benefits. By imposing a fixed cost on those seeking to
pursue the activity, costly permit requirements ensure that at least
some minimum level of private benefit is likely to be produced in
return for the potential harms created by the socially risky activity.
This would screen out a wide range of potential activities that might
177
pose significant harm with minimal private benefits. For instance,
someone who is filling a wetland to construct a structure with minimal
economic or personal benefit will be encouraged by a costly permit
system to construct that structure elsewhere, without the harm to the
178
wetland area, or at least with reduced harm.

174. In a notice-of-intent system, such as the PCN system described for section 404 general
permits, a general permit applicant need only provide notice to the agency of the proposed
activity, and can proceed with the activity unless the agency moves to halt it. See supra text
accompanying notes 135–39.
175. As we discussed earlier, this last situation is for practical purposes more or less the
same as a complete exemption from regulation. See supra note 87.
176. For discussions of the concept, see generally, for example, Jonathan S. Masur, Costly
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010) (applying the concept to
patent applications, arguing that the administrative costs of patent review screen out low-value
patents); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (applying the concept to judicial review of agency action, and
arguing that agencies can signal to courts that an agency action that is under judicial review has
high social value by expending significant resources on preparing administrative records for the
court to review).
177. See Masur, supra note 176, at 722–23 (applying costly screen concept to pollution
permits).
178. For example, the Corps has justified its use of general permits in part on the rationale
that the lower permit burdens of the general permits create incentives for actors to avoid harm
to wetlands so that they can qualify for the general permit, and avoid the costly process of
applying for an individual, specific permit. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision
Document: Nationwide Permit 39, at 7, 23 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf
(describing
a
general permit that allows commercial and industrial development so long as the total wetlands
impact is less than half an acre); id. at 7 (“Another important benefit of the NWP program . . . is
the incentive for project proponents to design their projects so that those activities meet the
terms and conditions of an NWP. The Corps believes the NWPs have significantly reduced
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Costly screens might be particularly useful in situations in which
individually small actions that have relatively small private benefits
produce disproportionate social harm. This might be because small
actors produce greater social harm per unit of activity than larger
179
actors. Or it might be because we are concerned about the
cumulative impacts of many small, individual actions. The cumulative
impacts might produce feedback or threshold effects such that the
total social harm from the total of all the small actions is larger than
180
the sum of the harm from each individual, small action. Cumulative
impacts are often an important issue in environmental harm, for
instance, when biological systems may have become stressed by prior
human impacts and are particularly susceptible to future, additional
impacts, even if small. An endangered species might be pushed over
the edge to extinction by a small harm that would be trivial for an
abundant species. In this situation, we would be interested in
181
screening out the relatively small action.
Of course there are limits to the utility of specific permit systems
as costly screens. First, personal benefits may not be well correlated
with social benefits; in other words, it is possible that some activities
have low personal benefits but high social benefits (large positive
externalities). The private regulated party seeking the permit will
only take into account the lack of personal benefits in making the
decision not to proceed, or to choose an alternate path; as a result,
even though the activity should occur from a societal perspective, the
permit requirement will lead the private actor to forego the activity.
Reciprocally, there may be high private benefits from the activity, but
low social benefits—often because of negative externalities from the
activity. If those negative externalities are not the ones covered by the
permit requirement, then the costly screen will not prevent the harm.
For instance, in the wetlands example above, the proposed activity in
the wetland might be extremely lucrative to the regulated party, and
therefore might be pursued even though it might produce other social
adverse effects to the aquatic environment because most applicants modify their projects to
comply with the NWPs and avoid the delays and costs typically associated with the individual
permit process.”).
179. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 557–60 (making this claim).
180. See Masur, supra note 176, at 723–24 (noting the utility of costly screens in reducing
cumulative impacts).
181. Thus, the benefits of regulation will not necessarily be proportional to the size of the
activity regulated; regulating even small activities may produce large benefits in certain
circumstances. See Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84. Contra Bradford, supra note 167, at 16
(arguing that the total benefit of pollution control depends on the size of the output regulated).
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harms, such as large amounts of air pollution from the structure. The
section 404 wetlands permit program regulates the harms caused to
water resources from the activity, but if other harms from the activity
are not regulated (for example, if there are no regulatory
requirements for air pollution), the costly screen of wetlands permit
requirements might not deter the owner and the activity will proceed,
making society worse off.
Second, the analysis above only looks at average levels of
benefits and costs. Some activities may have a low probability of
producing high social benefits. The expected value of the activity
might be less than the fixed costs of the permit requirement, such that
actors are deterred from engaging in the activity by the costly screen.
However, if society is willing to take the risk of a low probability of
high social benefits, we might want to encourage the activity to occur
despite the negative expected value.
The concerns about the differential impacts of permitting
requirements have motivated a wide range of statutory and
regulatory general permit systems, and even complete regulatory
exemptions, to reduce the regulatory burdens for small businesses or
182
small actors and to reduce barriers to entry. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has created streamlined filing and
disclosure forms for smaller firms that are subject to SEC securities
183
regulations. These streamlined provisions are intended to respond
to criticisms that the securities laws’ filing and disclosure
requirements impose large fixed costs on businesses, making it

182. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 542–43 (describing widespread special treatment for small
businesses in federal and state regulatory systems). Throughout this Part, we will at times draw
on both statutory and administrative exemptions as well as general permit systems as examples
in our analysis, in part because the same policy goals might be met with both exemptions and
general permits. Moreover, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between the two. For
instance, in the context of securities regulation, the basic rule is that securities must be
registered before they can be traded. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (6th ed. 2009). An exemption from the registration requirement
might be seen as an exemption from the regulatory system overall. On the other hand, in many
cases the unregistered security must still meet other substantive standards in the securities laws,
in which case the waiving of the registration requirement is more of a general permit.
Substantive standards must still be met, but the paperwork faced by the issuer or securities
holder is reduced by eliminating the registration requirement.
183. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 3.4(4)(D) (describing “streamlined disclosure
requirements” for smaller public companies). The provisions are generally available to
companies providing up to $75 million in public equity float. Id. The provisions do not exempt
the companies from any of the reporting or disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws. Id.
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infeasible for smaller entities to obtain capital funding through public
184
offerings. These streamlined forms do not change the underlying
regulatory requirements for the firms under the various securities
laws. There is also a range of statutory and administrative exemptions
from some of the filing and disclosure requirements under the federal
securities laws. Those exemptions allow relatively small issuers of
securities to provide minimal or no filings to the SEC or disclosures to
185
purchasers. Again, the rationale has been the need to reduce the
186
burden of regulatory compliance on small businesses.
Finally, the three-tiered permit system for hard rock mining on
federal lands that is administered by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), was in part explicitly developed to reduce
burdens on small mining operators. The BLM explicitly exempted
miners in the “casual use” category from any notice or permitting
requirements, and also only required miners who disturbed less than
five acres of public lands with their mining activities to file a notice
with the agency about their proposed actions—with the burden then
falling on the agency to object within a specified time and require a
184. See id.; Campbell, supra note 169, at 88–92 (2006) (describing how compliance costs for
registering public securities offerings will disproportionately affect small offerings, and
therefore make many offerings uneconomical); id. at 91–92 (“Registration has never been a
viable way for small businesses to raise capital. High transaction costs associated with registered
offerings inevitably put registration out of the range of small businesses in search of capital.”).
185. Regulation A is an exception from the registration requirement for issuance of
securities that are less than $5 million in any given year; the issuer must still provide some
disclosure information to the SEC and to the public. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.17; 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.151–.263 (2014). Regulation D provides for a series of exceptions from the
registration requirement for small-volume issues of securities, generally with limited filing and
disclosure requirements to the SEC and to the prospective purchasers. See HAZEN, supra note
182, § 4.19; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506. Statutory exceptions are in sections 3 and 4 of the 1933
Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c-d. The most recent of these is the JOBS Act, in which
Congress provided relaxed filing and disclosure requirements for “crowdfunding” of small
businesses via the Internet. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.17B; 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6).
For an overview of all of the exceptions, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Small
Business and the SEC, http:///www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm. Although these
exceptions do change many of the underlying substantive regulatory standards of the securities
laws, they are not full exemptions from those laws. For instance, issuers of these securities can
still be liable under various antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See HAZEN, supra
note 182, § 4.1[2].
186. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.15 (describing the history of these exemptions). For
instance, the JOBS Act, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), was specifically developed by
Congress to reduce the regulatory burden on small, start-up businesses using crowdfunding to
raise capital. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1370540017677#.UwRlYfldWSo.
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full permit application. Only the largest operations would be
188
required to file a full plan of operations for the BLM’s approval.
The BLM stated that the reason for this tiered system was to
minimize “the adverse impact of the rulemaking on the small
189
operator.” Nonetheless, all operators were still required to meet the
fundamental regulatory standard for mining operations on public
lands: avoiding unnecessary or undue degradation of the public
190
lands.
B. Permits as a Tool for Revealing or Developing Information
Essential to the concept of specific permits is the detailed level of
applicant-specific information required for the completion of the
permit application. This allows for the tailoring of the permit to the
circumstances of the particular applicant—either in determining
whether the permit should be issued, or in determining the scope and
parameters of the permit itself. Specific permits allow the agency to
extract information about the activities being permitted, the parties
seeking permits, and the harms and benefits that the permitted
activities might be producing. The regulator might be able to
cumulate the information collected from the full universe of permit
applications to get a sense of the overall shape of the regulatory
program, and of the activities the program regulates. Aggregation of
data in this way can allow for an understanding of how widespread
particular impacts from permitted programs are (for example, how
many wetlands have been developed in a geographic area over the
past ten years) and where those impacts are located (for example, a
map of where the development of wetlands has occurred and whether
certain watersheds are particularly impacted by the development).
Aggregation can give a sense of the net costs and benefits of an

187. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.10, 3809.21 (2013).
188. Id. § 3809.11.
189. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902,
78,902 (Nov. 26, 1980) (noting that many commentators expressed a concern that more
burdensome regulation “would limit activities on the Federal lands by the smaller operators and
would result in their being put out of business”); id. (“For example, at the lowest level of
activity, prospectors or part-time miners who cause only negligible surface disturbance will not
need to contact the Bureau of Land Management.”).
190. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.415; Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws,
45 Fed. Reg. at 78,908 (stating that in all cases operators “must not cause unnecessary or undue
degradation”). Other requirements, such as specific performance standards or the requirement
to post a financial guarantee to ensure that postmining reclamation can be paid for, do vary
from tier to tier. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.415, 3809.420, 3809.500.
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overall regulatory program. Data aggregation can also allow
regulators to get a sense of which parties are seeking permits and
which parties are being granted or denied permits. This might allow
for an understanding of the distributional impacts of a regulatory
program on regulated parties (for example, are small permit
applicants disproportionately having their permits denied?). As noted
above, distributional impacts may be a significant issue for a
regulatory program.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the information that is
gathered will be effectively used, or that the agency will even
cumulate the data across permit applicants. For instance, the
environmental review process under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) often requires permit applicants to collect and
present detailed information about the possible impacts of the activity
191
for which they are seeking a permit. The environmental review
process can thus be seen as an expansion of the information
requirements for the permitting process, and a significant increase in
the complexity and difficulty of any specific-permitting system. There
is ample evidence, however, that federal agencies do not do very
much with the information compiled by the NEPA process after they
192
have made the decision to grant or deny the permit. Nor do federal
agencies generally cumulate the information across environmental
review documents to get a sense of overall status or trends of a range
193
of permitted activities. As such, many observers have noted that
federal agencies are losing a tremendous opportunity to use the data
produced by the NEPA process to improve environmental
194
decisionmaking.
191. When a federal regulatory agency issues a permit, the granting of the permit becomes a
federal action that triggers environmental review under NEPA. See NEPA Compliance, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 22, 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/WATER.NSF/
34090d07b77d50bd88256b79006529e8/fe7c90b6e62c946c882569530056d925!OpenDocument.
The scope of the review generally encompasses the full range of impacts caused by the proposed
permitted activity, even if that activity is being pursued by a nongovernmental actor. See 40
C.F.R. § 6.605(a)(1) (2002) (“When determining the significance of a proposed new source’s
impact, the responsible official shall consider both its short term and long term effects as well as
its direct and indirect effects . . . .”).
192. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (2002).
193. See Daniel Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Risk Assessments: Learning from
NEPA’s flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,605, 10,610–12 (2009) (noting lack of
central repository or digitization of NEPA documentation).
194. See id., at 10,610–12; Karkkainen, supra note 192, at 923; see also Joseph F.C. DiMento
& Helen Ingram, Science and Environmental Decision Making: The Potential Role of
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General permits, on the other hand, by definition require less
information from the applicant than specific permits. On average
then, general permits will provide less information to the agency than
195
a specific permit. This has been a significant concern with the
general permit systems under the CWA. A study of the application of
one section 404 general permit in northern California that covered
the filling of “isolated” or “headwaters” wetlands concluded that
there was a “black hole” of information about the use of the permit,
including a dearth of information on how many activities that were
covered by the permit were actually reported to the agency (even
196
when reporting was required).
There was also very little
information in the permit about the quality and nature of the
wetlands affected by the wetland fills, which prevented an assessment
of the cumulative environmental harms caused by the permitted
197
activities.
Environmental Impact Assessment in the Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 283, 300–03 (2005) (calling for creating central NEPA clearinghouses to allow
the accumulation of information across multiple review documents).
195. This is in contrast with the general conclusions drawn by the literature on rulemaking
and adjudication, in which rulemaking is generally seen as more effective in gathering and
assessing information about how a particular regulatory program is operating. See Bernstein,
supra note 157, at 588, 618 (rulemaking “affords greater opportunity for data collection (and the
clear enunciation of policy for ready transmittal to the affected public)”); Ralph F. Fuchs,
Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 83, 94
(1977) (“The advantages of rule making include . . . the possibility of assembling all relevant
information from a variety of sources at that time.”); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of
Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 503–04 (1970) (noting that scholars have stated that
rulemaking is based on “legislative facts” about general conditions in society and adjudication
on “adjudicative facts” particular to the individual parties); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 295
(describing problems with information collection and analysis for the adjudicatory exceptions
process for oil price regulation in the 1970s).
196. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 637–40 (quoting a Corps official as conceding
that the agency has little information about the scope or impact of the program, and noting that
the estimates of usage under the program that do exist “appear[] to rest heavily on
speculation”).
197. See id. at 637–40 (noting that as of the early 1990s there was “little information
available on the magnitude of wetland alterations permitted” under Nationwide Permit 26). For
other examples of the lack of information about the scope or impacts of the section 404 general
permit system, see Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232,
1257–59 (D. Wyo. 2005) (noting lack of cumulative impacts analysis for section 404 general
permit because of agency’s inability to do analysis until it has specific proposed activities under
that permit), and U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 39, at
22 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_39_2012.pdf (stating that, for cumulative effects based on one particular section 404
general permit, “it is not possible to quantify the relative contributions of the various activities
that affect the quantity of wetlands, streams, and other aquatic resources and the functions they
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Nevertheless, general permits may still be a good regulatory
choice to increase the provision of information. First, if the legal or
political realities are such that the only realistic alternative to a
general permit is a full-blown exemption for the relevant activity, the
general permit can provide more information than an exemption. For
instance, even requiring that minimal information be provided (such
as a notice of intent by a private actor that it is proceeding with an
198
activity covered by a general permit) gives more information to a
regulatory agency than an exemption for which there is no such
requirement. A notice of intent can at least give the agency a sense of
how many actors are taking advantage of a general permit provision,
199
and a rough idea of the relative impacts of those actions.

provide, because such data are not available at the national scale,” and providing a very general
overview of potential impacts from the proposed general permit).
198. Both the section 404 general permit program and the NPDES general permit program
require many (but not all) applicants for general permits to file notices of intent. See, e.g.,
Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (reissuing of section 404
nationwide permits, including requirements for many permits for preconstruction notices to be
filed with the Corps before work is initiated); General Permit Requirements and Reporting
Requirements for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg.
11,394, 11,397–98, 11,406 (Apr. 2, 1992) (requiring notices of intent for many sources, but not
for small discharges with minimal impacts, as the EPA explicitly relies on information gathering
as the justification for the notice-of-intent requirement); EPA Construction General Permit,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 5, 2014), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/cgp.cfm
(regulating stormwater discharges from construction activities, such as clearing, grading, and
excavating, that disturb one or more acres, or smaller sites that are part of a larger
development). The EPA’s framework regulations for NPDES general permits require a notice
of intent to be filed for all general permits unless exempted by the agency. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.28(b)(2) (2002). Exemptions can occur only for certain kinds of sources, and only if the
agency makes specific findings. Id.
199. For instance, an upper-bound estimate of the impacts of actions can be made by
multiplying the total number of notices of intent by the maximum amount of impacts that are
permitted under the general permit provision. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision
Document:
Nationwide
Permit
39,
33
(Feb.
13,
2012),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf (using historic
data of total number of activities reported under a section 404 general permit, and average to
maximum amount of impacts from each of those activities, to estimate total impacts and
required mitigation from that permit). The EPA, which sets guidelines that the Corps is
required to follow in developing its section 404 general permit program, mandates these kinds
of estimates when the Corps develops a general permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.7(b)(3). The BLM
also has argued that its requirements that many small mining operators provide the agency prior
notice of their activities would provide useful information about mining activities and impacts
on public lands, information that would not be available from a complete exemption from
regulation. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902,
78,902, 78,904 (Nov. 26, 1980); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew
Dorchak, Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55
ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2003).

RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2014 5:18 PM

190

[Vol. 64:133

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Second, general permits can allow agencies to focus their
energies, and the energies of permit applicants, on the information
that is most useful to the regulatory program, rather than waste
energy on collecting information that is unnecessary or redundant.
For instance, generic drugs have a streamlined permitting process;
unlike new drugs, which must provide clinical data on the drug’s
safety and efficacy, generic drug applications must only demonstrate
that the generic is “bioequivalent (i.e., performs in the same manner
200
as the innovator drug).” Because the original name-brand drug has
already shown its safety and efficacy, requiring that information
would be redundant and would impose needless obstacles on the
provision of cheaper generic drugs. Alternatively, information may
already have been collected and assessed under a different regulatory
permit program, on which a general permit program could
201
piggyback.
C. Permits as Tools to Tailor Regulation to Specific Circumstances
By definition, more specific permits allow for more tailoring of
the permit to the specific circumstances of the applicant, the

200. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7) (2013) (requiring a showing of bioequivalence in
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)); 21 C.F.R. § 320 (describing bioavailability and
bioequivalence requirements).
201. Many of the section 404 general permits are justified by the Corps as avoiding
duplication with other regulatory programs that have already assessed the environmental harms
of a regulated action. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide
Permit 8, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
nwp/2012/NWP_08_2012.pdf (oil and gas structures on the Outer Continental Shelf, justified on
the basis that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management already regulates environmental
impacts); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 21, at 2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_21_2012.pdf (surface coal mining activities, justified on the basis that environmental
impacts are already regulated under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 27, at 2 (2012), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_27_2012.pdf
(aquatic
restoration projects, in which the projects have already been approved by other conservation
agencies); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 49, at 2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_49_2012.pdf (coal mining activities, justified on the basis that environmental impacts are
already regulated under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 50, at 2 (2012), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_50_2012.pdf (same); see
also 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(f)(2) (2011) (defining a general permit as available when it would
“avoid[] unnecessary duplication of the regulatory control exercised by another Federal, state,
or local agency provided it has been determined that the environmental consequences of the
action are individually and cumulatively minimal”).
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particular activity being approved, or the particular location of the
202
regulated activity. Tailoring might involve: specific findings about
the applicant or the activity before an approval is granted; constraints
on the activity as conditions of the granted permit; or requirements
for mitigation of the harms caused by the activity, among others.
The question thus becomes at what point does the ability to
tailor a specific permit make a specific permit more useful than a
general permit. Tailoring through specific permits necessarily imposes
costs—informational costs, administrative costs, transaction costs, and
potentially even litigation costs—and therefore, tailoring will only be
worthwhile if the costs of tailoring are outweighed by the benefits of
203
tailoring.
The benefits of tailoring stem from being able to reduce harms
and increase benefits by carefully deciding whether an activity should
proceed and, if so, under what terms. This means that the risks of
harms must be high, and can be decreased through tailoring, or that
the potential of benefits from a proposed activity must be high, and
those benefits can be increased through tailoring. In those
circumstances, decreasing risks or increasing benefits through careful
permit design can be socially worthwhile. On the other hand, if
activities will individually have relatively small risks of harm or
potential for benefits, the impacts on those risks or benefits through
204
careful tailoring will be relatively small. Thus, general permits make
202. This is one of the more important benefits of adjudication in general. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); Baker, supra note 158, at 661 (“Where the particular
problem is ‘so specialized’ or so dependent for solution on the various complex factual
situations presented as to render it ‘impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general
rule,’ the ad hoc approach is necessary.”); Schuck, supra note 3, at 235 (noting utility of
adjudication in focusing on the particular characteristics of individual actors).
203. See C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions, 72 U. MO. KANSAS CITY
L. REV. 857 (2004) (noting that one cost of varying regulatory levels among different parties will
be creating costs for regulated parties, agencies, and third parties to determine what level of
regulation properly applies to a particular regulated party).
204. In determining whether it is the risks of harm or the potential for benefits that matter
for assessing whether tailoring is important, we focus on why we have the regulatory program in
the first place. If the program focuses on preventing harm, then it is whether the risks of harm
are large and controllable in that matter; if the program focuses on providing benefits, then it is
the potential for benefits that matter; and of course, for some programs both will be relevant.
Another way in which the level of harm or benefit might affect the choice of general
versus specific permits is if the resource being allocated through a permit is extremely limited,
and we want to ensure that the resource is equally distributed among a limited number of
claimants, or the resource is distributed to the most deserving of those claimants. (One classic
example of this is the distribution of permits to operate taxis in major metropolitan areas.) In
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a lot more sense when either the risks of harm or the potential benefit
from an activity are relatively small; or when the risks of harm or the
potential benefit are invariant no matter what tailoring is undertaken.
205
In both situations, tailoring will generally not be beneficial.
We can see this kind of analysis present in various general permit
programs. As explained in Part I, for example, the provision of the
CWA that allows for general permits in the section 404 regulatory
program lays out specific requirements that must be met for a general
permit to be issued. The agency must “determine[] that the activities
in [the] category [to be covered by a general permit] are similar in
nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse
206
effects on the environment.” The last two requirements (minimal
individual and cumulative adverse environmental effects) follow from
the above analysis—the program is focused on preventing harm to the
environment, but if there is minimal harm, there is no need for careful
207
analysis because harm cannot be reduced very much. The first
this case, a “first come, first served” general permit system may not be appropriate, and we
instead might choose to use a specific permit system that allows us to distribute permits to use
the limited resource to whichever applicants “best” deserve to use the resource, however
defined.
205. Rulemaking is generally identified as the more efficient relative to adjudication when
the issues that are in common for most regulatory decisions dominate over the issues that vary
across decisions. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492
(1992) (observing that rulemaking is better for addressing issues that will be raised repeatedly
and are similar); Fuchs, supra note 195, at 94.
206. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2012).
207. Many of the existing section 404 general permits appear to be examples of activities
that cause de minimis harm to wetlands. See generally, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 1 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/
Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_01_2012.pdf (aids to navigation), U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 5 (2012), available at
OF
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_05_2012.pdf 5 (scientificmeasurement devices); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit
6
(2012),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_06_2012.pdf (survey activities); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document:
Nationwide Permit 9 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/
civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_09_2012.pdf (structures in fleeting and anchorage areas); U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 10 (2012), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_10_2012.pdf
(mooring
buoys); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 11 (2012),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_11_2012.pdf
(temporary recreational structures); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document:
Nationwide Permit 28 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
nwp/2012/NWP_28_2012.pdf (modifications of existing marinas); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 36 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/
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requirement can also be seen as based on the above analysis. For, if
activities in the category are similar in nature, then that could mean
the harms or benefits of those activities will be similar as well—
imposing tailored permit analysis or conditions on individual activities
will not have a major impact on the harms or benefits that the
208
activities create.
Several of the general permits issued by the Corps for the section
404 permitting program appear to be examples of relatively high-risk
and high-benefit projects that might justify a more tailored permitting
system, such as the nationwide permits for various coal mining
209
210
activities, the permits for transportation projects, residential
Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_36_2012.pdf (boat ramps); see also Reissuance of
Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012).
208. Note that if our analysis is correct, in situations in which the harms and benefits are
relevant to the regulatory program, what matters for this particular factor in the general permit
test is whether the activities are similar in the harms or benefits they cause, not whether they are
similar on unrelated factors (for example, the number of applicants seeking the permit). The
EPA’s guidelines for section 404 general permits, which the Corps must follow, appear to
recognize this point. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.7(a)(1) (2002) (requiring a finding before a general
permit is issued that the activities to be regulated will be both “similar in nature and similar in
their impact upon water quality and the aquatic environment”). At times the Corps has pointed
to other kinds of similarities as justifying the use of general permits. For example, the Corps
issued a general permit for certain kinds of oil and gas activities, and stated that the general
permit could be justified because those activities had similar purposes (obtaining oil and gas).
See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1257–59 (D.
Wyo. 2005). Nevertheless, the Corps also has usually pointed to the similarity of impacts, either
explicitly, id., or implicitly, by noting how the conditions on general permits greatly narrow the
kinds of impacts that can be expected from the activities regulated by the permit, see Alaska
Ctr. for the Env’t v. West, 157 F.3d 680, 84–85 (9th Cir. 1998) (conditions imposed on general
permit limit the kinds of impacts that can be expected from permitted activities); Sierra Club v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1190–96 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the
conditions imposed on a general permit limit the kinds of impacts that can be expected from
permitted activities to “suburban development”).
Other kinds of similarity besides similarity of impacts might justify the use of general
permits based on other factors besides tailoring to reduce risks and increase benefits. For
instance, combining a range of activities that are usually performed together (perhaps because
they have the same overall purpose) might reduce the administrative burdens of a general
permit system, advancing the goal of reducing administrative burdens in general, or for small
actors. See Wyo. Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. at 1257–59 (discussing the agency’s reliance on
this rationale).
209. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 21 (2012),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_21_2012.pdf;
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 49 (2012), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_49_2012.pdf; U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 50 (2012), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_50_2012.pdf.
210. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 14 (2012),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_14_2012.pdf.
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212

developments, and Commercial and Institutional Developments.
All of these involve potentially substantial impacts on wetland
213
resources,
all generally involve activities that should have
substantial economic value, and therefore might well be worth the
time and effort to tailor. And in fact the Corps does provide some
tailoring in many of these nationwide permits: the Corps requires
preconstruction notice for many projects, allowing the agency either
to require an individual permit if necessary or to strike a middle
ground by requiring less comprehensive information and attaching
214
case-specific conditions to the use of the general permit.
The Corps has another way of providing at least some tailoring
for general permits: general conditions that limit the applicability of
general permits and reopener provisions. The conditions prevent the
215
use of general permits in certain sensitive locations, and also require
a much more detailed analysis when certain sensitive resources are
216
present. The reopener provisions generally allow the Corps to
211. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 29 (2012),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_29_2012.pdf.
212. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 39 (2012),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf.
213. All of these permits cap the total impacts on wetlands for each permitted project at
one-half acre, though even this amount can be substantial cumulatively across all issued permits.
See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21. 2012).
214. See supra text accompanying note 191. For Nationwide Permit 14, preconstruction
notice is required for projects that disturb between one-tenth and one-half an acre; all of the
other permits require preconstruction notice for all permitted projects. See Reissuance of
Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184. Preconstruction notice means that the Corps
has forty-five days after receiving the notice to require the permit applicant to file for an
individual permit or request more information; in general, failure by the Corps to take any
action allows the permit applicant to proceed with the permitted activity. See id. (general
condition 31). Nonetheless, these permits have been controversial, both because of concerns
about a lack of reporting and enforcement, see supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text, and
because of concerns that the Corps does not effectively exercise its ability to require an
individual permit. See COPELAND, supra note 68. Nationwide Permit 21 has been particularly
controversial and the subject of repeated litigation. See id. at 12 (“Citizen groups have filed
lawsuits seeking generally to halt the Corps’ use of nationwide permit 21 for mountaintop
mining operations.”); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009) (vacating the Corps’ issuance of Nationwide Permit 21 because it did not provide
evidence that a proposed mitigation process would be successful or adequately enforced).
215. For instance, general permits cannot be used in Wild and Scenic River areas, and many
permits are not applicable in marine sanctuaries, marine monuments, and National Estuarine
Research Reserves. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,283 (general
conditions 16 and 22).
216. If endangered species or historic and cultural resources are present in the location
where the permitted activity will occur, then consultation under the ESA or the National
Historic Preservation Act must occur. See id. at 10,283–84 (general conditions 18 and 20).
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require an individual permit when, in its discretion, one appears to be
217
necessary.
Many of the exemptions from the registration requirements
under the securities laws (both statutory and regulatory) can be, or
are, justified on the grounds that very minimal harm could occur from
the exempt securities transactions. For instance, many of the
exemptions set caps on the total amount of securities that can be
issued or require that the securities can be marketed only to
“sophisticated” investors who presumably are less vulnerable to fraud
218
and likely have more funds to cover any losses from fraud, or both.
Finally, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has a
system to determine whether proposed construction projects would
219
interfere with air traffic. Any proposed construction project that is
more than two hundred feet high or would vertically cross into the
potential approach airspace of a nearby airport must provide notice
220
to the FAA. If the proposed construction project is more than two
217. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.5 (2011). The EPA has a similar provision allowing it to require an
individual permit for any general permit application. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3) (2012).
Additional examples of the relevance of tailoring for a general permit program are
both the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) over-the-counter and generic drug-approval
process. As noted above, the generic drug approval process has a streamlined permitting
program that only requires generics to demonstrate that they are “bioequivalent” to already
permitted drugs. Again, by showing similarity with an existing drug, this showing makes clear
that tailoring would not be socially beneficial because the harms and benefits would be the same
as those already concluded to be acceptable.
The over-the-counter drug approval process is similar. The FDA makes an initial
determination that harms are minimal and benefits are relatively large for a specific drug or
group of drugs. Here the conclusion that harms are minimal means that the utility of specific
permitting of individual drugs would be relatively low. See Drug Applications for Over-theCounter (OTC) Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/
Over-the-CounterDrugs/default.htm; 21 C.F.R. §§ 330.1, 330.10 (2011). The statutory basis for
the over-the-counter exception is 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1), which defines a “new drug” that
requires FDA approval as a drug that is “generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and
effective for use.”
218. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 182, §§ 4.19–4.20 (describing how various exemptions
under Regulation D limit offering amounts to below $1 million or $5 million, or allow marketing
only to “accredited investors” who have a substantial net worth, or both).
219. See 14 C.F.R. § 77 (2012).
220. Id. § 77.9(a)–(d). Structures that fall within the two-hundred–feet-high category must
provide additional information. Id. § 77.11. Structures that are “shielded by existing structures
of a permanent and substantial nature or by natural terrain or topographic features of equal or
greater height, and will be located in the congested area of a city, town, or settlement where the
shielded structure will not adversely affect safety in air navigation” are exempt from the notice
requirements. Id. § 77.9(e)(1).
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hundred feet high, however, the FAA presumes that the project will
interfere with aviation, and the permit seeker must provide evidence
221
rebutting that presumption along with basic notice. Proposed
construction projects that are five hundred or more feet high, or are
over two hundred feet high and close to an airport, or that are within
specified areas near to the airport, are presumed to be hazards to air
navigation and must submit to an aeronautical study by the FAA to
222
determine if a hazard exists. Other projects may be subject to a
223
study if the FAA determines that a study is required. Again, the
system increases the level of information required by the applicant—
and the concomitant scrutiny by the regulatory agency—based on the
level of potential harm caused by the proposed project.
The NPDES general permit program, which as previously
mentioned is part of the CWA, provides an example of how the need
for tailoring might undermine the effectiveness of a general permit
program. The NPDES general permit program has at times been
justified by the agency on the grounds that it can avoid regulatory
224
burdens for small discharges with minimal impacts. But the NPDES
general permit regulations do not restrict the use of general permits
to “minor” point sources, and any one permit can cover a range of
225
sources. In addition, there are more fundamental problems with the
NPDES general permit program from a tailoring perspective. First,
there are often site-specific reasons to be concerned about the
impacts of emissions from a particular discharger into a particular
waterway. Each waterway is different, and may be susceptible or

221. Id. § 77.7(d).
222. Id. § 77.17. Even if the FAA concludes that a proposed construction project is a hazard
to navigation, the agency cannot directly prohibit the project, although its adverse conclusion
will usually have significant impacts on local zoning approvals, insurance, and airport
operations. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2002); J. Scott
Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce National Resource, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 267
(1994).
223. 14 C.F.R. § 77.27.
224. See, e.g., General Permit Requirements and Reporting Requirements for Storm Water
Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,394, 11,405–06 (Apr. 2, 1992)
(justifying exemption of some NPDES general permits from a notice-of-intent requirement on
the grounds that those permits involve small discharges with minimal impacts).
225. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 422–23; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii) (2012). The regulations
generally do require a finding that the discharges “within each category” involve similar
operations, similar discharges, and require similar effluent limitations or operating conditions.
Gaba, supra note 79, at 422; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2).
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226

vulnerable in different ways to discharges. However, the EPA’s
current NPDES general permit system does not appear to be very
effective at taking these site-specific water quality issues into
227
account. Second, the best management practices (BMPs) that are
usually imposed on regulated parties through the NPDES general
permit program often require some form of site-specific development;
the EPA has attempted to address the potential incompatibility
between general permits and site-specific crafting of BMPs by
allowing regulated parties to draft their own BMPs with minimal or
no review by the agency, which has raised serious enforcement
228
problems. Although there may be other justifications for the current
NPDES general permit program—either political, or on the grounds
of reducing impacts on small parties—tailoring is not one of them.
D. Permits as Political Tools
The way in which a permitting system is structured might help to
address political constraints or reduce resistance to a regulatory
229
scheme. General permits might provoke less political resistance
from regulated parties because they are less burdensome in terms of
paperwork and transaction costs. Indeed, some permits that do not
even require notice to the agency might impose essentially no costs
on the regulated party—and from that party’s perspective, the
permits might equal a full-blown exemption from regulation.
Avoiding regulatory burdens might be important even if the use of
the permits is not limited to situations in which reduced regulatory
burdens are economically justified, such as for small parties or when
tailoring is not appropriate. To the extent that particular interest
groups have substantial political power or influence, reducing
regulatory burdens on those groups might make the regulatory
system politically possible. This is likely one reason that the EPA has
230
used general permits for the regulation of agricultural discharges —
231
farmers have substantial political sway.

226. This may be the case, for instance, because the waterway is already heavily affected by
other discharges, or contains threatened or endangered species.
227. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 434–56.
228. Id. at 456–64.
229. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 284–85 (noting the importance of exemptions from rules
that can mollify powerful political interests).
230. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 430–31 (providing an overview of concentrated animalfeeding operations (CAFOs) general permits); Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (the EPA’s announcement of general permits for
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Another important source of political resistance due to
regulatory burdens is the regulation of widespread, common activities
232
pursued by many individual members of the public. The fixed costs
of permitting might simply be politically impossible to impose on
233
frequently pursued activities,
especially if there is a general
234
expectation that the activity should be permitted. General permits
can allow for regulation with an especially light touch, even allowing
ex post approval of projects under the permitting system and avoiding
potential backlash against the regulatory system. This is how section
404 permits have been used on occasion, allowing developers who
might not have even been aware that their activities were covered by
235
the regulatory program to receive after-the-fact permits. In so
doing, the regulators may avoid a major political fight over applying a
regulatory program to “everyday activities”—albeit at a potentially
high cost to the deterrent effect of the regulatory program.
But if the goal is simply to reduce regulatory burdens to address
the political resistance to a regulatory program, why not just grant
outright statutory exemptions from the regulatory program for
favored interest groups? There are several good reasons. First,
general permits might allow at least some regulation even when there
is substantial political resistance—providing for some reduction in
harm compared to a baseline of no change under an exemption. For

CAFOs); 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(h) (general permit provisions for CAFOs). EPA has justified its
use of general permits for CAFOs on the grounds that the NPDES permit process requires endof-the-pipe emission controls, but that CAFO water emissions are best addressed through
BMPs, which are very different. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 420–21; National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846 (Jan. 28, 1977); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377–80 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There is nothing inherently inconsistent,
however, between the use of BMPs and specific permits.
231. See Ruhl, supra at 84, at 331–33.
232. In Part III, we explore the possible reasons for this resistance, why this resistance will
be of increasing importance in a globalizing world, and how this resistance might be reduced or
ameliorated using general permits. See infra Part III.
233. Of course, the fixed costs of permitting might be economically unjustifiable when they
are imposed on frequently pursued activities. If each instance of the activity requires permitting,
the fixed costs would mount rapidly. Reducing those fixed costs through general permits will
therefore be desirable, just like in the context of regulating the behavior of small actors. Those
fixed costs might also be minimized by allowing an actor to receive an ongoing permit, rather
than by requiring a permit for each particular activity.
234. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1317–28
(2009).
235. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 621, 647–49.
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instance, it is possible that without general permits there might have
236
been no regulation at all of large animal feedlots under the CWA.
Second, general permits might also be more flexible compared to
exemptions. For instance, compare two options: on the one hand, a
complete exemption under the statute for certain activities or interest
groups, versus on the other hand, the placement of those activities or
interest groups within the regulatory jurisdiction of the agency, to be
regulated using a general permit. The statutory exemption might be
very difficult to change or eliminate over time—perhaps in response
to changed political circumstances (for example, reduced political
resistance to the regulatory program), or to an increased need for
regulation of the exempted activities or interest groups (for example,
because of economic, ecological, or social changes). Legislatures
often face substantial inertia that restricts their ability to enact even
237
small changes in statutes —particularly at the federal level where
legislation requires approval by two legislative bodies, the President,
and (effectively) the relevant committees within each legislative body.
Agencies, on the other hand, can change rules so long as they have
the support from the President (or at least indifference if the change
is sufficiently low profile), and the rule change survives judicial
238
review. If the legislature intends to stop the agency’s regulatory
change, it must overcome its legislative inertia and pass a substantive
239
or appropriations bill that prevents the change. General permit
systems, therefore, might more easily allow the phase-in of
regulations in situations in which there is substantial political
236. There are significant exemptions from many environmental laws for agriculture. For
instance, the CWA exempts “return flows from irrigated agriculture” from regulation. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(k)(1) (2012). For a comprehensive list of the many exemptions, see Ruhl, supra note 84,
at 293–315. Indeed, the EPA originally intended to completely exempt most agricultural sources
from any regulation, but was prevented from doing so by litigation. See Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
237. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1179–80, 1198–99 (2009) (describing
the difficulty of enacting legislative change at the federal level).
238. Given the deference that courts usually provide to agency action, judicial review is
more likely to delay than absolutely prevent a regulatory change. See William S. Jordan, III,
Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency
Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393,
418 tbl.3 (2000) (concluding that of sixty-one cases in which the D.C. Circuit remanded an
agency rule between 1985 and 1995, there were only twelve cases in which the remand order
prevented the agency from pursuing its objective).
239. The legislature’s position is even worse because if the President supports the regulatory
change, he can veto any bill that prevents the change. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Congress must
garner two-thirds support to override a presidential veto. Id.
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resistance because there is less inertia to overcome in making
regulatory changes. In fact, although the EPA did not refer to
political considerations, its development of the NPDES general
permit system was intended as a phased process in which the agency
would move over time from permitting a wide range of agricultural,
stormwater, and silvicultural sources under blanket general permits,
to permitting more tailored general permits and even individual
240
specific permits.
As for the difference between a regulatory general permit and a
regulatory exemption, the border between the two can be difficult to
draw—as noted above, it is unclear how different the situation is from
a regulated party’s perspective, between a rule that grants a general
permit for an activity with no notice or conditions requirements, and
a rule that flat-out exempts the activity from regulation. Of course,
under some statutory schemes the agency might not have the
authority to exempt an activity from regulation, even if the activity
241
falls within the agency’s jurisdiction.
But even if regulatory
exemptions are available as options, there might be a reason for an
agency to choose to use a very lax general permit system instead of a
complete exemption. There might be a psychological or political
difference between not regulating at all and regulating with a very
slight touch, if the agency believes that in the future additional
regulation might be required. Actors who believe that they are
completely exempt from regulation might fiercely object to the
imposition of substantial regulatory exemptions, whereas actors who
understand that they are subject to minimal regulation might be less
242
resistant to seeing that regulation gradually increased. Indeed, it
was the concern that exemptions would be all too permanent that led
the D.C. Circuit to reject the EPA’s efforts to carve out regulatory
exemptions from the NPDES permitting program:

240. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846 (Jan. 28,
1977). The EPA continued to pursue this strategy for many years. See General Permit
Requirements and Reporting Requirements for Storm Water Discharges Associated with
Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,394 (Apr. 2, 1992) (using a phased general permit approach
for stormwater regulation).
241. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 568 F.2d 1369 (rejecting the EPA’s attempts to exempt a
wide range of agricultural, silvicultural, and stormwater sources from NPDES regulation).
242. See Biber, supra note 234, at 1317–28 (describing how the imposition of new regulatory
restrictions on previously unregulated, but widespread, activities can create a political backlash
against regulation).
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There is also a very practical difference between a general permit
and an exemption. An exemption tends to become indefinite: the
problem drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be
recalled in the absence of a crisis or a strong political protagonist. In
contrast, the general or area permit approach forces the Agency to
focus on the problems of specific regions and requires that the
problems of the region be reconsidered at least every five years, the
243
maximum duration of a permit.

The political and legal flexibility that general permits create
compared to exemptions might also be particularly useful in the
context of regulating de minimis harms. Although de minimis harms
244
might justify an exemption from regulation, one challenge is that
the kinds of harms that are considered de minimis might change over
time. For instance, as the number of actors imposing very small harms
on an environmental resource increases, what was at first seen as a
harm that could be ignored, might eventually become a cumulatively
245
important harm that requires attention. It will be easier to adjust
regulations to take into account the changing impact of certain harms
through a more flexible general permit system than through an
246
exemption system.
Another possible concern with the use of full exemptions is that
exemptions might be vulnerable to political pressure. As noted above,
in general we would expect that agencies should have less information
about how widely exemptions are used, and the harms that they
cause, compared to even general permit systems (which might have

243. Natural Res. Def. Council, 568 F.2d at 1382. CWA permits are valid only for periods up
to five years, so general permits necessarily require revision and reissuance on a regular basis by
the EPA. This, however, is particular to the CWA; general permits need not necessarily have
limited terms.
244. See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good than Harm”: A First
Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 426–27
(1993).
245. For examples and discussion of this problem, see infra Part III. See also Holly Doremus,
Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 19–20 (2003).
246. If the use of general permits is seen as a step toward a more “adjudicatory” form of
rulemaking compared to exemptions, then it makes sense that general permits would be more
flexible and responsive to changes in conditions. Adjudication is frequently identified as more
flexible and responsive than rulemaking, and therefore more appropriate for policy contexts
that are dynamic or uncertain. Bernstein, supra note 157, at 588, 616 (recommending the use of
adjudication when information is tentative and uncertain); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 927–28;
Magill, supra note 161, at 1406–07 (noting that adjudication is preferable when there is
“inexperience, complexity, and unforeseen circumstance”); Schuck, supra note 3, at 196, 265
(arguing that adjudication “facilitates cautious and flexible policy development”).
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reporting or other requirements), because exemptions by definition
require no reporting through a permit process. Gathering information
about how widely an exemption might be used or its impact would be
very costly, whether for an agency, outside groups, or the general
247
public. Because information is a public good, it will be difficult to
organize members of the public to collect information about the use
248
or impacts of the exemption. The informational advantages that
regulated parties often have will therefore be exacerbated, and the
lack of information about the exemption may make it difficult to
mobilize members of the public to push for administrative or
legislative changes to the exemption, or even to know whether
changes are desirable.
A final political advantage of general permits compared to
exemptions is that they might provide more politically feasible ways
to collect funds for mitigating harms or restoring damaged resources.
Activities, whether covered by a general permit or by an exemption,
may cause significant social harms—harms that we might want to
offset through mitigation or eliminate through restoration activities.
Mitigation and restoration cost money. But if the activity is covered
by an exemption, it may be more difficult to connect the fees
collected with the harms caused—after all, if a harm was caused, why
249
not regulate in the first place? General permits, however, explicitly
recognize the harm caused by the activity, perhaps providing greater
political support for, and judicial approval of, fees that are collected
250
for mitigation or restoration. And it seems plausible that these kinds
of fees are much more politically feasible to collect and use than are
251
general taxes to pay for restoration or mitigation.

247. Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31
(2011) (discussing how expensive environmental monitoring can become).
248. Information is a public good in economic terms because it is nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable. Id. at 13–14. The organizational obstacles to producing information will be
particularly challenging to overcome if the harms caused by an exemption are also to a public
good—for example, pollution from an unregulated factory that contaminates the air.
249. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 184–85 (arguing that the difference between an exception
and a permit is that an exception implies that the otherwise-regulated action is justified and
without moral blame, whereas a permit implies that the action is morally blameworthy but is
being permitted in any case).
250. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (requiring
environmental permit mitigation exactions and fees to meet the “essential nexus” and “rough
proportionality” tests); see also infra note 322 and accompanying text.
251. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 51 (2011) (summarizing literature that finds voters are
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We can think of one way in which specific permits might have a
political advantage over general permits. To the extent that the public
feels a need to closely watch over perceived bad actors such as
polluters, the paperwork and transactional burdens of regulation
might be seen as a good thing. They might even be seen as
appropriate punishment for socially undesirable (but not illegal)
activities. The tailored, more empirical approach of specific
permitting could also build greater public legitimacy for the
252
regulatory regime. Of course, this political rationale will only apply
when someone else is paying the cost of a specific permit program,
and as such, this rationale will likely not apply when a regulatory
program covers activities that are widely pursued by many members
253
of the public.
Thus, overall, general permits provide some substantial political
advantages compared to specific permits and to outright exemptions.
Those advantages might explain why a number of environmental laws
give the relevant agencies wide jurisdictional authority over permit
design, which those agencies in turn apply through a significant
254
number of general permits or other regulatory tools. Statutory
exemptions might pose a particular challenge in the context of
environmental laws. The beneficiaries of environmental regulation
tend to be broadly distributed (often the entire public if an
environmental resource is a public good), whereas those subject to
much environmental regulation are small groups of regulated
industry. Beneficiaries therefore tend to face significant obstacles in
255
organizing to enact legislation.
The enactment of stringent
environmental statutes may therefore be an infrequent event,
prompted by high-profile crises or catastrophes that mobilize the

more likely to support government revenues that are labeled as fees than those that are labeled
as taxes).
252. See generally Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land Use
Decisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 538 (2010).
253. We discuss the challenges that regulation of individual activities poses in Part III, infra.
254. See, for example, the CWA’s prohibition of all point-source discharges without a
permit, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012), the ESA’s prohibition of all “take” of members of listed
endangered species without a permit, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012), and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act’s prohibition of all “take” of members of migratory bird species without a permit, 16 U.S.C.
§ 703. The 1933 Securities Act has a similar default rule of prohibiting all actions unless they are
specifically permitted. See 16 U.S.C. § 77d.
255. See Biber, supra note 53, at 40–49 (2008).
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public to overcome those organizational obstacles. If legislation is
an infrequent event—and there has not been a significant
environmental statute enacted at the federal level in over twenty
257
years —then statutory exemptions would be extremely hard to
eliminate or reduce even if changed circumstances warranted such an
adjustment. Legislators and activists who have the opportunity to
enact stringent environmental legislation are likely quite aware of
how difficult it is to revisit the legislation, and therefore might err on
the side of over- rather than under-inclusiveness, counting on the
administrative process to address the problems of over-inclusion
through tools such as general permits.
E. Permits as Enforcement Tools
Permits are, of course, an important component of the
enforcement of regulatory standards. Permits can allow a regulatory
agency to know who might be violating the law, what standards
regulated parties need to be complying with, and where regulated
activities are supposed to be occurring. The value of increased
enforcement would be determined, at least in part, by the level of
harms or benefits that the regulatory program is trying to prevent or
provide; higher harms or benefits mean more payoff from
enforcement. Compared to a complete exemption, general permits on
average should make agency enforcement easier—though general
permits may not facilitate enforcement as much as an individualized
specific permit. One of the criticisms of the broad use of general
permits in the section 404 program has been that the use of general
permits has made it too difficult for the agency to identify and
prosecute violations of the law, and that more detailed specificpermitting requirements would allow the agency to keep better tabs
on who is engaging in regulated activities and whether those parties
258
are complying with the law.
There is another enforcement alternative for an agency with a
broad regulatory mandate besides general or specific permits—it can
choose not to issue any permits (or it may not be empowered to issue
permits) that authorize certain activities, and instead it may use its

256. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—the “Issue-Attention” Cycle, 28 PUB.
INT. 38, 39–41 (1972); Farber, supra note 166, at 66–67 (1992).
257. Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129
(2013).
258. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 645–46.
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discretion to not prosecute violations of an otherwise applicable
regulatory mandate. In some circumstances, large numbers of people
might be violating the law, but the agency prosecutes only a tiny
fraction of violators. These kinds of overbroad statutes might allow
for relatively simple prosecution of otherwise hard-to-detect
regulatory violations, as regulatory agencies can use the frequent but
small violations as proxies for more serious, but more difficult-toprove, violations. For instance, many states prohibit “waste” of
animals killed by hunters, which usually is defined to include leaving
any portion of a killed animal behind, rather than transporting the
259
animal to be used for food, hides, and other purposes. Waste
statutes are frequently violated by hunters, but they allow for the easy
prosecution of poachers who are seeking to kill animals simply for a
260
particular high-value organ (such as horns or gall bladders).
Similarly, many states criminalize the nighttime possession of
firearms in automobiles in areas that are commonly used for hunting
261
to prevent illegal “spotlighting” of animals. Spotlighting involves a
driver using car headlights to freeze a deer so that it will not react,
and can be shot and killed easily. Spotlighting would be very difficult
to prevent directly because it requires catching someone in the act of
putting their headlights on the animal and attempting to kill it, but it
is much easier to identify someone with a weapon in his or her car at
night. Prosecutorial discretion can therefore allow enforcement
agencies to decide which of the many violations of waste or firearms
rules should be enforced based on their judgment about whether the
262
violator is in fact a poacher or spotlighting.
The problem is that this sweeping use of prosecutorial discretion
creates tremendous uncertainty for regulated parties. Especially if the
regulated activity requires significant investment, that uncertainty
might be undesirable. A general permit might balance the need for
having broad underlying statutory authority to allow for enforcement,
263
with the need to provide some assurance to regulated parties.
Indeed, agencies might codify their use of prosecutorial discretion
through guidance documents in ways that effectively act like general
259. See DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
724–25 (2d ed. 2010).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 699–707.
262. Id. at 705–06, 723–25.
263. Again, rulemaking is generally identified as providing greater predictability for
regulated parties. See supra note 163.
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permits. For example, the FWS has effectively struck such a deal with
264
regard to the enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against
commercial wind power facilities, under which, if a facility follows the
guidance the agency has issued, the agency does not enforce the
statutory take prohibition if a migratory bird is killed by a wind
265
turbine.
F. Permits as Constraints on Administrative Discretion
Specific permits are also more likely to have significant public
participation requirements and to face more in-depth judicial review
than are general permits. Public participation requirements tend to be
greater for specific permits in part because many general permits do
not have a structure that allows for notice to the public and an
opportunity to be heard: if a general permit does not require notice to
the agency, members of the public will not receive notice either.
Agencies might apply the statutory mandates for public participation
in permitting only during the stage at which they create the general
permit, not when applying the permit to individual actors. This has
occurred in both the section 404 and the NPDES general permit
266
contexts. And, even if there is a theoretical system by which
members of the public might be involved in the permit’s actual
application, there is little reason to expect it will actually occur. For
instance, NPDES general permits allow for any “interested person”
to request that the agency issue an individualized permit for a
267
particular project. However, unless members of the public are
regularly sifting through the notices of intent that are submitted to
the EPA or to state agencies, there is no way that they would be
aware of whether a project is even occurring, let alone whether there

264. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701–719c (2012)
265. See Draft Voluntary, Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines: Questions and Answers,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/Wind_Energy
_Guidelines_Qs_and_As.FINAL.pdf (last visited July 6, 2014) (“The Service will regard such
voluntary adherence and communication as evidence of due care with respect to avoiding,
minimizing, and mitigating significant negative impacts to species protected under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and will take that into account
when exercising its discretion with respect to any potential referral for prosecution related to
the death of or injury to any such species.”).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 108–15 (describing the section 404 program); see
also Gaba, supra note 79, at 426 (detailing the framework regulations for EPA-issued NPDES
general permits and cross-reference procedures for individual permits when laying out how an
overall general permit is created); 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(1) (2012).
267. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3)(i).
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268

are any permit applications pending. And, if the notice of intent has
minimal information about the proposed activity and its potential
impacts, it will be very difficult for members of the public to
determine whether a request for an individualized permit makes
269
sense. Of course, the relative lack of public participation does
reduce the burdens on regulated parties, which might be desirable for
270
economic or political reasons.
Some applications of general permits to particular projects are
not exempted from judicial review requirements that apply to specific
271
permits. Nevertheless, in practice it may be very difficult for outside
268. There are also questions of whether NPDES general permit notices of intent are even
available to the public. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 465–67 (describing litigation on this question
and inconsistent agency positions). If notices of intent are not even available to the public, then
that makes public participation even more difficult.
269. For instance, early versions of preconstruction notices for section 404 general permits
were extremely sparse in information, making it very difficult for outside parties to determine
whether more careful scrutiny would be warranted. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 642–
43 (noting the information in preconstruction notices is insufficient to allow for adequate
review). Current versions of preconstruction notices have more substantial information
requirements. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21,
2012) (imposing a general condition (number 31) on preconstruction notices that requires
additional information from permit users).
270. The fact that specific permits, on average, might allow for greater public participation
than general permits is in tension with the general trend in the literature, which argues that
adjudication makes broad public participation more difficult compared to rulemaking. See
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 US 759, 777 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The rulemaking procedure performs important functions. It gives notice to an entire segment of society
of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming. It gives an opportunity for persons
affected to be heard.”); Berg, supra note 173, at 163 (describing the most frequently cited
arguments for why “rulemaking offers advantages both in terms of fairness and efficiency”);
Fuchs, supra note 195, at 94 (detailing the advantages of rulemaking); Magill, supra note 161, at
1396 (describing the consequences of the choice of forum); Alan B. Morrison, The
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986)
(“Unlike adjudications, which are often focused on a single party, rulemaking allows an
opportunity for all interested parties to comment.”); id. at 255–56 (the costs of participating in
rulemaking are lower, so it is “much easier for large segments of the public to become
involved”); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 930 (noting that a “substantial advantage[] . . . for
rulemaking is that it requires the agency to allow general participation in the deliberative
process by all those who may be affected by the rule”). This in part may be because of the
specific statutory requirements for public notice and comment for permits issued under statutes
like the CWA and Clean Air Act, which supplement the bare-bone procedural requirements for
informal adjudication under the APA.
271. As noted above, the creation of a general permit in the first place is generally subject to
judicial review. See supra text accompanying note 123; see, e.g., Reissuance of National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Offshore Oil and Gas
Exploration, Development and Production Operations off Southern California, 79 Fed. Reg.
1643, 1643 (Jan. 9, 2014) (“For purposes of judicial review the permit is considered issued on
January 23, 2014. The final permit was signed on December 20, 2013 . . . and is effective on
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parties (parties besides the regulated party) to seek judicial review of
the application of a general permit to a particular project, for the
same reasons that it is often difficult in practice for outside parties to
participate in the general-permitting process. If outside parties are
not aware that a general permit even applies, it will be difficult for
them to seek judicial review of the permit’s application to a particular
project. Of course, as has been done, they might challenge the permit
272
as a whole. But plaintiffs might then run into the challenges of
providing evidence of the flaws in the permit: if general permits
provide on average less information about the actions that occur
pursuant to the permit, then plaintiffs will have less information to
challenge the legality of the permit.
Thus, agencies might have more leeway in the application of
general permits to individual cases than they would in the context of
specific permits, at least with respect to parties other than the
permitted party. The permitted party will often have significant
information about whether the activity is occurring, what impacts it
might have, and how the activity relates to the regulated system. But
that will not be the case for outside parties. As a result, we might
expect that agencies’ added discretion in the context of general
permits will on average result in lower levels of regulation. If this is
the case, then the added burdens imposed by specific permits on
regulated parties and administrative agencies may be warranted if the
harms prevented or benefits provided by the specific regulatory
program are substantial enough.
Although general permits might reduce the ability of
nonregulated parties to control or constrain agency discretion, they
also may have the effect of constraining or reducing agency discretion
with respect to regulated parties. General permits are, in effect, an
open invitation by the agency for regulated parties to undertake their
activities without legal liability. As discussed above, they reverse the
background rule holding that activities are prohibited unless the
March 1, 2014.”). Regardless, whether the application of a general permit to a particular
regulated party (what we identify as permit administration in Part I) is subject to judicial review
varies from context to context. Here we focus on the implications and practical relevance of
judicial review for permit administration.
272. There have been several challenges to section 404 general permits as being
insufficiently restrictive. See, e.g., Ky. Riverkeeper v. Rowlette, 714 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2013);
Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. West, 157 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006). There have also been challenges claiming they
are too restrictive. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2006).
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agency issues a permit—the background rule that so troubled
273
Epstein.
Of course, agencies can revise or revoke general permits, either
274
in general or in specific applications. Complete revocation of a
general permit may require various administrative procedures, such
275
as compliance with notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.
Moreover, if the general permit is the response by the agency to
political pressures or realities, that would significantly constrain the
ability of the agency to eliminate or substantially change a general
permit program in its entirety. If the agency singles out individual
regulated parties for revision or revocation of their general permits, it
can avoid or reduce the political problem. The risk of an agency
singling out individual actors appears to be one of Epstein’s concerns
about how the permit power might be abused. But the same factors
that make it difficult for outside parties to determine whether and to
what extent general permits are being used will also often constrain
the ability of an agency to single out individual actors. At the
extreme, a general permit without any reporting or notice
requirements leaves the agency with no information about who is
engaging in the regulated activity, and therefore who can be singled
276
out for enforcement.
273. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (stating that general permits under the section 404
program must be revocable by the agency). For instance, there are general permits that require
certification by the agency that the proposed activity would comply with the terms of the
general permit. The agency can refuse to grant certification. And there are general permits that
require notice to the agency of the regulated activity, in which the agency retains the right to
step in and require a specific permit application.
275. See, e.g., id. (stating that a general permit revocation requires a public hearing). If the
general permit has a sunset provision, such as the five-year limit for CWA permits, then no
procedures need be followed by the agency to let the permit expire.
276. The literature generally concludes that adjudication is more susceptible to political
pressure and favoritism than rulemaking. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 93–94 (1983) (noting criticism of immigration
adjudications as being vulnerable to political pressure) [hereinafter Diver, Optimal Precision];
Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 408–09
(1981) (stating that critics have argued that adjudication has been “a paper veneer behind which
rank favoritism or obsequiousness could flourish”) [hereinafter Diver, Policymaking]; Schiller,
supra note 157, at 1150 (noting critics have argued that adjudication “encouraged agency
capture [because a] ‘[l]ack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence
are bound to rush [in]’” and “nothing could limit administrative actors from simply following
the self-serving dictates of the regulated”) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 22–23
(1962)); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 282 n.409 (arguing that it is more difficult for outsiders
representing diffuse interests to participate in adjudicatory decisionmaking because of its
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G. Permits as Easing Administrative Burdens for Agencies and
Regulated Parties
One of the reasons agencies most commonly cite when they
develop general permit programs is that once a general permit is
issued—which is not necessarily a small feat in the administrative
state—it serves to reduce administrative burdens on the agencies
277
278
279
themselves, for all regulated parties, or for both. Of course, it
makes sense that if an agency is going to fully process a permit
application, a shorter and more cursory application is easier to
process. But there is no necessary reason why a specific permit
technical complexity and the difficulty of determining whether a particular case will have a
significant impact on diffuse interests); id. at 293 (noting that the general standards and lowprofile nature of adjudication may make adjudicatory exceptions vulnerable to favoritism).
277. For an examination of the reduction of burdens in the context of the section 404
general permit program, see, for example, Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg.
10,184, 10184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (the Corps’ explanation for renewal of the section 404 general
permit program); Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 630 (describing how conserving agency
administrative resources was a major portion of the Corps’ original justification for the section
404 general permit program); Davison, supra note 79, at 67 (noting how this explanation has
been regularly used by the Corps throughout the history of the general permit program). In the
context of the NPDES general permit program, see, for example, National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,873 (June 7, 1979) (relying
on administrative burden argument when developing general permit program); National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846, 6846 (Jan. 28, 1977) (same); Gaba,
supra note 79, at 420–23 (describing the history of the general permit program).
An agency’s reference to “administrative burdens” might be a cover for the agency’s
resistance to implementing a new regulatory program; a general permit program can allow the
agency to avoid committing significant resources to a program that it does not wish to pursue,
and allow enforcement to be minimal. This might have been the original reason behind both the
section 404 and the NPDES general permit programs. See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard
Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence,
Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 704–06, 705 n.56
(1989) (describing how, in response to a court decision that required the agency to expand its
regulatory jurisdiction under section 404, the Corps issued a press release stating that the
decision “would require permits from ‘the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the
farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to
protect his land against stream erosion’”); Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 629 (same).
278. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466 (May 12, 1983) (proposing to change the nature of the
section 404 general permit program to “reduc[e] unnecessary regulatory burdens”). Note that
these kinds of efforts at regulatory relief are not just focused on small or new entities, unlike
those discussed in Part II.A. See supra Part II.A.
279. Overall, rulemaking has been identified as imposing upfront costs on the agency to
develop rules that would, ideally, reduce administrative costs in the implementation of the rule.
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 173, at 255; Diver, Optimal Precision, supra note 276, at 73–74; Fuchs,
supra note 195, at 94; Morrison, supra note 270, at 255. This tradeoff is very similar to the
tradeoff we discussed earlier between spending resources in establishing the permit system
(higher for a general permit) and spending resources in administering the permit program
(lower for a general permit). See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
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program has to be more burdensome for the agency than a general
permit program. An agency could require lots of detailed information
on permit applications, but then simply rubberstamp the applications.
Ensuring that the application information is accurate could be
accomplished by randomly auditing the applications and imposing
280
severe sanctions for false information.
Setting that point aside, reducing the administrative burdens on
the agency—as with reducing burdens on regulated parties in
general—will generally be socially beneficial only if the savings that
result from the reduced burden outweigh any losses that result from
less-effective regulation (less-useful information means less-effective
enforcement). That tradeoff will depend a lot on the specifics of a
particular regulatory program.
H. Permits as Lessons for the Adjudication Versus Rulemaking
Debate
Our analysis of the pros and cons of general versus specific
permits does not line up consistently with the general consensus of
the pros and cons of adjudication versus rulemaking. We agree that
general permits, like rulemaking, will (1) tend to reduce the costs for
regulated parties and the public to gather information about what a
regulatory standard is; (2) be more efficient than specific permits
when issues in future decisions are more likely to have features in
common; and (3) tend to be more predictable for regulated parties in
terms of their implementation. We also agree that general permits—
which may be seen as more like adjudications than full-blown
exemptions—are probably more flexible than exemptions in adjusting
to changes in future circumstances, just as adjudications are generally
seen as more flexible than rulemaking.
But on the other hand, compared to specific permits, general
permits may be less likely to produce useful information about how a
regulatory program is functioning and may provide fewer
opportunities for public participation. These conclusions are both in

280. This is a basic application of deterrence theory. For an example of this theory, see
Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of
Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 730–32 (1989). There might be limits on how
severe the sanction can be. If so, the agency’s audit rate could only be reduced so far without
reducing its deterrent potential.
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tension with the general assessment of the administrative law
281
literature about the relative merits of adjudication and rulemaking.
We think there are some important implications for the
administrative law literature from our analysis. First, studies of hybrid
forms can be essential in revealing whether generalizations about
overall categories are accurate. Second, agencies that are seeking to
resolve the tradeoffs between different archetypal forms may find
hybrids attractive, as general permits may allow for some mixing and
matching of the pros and cons of different categories, but unexpected
results might occur if one is not careful to closely examine how and
why different forms of agency decisionmaking produce different
282
results. Thus, we think the third and most important lesson is the
need to take a careful, context-dependent approach in thinking about
283
rulemaking versus adjudication in agency practice. This includes
careful consideration of the appropriate use of hybrid forms of
permits in recommendations to legislators or agency leaders about
284
how agencies and agency decisionmaking should be structured.
III. PERMITTING THE FUTURE—THE CASE FOR GENERAL PERMITS
As Part II covers and Table 3 summarizes below, general and
specific permits each have their advantages and disadvantages. But
looking forward, it seems plausible that general permits will be
increasingly important as a regulatory tool in a world in which social
costs and benefits are the result of the accumulation of millions, even
billions, of individual actions across regions, nations and the world.
As a case study, we focus on environmental problems, but we believe
281. See supra Part I.F.
282. For instance, the fact that general permits might produce less-useful policy information
compared to specific permits may be a result of the fact that agencies generally do not conduct
ongoing monitoring of permitted activities on their own initiative, instead depending on the
permit to impose these obligations on permitted parties. See Biber, supra note 247, at 13–14.
Specific permits are more likely to impose those requirements than general permits. Broad
generalizations about rulemaking versus adjudication, however, would miss this important
nuance in the context of permitting.
283. See Robinson, supra note 195, at 536 (stating that analysis of whether rulemaking or
adjudication is preferable “has been hindered by too great an attachment to labels and abstract
concepts”); id. (“[T]he arbitrary distinction between modes of proceeding does not provide
useful criteria for determining what are the appropriate procedures in any particular kind of
case. . . . These highly elastic concepts tend to obscure the varied needs of different agencies and
varied demands of different regulatory functions.”).
284. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 297 (calling for a “richer array of procedural options, a set
of alternative decision modes that mirror the diverse mixture of competing values presented by
different kinds of exceptions decisions”).
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that the issues and concepts we develop here have relevance for a
285
wide range of other areas.
Table 3. Factors Relevant to Deciding Between General and Specific
Permits
Factor

General Permits

Specific Permits

Barriers To
Entry

Reduce barriers to entry to
perform regulated activities,
encourage entry by new actors
into economic activity, and
reduce fixed costs that burden
small business actors.

Impose barriers to entry that
might deter new entrants in
economic activity or harm
small business actors. Can
provide screens that deter
activities with low social
benefits and high social costs.

Information

Relative to exemptions, provide
more information about
regulated activities and actors.

Relative to general permits,
provide more information
about regulated activities and
actors.

Tailoring

More appropriate when
regulating low-harm or lowbenefit activities, or when harms
and benefits are relatively
uniform across regulated
activities or actors.

More appropriate when harms
and benefits are highly variable
across regulated activities or
actors.

Politics

May allow for regulation that is
socially desirable when specific
permits are politically infeasible
(such as for regulating politically
powerful actors or everyday
activities). Relative to
exemptions, may allow more
flexible and increased regulation
over time. May also allow for
the collection of mitigation fees.

May satisfy public demand to
punish bad actors through
punitive regulatory burdens.

285. For discussion of other nonenvironmental areas in which this dynamic may be relevant,
see infra notes 347–50 and accompanying text.
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Factor

General Permits

Specific Permits

Enforcement

Relative to exemptions, provide
more information that allows for
effective enforcement. Relative
to overbroad prohibitions that
are sporadically enforced, may
be fairer and more predictable.

Relative to general permits,
provide more information that
allows for effective
enforcement.

Constraint on
Agency
Discretion

Relative to specific permits,
harder for public to monitor
permitting, and hold agency and
regulated parties accountable.
Relative to specific permits, may
be harder for agency to control
regulated parties’ activity.

Relative to general permits,
easier for public to monitor
permitting, and hold agency
and regulated parties
accountable.

Administrative
Burdens

Fewer administrative burdens
compared to specific permits.

Greater administrative burdens
compared to general permits.

A. Managing Cumulative Impacts of Small Harms
The traditional depiction of environmental pollution—one that is
still used in stock photos for press coverage of environmental issues—
is that of a massive industrial smokestack billowing emissions into the
atmosphere, or of a large waste pipe from a factory discharging
noxious wastes into a river or lake. Although industrial discharges are
a significant contributor to environmental harms in the United States
and around the world, it turns out that they are not the most
significant contributor. In fact, much environmental harm is
increasingly the result of the accumulation of actions by millions of
286
individuals and businesses.

286. Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment:
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 119–24 (2009)
(describing the contribution of individuals to environmental harm); Jason Czarnezki, Everyday
Environmentalism: Concerning Consumption, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,374, 10,374 (2011); Michael
P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era
of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 541–84 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh,
Smokestack to SUV] (describing the contribution of individuals to environmental pollution and
environmental harms); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 193–97 (2001) [hereinafter Vandenbergh,
Social Meaning] (detailing second generation environmental problems).
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Take climate change, for example. Although electricity, coal, and
oil and gas companies directly produce fossil fuels and emit carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere when producing energy, those emissions
are a response to the individual demands of millions of consumers to
turn on their lights, heat their homes, drive their cars, or fly in
287
airplanes. Another example is the problem of air quality in major
metropolitan areas of the United States. Air quality in cities such as
Houston and Los Angeles remains unhealthy despite decades of
288
significant federal, state, and local environmental regulation. That
regulation has removed much of the emissions from large industrial
sources of pollution. But, in most cities in the United States, most of
the remaining air quality problems are the result of dispersed
emissions, which are caused by the individual and mundane choices of
millions of Americans to drive their cars instead of taking public
transit, to clean their clothes at a dry cleaning facility, to paint their
houses, to burn wood in a fireplace, or even to use lighter fluid on a
289
backyard charcoal grill.
The accumulation of dispersed emissions is also probably the
most important remaining cause of water pollution in the United
States. Pollution in many rivers and streams in the United States is
the result of diverse and frequent activities such as homeowners
fertilizing their lawns and using herbicide to eliminate weeds;
automobile owners changing their oil in their driveway; and farmers
290
using fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides on their fields. Activities
that appear to be far removed from water quality—such as paving
over a field or forest to construct a parking lot, or adding a paved
driveway to a single home—are major contributors to water quality
291
problems. Even pet dogs may be a major contributor to water
pollution in urban areas, given that many owners do not clean up
after their animals, and animal waste has been shown to cause
287. See Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84, at 1402–11 (describing climate change and
the 1 percent problem).
288. See David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When Numbers Matter More than
Size (Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. Ctr. for Global Energy, Int’l Arbitration & Envtl. Law, Research
Paper No. 2014-04), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316294.
289. Id.
290. See EDWARD B. WITTE & NATALIA MINKEL-DUMIT, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
HANDBOOK 194–95 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011); Ruhl, supra note 84, at 274–92 (describing
the environmental harms that farms cause).
291. Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO.
L. REV. 431, 439–55 (2011) (describing how impervious surfaces produce significant water
quality problems in urban waterways).
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significant water quality issues. These so-called “non-point sources”
of water pollution—because the pollution cannot be traced to a
particular point of emission, but instead result from the accumulation
of pollution in runoff from the land into waterways—are generally
unregulated under the CWA, yet are probably the primary reason
why most rivers, streams, and lakes in the United States do not meet
293
water quality standards.
Finally, consider the problem of human activities that degrade
and destroy native species’ habitats and ecosystems. Of course, much
of this is the result of activities by major corporations (for instance,
timber harvesting by paper companies and strip mining by coal
companies). But much of it is also the result of relatively small
decisions by individual people to, for example, buy a lot and build a
single-family home in a rapidly growing exurban development, or
294
clear native vegetation in their front or back yard and plant a lawn.
Moreover, these are all activities that, if they are to be addressed
by the legal system, will primarily be addressed through regulation by
administrative agencies rather than by common law tort litigation
under claims such as nuisance. Nuisance, after all, requires identifying
how a particular actor’s actions proximately caused a particular
295
plaintiff’s injuries. But the problems of identifying causation and
responsibility are often insurmountable when the harm results from
the accumulation of thousands or millions of individually trivial, but
collectively problematic, actions. The accumulation of harm from so
many sources makes identification, management, and enforcement

292. Nonpoint Source Pollution (Polluted Runoff), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/region2/water/npspage.htm (“Pet wastes are a significant cause of nutrient
contamination and contain bacteria and viruses which can cause harm to people and aquatic
life.”).
293. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 291, at 432–60 (describing the challenges of improving water
quality in urban watersheds, the importance of non-point source pollution in water quality
degradation, and the difficulties of using current legal structures to address that problem);
David A. Fahrenthold, Anacostia River Shows Decades-Long Failure to Improve Water Quality,
Ecosystem, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/01/AR2010020103217.html (describing the failure to deal with nonpoint source
pollution as an “environmental blind spot,” despite successes in reducing pollution from point
sources such as sewage plants and industrial facilities).
294. See Paul Robbins, Annemarie Polderman & Trevor Birkenholtz, Lawns and Toxins:
An Ecology of the City, 18 CITIES 369, 376 (2001).
295. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 615 F.3d 496, 502–06 (6th Cir.
2010) (applying proximate causation requirement to public nuisance claim); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (nuisance liability only exists when allegedly tortious activity
is the “legal cause” of harm).
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much more difficult and costly. These harm-causing activities are
often dispersed in space and time precisely because each individual
action only produces a limited amount of harm; and the harm caused
by each individual action is often subtle or difficult to detect, again
296
because of the limited amount of harm. So, whom is the asthmatic
resident of Los Angeles supposed to sue to reduce the smog that
prevents her from leaving her house on dozens of days each year?
Every driver in the greater Los Angeles area? Every dry cleaner?
297
Every person who owns lighter fluid?
There is little need to carefully tailor a regulatory system for
each one of these kinds of individual activities. For instance, there are
likely minimal or no differences in the environmental impacts
produced by two neighbors’ use of lighter fluid on backyard barbeque
grills. Those minimal or nonexistent differences mean that we do not
need a detailed specific permit to carefully tailor the regulatory
298
system for each neighbor’s lighter fluid use. A standardized general
permit will do.
General permits are likely also superior to the two other options
(specific permits and exemptions) in managing the environmental
harms from the accumulation of thousands or millions of individual
activities. Currently, many of these activities are exempt from
government regulation. But as noted above, general permits—even if

296. Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 590 (“Not only are the releases
from any one individual smaller and less visible, but the harms arising from individual behavior
in many cases are less visible as well. In fact, environmental harm may only arise from individual
behavior when many sources are aggregated. In addition, the low concentrations and long time
periods involved in many releases from individuals make it more likely that these releases will
generate gradual, and in some cases almost imperceptible, changes in ecosystem health . . . .”);
see also Babcock, supra note 286, at 130 (describing how “individual contributions are so small
compared to the pollution from an industrial polluter”).
297. Indeed, Epstein himself concedes that these kinds of problems are not suitable for
common law adjudication. See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the
Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 317, 320–26 (2011) (arguing against the application of public nuisance
litigation to address climate change, and in favor of exclusive reliance on administrative
remedies). There is, at the very least, some tension between Epstein’s claim that administrative
permits should be limited to situations in which courts would find a common law nuisance, and
his position that many diffuse harms that would not qualify as common law nuisances should be
addressed only through regulation by administrative agencies.
298. Moreover, the complexity that a specific permit would impose on the broader public
would likely be highly inefficient compared to a much simpler general permit. See Louis
Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 151
(1995) (noting that complex rules can be efficient for regulation if only a small number of
people have to bear the information costs of understanding and complying with the rules).
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they impose minimal substantive and procedural burdens—can have
significant advantages over an exemption. First, the general permit
can allow the collection of information that can be used to design a
more effective and politically sustainable regulatory program in the
future. Second, it may be more feasible to, over time, increase
regulatory standards if one begins with a general permit program
rather than with an exemption. General permits also might make it
more feasible for a regulatory agency to respond to emerging
harms—for instance, an activity that previously was harmless because
it was limited might become more widespread and begin causing
299
significant damage. A general permit with minimal burdens might
be relatively easily expanded into a general permit with some teeth
that can more effectively combat the growing damage from the
activity. In contrast, eliminating an exemption by imposing regulation
where none existed at all may be much more difficult to accomplish,
particularly when it requires legislative action. Finally, general
permits might allow more public participation and accountability than
a legislative exemption, given that there is at least a rulemaking
process for the public to participate in and for courts to review.
The other option would be the creation of overbroad laws that
regulate a wide range of everyday behavior, with prosecutorial
discretion being exercised to limit enforcement to all but the most
extreme violations, or to prosecute a few high-profile violations to
encourage compliance within the broader public. But as discussed
300
earlier, overbroad laws raise a wide range of serious concerns.
Those concerns include uncertainty for regulated parties that might
deter investment. Selective enforcement—particularly against
individuals whose actions are no worse than those of other individuals
301
who escape prosecution—also raises due process concerns, the
potential for corruption and abuse by prosecutorial authorities, and
may create a strong political backlash against a regulatory system that
can arbitrarily single out individuals for government action. We may

299. See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 263–65 and accompanying text.
301. See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 691 (10th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that conviction under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act violated due process where
the defendant did not have notice that the relevant activity might harm birds, and where that
activity was widely undertaken in the oil and gas industry).
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be better off with a system that regulates almost everyone, but with a
302
light touch, than with a system that regulates only a few.
B. Managing Transitions to New Regulation
The challenge to addressing many of the most pressing
environmental harms is that many of the individually small human
actions that contribute to those harms are currently exempted from
regulation under environmental laws, either through statutory or
303
administrative exemptions. Most environmental regulations only
indirectly touch individuals, by regulating the producers of goods and
304
services rather than the consumers of goods and services. The
regulation of wetlands and the protection of endangered species are
the only two major examples of federal environmental law trying to
305
directly regulate actions by individuals. Even in those areas in which
there is no explicit exemption, in practice regulation has been either
306
fitful or infrequent.
Those regulatory gaps likely exist because the regulation of
individual activities is a difficult task. First, it may be hard to convince
the public that regulation is even necessary. People may discount the
importance of individual actions that cause small levels of harm, even
307
though those actions might cumulatively be extremely important. In
302. This may be the case because, particularly if the goal is to deter or modify widespread
behavior that is environmentally harmful, limiting enforcement to a few select cases may mean
that punishment must be imposed at a high level. Fairness concerns and political backlash might
be elevated when a few individuals are singled out for draconian punishment for activities that
everyone is doing.
303. Ruhl, supra note 84, at 293–316 (describing agricultural exemptions); Vandenbergh &
Stack, supra note 84, at 1394–96 (identifying numerous exemptions under many statutes).
304. See Katrina F. Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that
Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1130 (2012) (“[T]he federal statutory scheme of
environmental protection in large measure reaches individual behaviors and associated
environmental harms only indirectly.”).
305. Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 611–12.
306. Id. at 517.
307. As professors Vandenbergh and Stack observe:
When individuals respond to a low probability as if it is essentially zero, one percent
arguments may have powerful effects in policy debates, even when they relate to
small contributions to a problem as opposed to small probabilities.
One way to see this is to consider how regulatory decisions, and in particular
decisions about whether to exempt a source or set a regulatory threshold, can be
framed. An exemption for a particular entity based on it being a small part of the
problem can be stated as accepting a small increase in the probability of a particular
undesired outcome. If, for example, my company’s water discharge amounts to only
1% of the discharge of a pollutant into a river, then providing an exemption to my
company is roughly equivalent to saying that a small increase in the probability of the
contaminants in water reaching a certain level is acceptable.
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general, the public does not know how important individual actions
308
are for environmental harm.
Even if regulation is seen as potentially necessary, individuals
may object to the direct application of government coercion to their
day-to-day lives. “[D]irect regulation of individual behaviors may be
expected to give rise to or to create perceptions of government
overstepping, even when indirect regulation operates, without
309
objection, to control the same behaviors for the same end.”
Regulation of frequent individual activities may raise significant
privacy concerns due to the potentially intrusive nature of
310
enforcement. Government mandates that reach inside the home
311
might be particularly susceptible to such resistance.
Of course, citizens accept government coercion in a wide range
of day-to-day activities. For instance, they adhere to speed limits on

Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84, at 1401.
308. See Babcock, supra note 286, at 125; Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 286, at
197–99.
309. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1166. Indirect regulation may be preferable because instead of
requiring constant and potentially intrusive enforcement, it changes the structure of the social
and economic environment to make certain undesirable activities less likely and less common,
or desirable activities more likely and more common. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and
the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 662–67 (2006) (arguing that
structural laws are preferable). For instance, a ban on the construction of inefficient
refrigerators by major corporations would not, in theory, prevent an individual from
constructing his own inefficient refrigerator, but it makes it extremely unlikely.
310. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1244 (2001) (“Simply
mandating a reduction in garbage disposal, for example, can turn government officials into
garbage snoops . . . .”); Cheng, supra note 309, at 659 (detailing fiat regulation and its problems);
Kuh, supra note 304, at 1148 (noting that it is “frequently articulated . . . that direct regulation of
environmentally significant individual behaviors would require unacceptably intrusive
enforcement—measures that would be too invasive of privacy and civil liberties”);
Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 598 (“[T]he intrusiveness of enforcing
these regulations may undermine compliance or produce a political backlash.”).
In theory, one solution to enforcement problems is to increase the level of punishment
for those violations that are detected. There are political limits, however, on how severely a
punishment can be imposed, and for many minor offenses those limits are quite low. See Cheng,
supra note 309, at 659–60 (“[I]mposing large, draconian fines or sentences for minor regulatory
violations insults common intuitions of desert. Disproportionate penalties provoke community
outrage and ultimately may cause even greater underenforcement as police and prosecutors feel
increasingly conflicted about the law’s advisability.”). This will be a serious limitation in the
environmental context, in which many of the individual actions that cause environmental harm
are seen, at worst, as minor offenses. Under-enforced laws also raise the risk of “arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 661.
311. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1175. Nonetheless, some forms of regulation—such as local
recycling mandates that might require trash inspections or restrictions on the importation or
exportation of endangered species—have not prompted the same level of backlash. Id. at 1148.
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streets and highways—limits enforced by police officers. But
regulations of individual behavior in the environmental context face
several additional obstacles. Most saliently, they impose new
constraints on the ability of people to do things that they had
previously been free to pursue. There is evidence that mandates
restricting individuals’ ability to engage in widespread activities that
they feel entitled to pursue may provoke significant political
312
resistance, at least initially. Many individual actions that cause
environmental harm are the result of habits that may be difficult for
313
individuals to change, such as commuting patterns. Relatedly,
mandates that are seen as infringing on preexisting private property
314
rights might be particularly unpopular.
There are also
administrative challenges—the regulation of frequent individual
315
activities may be extremely costly in terms of enforcement. Finally,
there may be a concern that regulation will be unfair or will
312. Babcock, supra note 286, at 152 (explaining how “when the freedom to conduct an
activity is very important, individuals may react to increased threats to restrict that freedom by
simply increasing their commitment to the illegal activity”); Jonathan Baron & James Jurney,
Norms Against Voting for Coerced Reform, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 347 (1993)
(describing the results of their experiment—that respondents are less likely to vote for imposing
coercive regulations because of a fear of intruding on individual rights, even when the
regulations are believed to be effective in accomplishing social goals); Biber, supra note 234, at
1317–28 (describing the two ways in which backlash might occur); Kuh, supra note 304, at 1149
(noting that “opposition has frequently been grounded in property-rights objections”).
313. Babcock, supra note 286, at 153–54; Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286,
at 594–95; see also Giuseppe Carrus, Paola Passafaro & Mirilia Bonnes, Emotions, Habits and
Rational Choices in Ecological Behaviours: The Case of Recycling and Use of Public
Transportation, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 51, 58–60 (2008) (describing a survey that found past
behavior to be a strong predictor of likely future environmental behavior); Christina Knussen,
Fred Yule, Julie MacKenzie & Mark Wells, An Analysis of Intentions to Recycle Household
Waste: The Roles of Past Behavior, Perceived Habit, and Perceived Lack of Facilities, 24 J.
ENVTL. PSYCH. 237 (2004) (describing a survey of recycling behavior in Scotland, which found
that individuals with a habit of not recycling were unlikely to recycle in the future); Linda Steg
& Charles Vlek, Encouraging Pro-Environmental Behavior: An Integrative Review and Research
Agenda, 29 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 309, 312–13 (2009) (noting the importance of habits in
determining environmental behavior). There is evidence that it may be harder for individuals to
make one-time or infrequent changes (for example, by purchasing more efficient or lesspolluting equipment) than to make repeated or frequent changes to daily activities (for
example, using equipment for shorter periods of time or less frequently). Linda Steg, Lieke
Dreijerink & Wokje Abrahamse, Why Are Energy Policies Acceptable and Effective?, 38 ENV’T
& BEHAV. 92, 97 (2006).
314. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1141 (“Section 404’s potential and actual interference with
property rights has occasioned vociferous opposition to the program.”).
315. Babcock, supra note 286, at 150 (noting that such regulations are “often inefficient and
expensive to enforce”); Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 598 (“[T]he cost
of enforcement against large numbers of individuals makes behavior change based solely on the
threat of formal legal sanctions unlikely.”).
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disproportionately affect a particular segment of society, at least in
316
terms of transition costs. For instance, mandates or restrictions are
most unpopular among individuals who have the least ability to take
317
alternative steps to achieve their goals.
Many of the problems relating to the imposition of individual
regulation therefore, are problems of transitions—of the psychic,
informational, economic, and practical costs to individuals of
318
adjusting their daily lives to a new regulatory rule. For instance, a
ban on lighter fluid in Los Angeles requires individual residents to be
aware of the new prohibition, identify alternatives to lighting their
charcoal grills or using alternatives to charcoal grills, pay any costs for
the transition to new solutions (such as buying a gas grill), and
become comfortable with any ongoing added costs or inconveniences
associated with the new solutions. Added costs or inconveniences
might, for example, include longer wait times to ignite a charcoal grill
without fluid, or more effort to light the grill.
General permits might be very helpful in managing this
transition. General permits can be structured to reduce some or all of
the transition costs of a new regulatory system. For instance, general
permits can reduce the administrative burdens on regulated
319
individuals. At the extreme, general permits that do not require any
notice to regulators, any mitigation fees, or any permit application are
(in all but name) an exemption from regulation. This can give time
for the regulatory agency to notify and educate the public on the
316. Baron & Jurney, supra note 312 (describing the results of their experiment—that
respondents are less likely to vote for imposing coercive regulations because of a fear of adverse
impacts on particular individuals, even when the regulations are believed to be effective in
accomplishing social goals); see also Tommy Gärling & Geertje Schuitema, Travel Demand
Management Targeting Reduced Private Car Use: Effectiveness, Public Acceptability and
Political Feasibility, 63 J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 148 (2007) (summarizing traffic-management
research reaching similar conclusions); C. Jakobsson, S. Fujii, & T. Gärling, Determinants of
Private Car Users’ Acceptance of Road Pricing, 7 TRANSP. POL’Y 153, 153 (2000) (describing a
survey that found lower-income drivers who could not as easily afford price increases were more
likely to believe that charges to use roads were unfair and to oppose those charges).
317. See generally, e.g., Sytze A. Rienstra, Piet Rietveld & Erik T. Verhoef, The Social
Support for Policy Measures in Passenger Transport. A Statistical Analysis for the Netherlands, 4
TRANSP. RES. PART D 181 (1999) (describing that transport users least able to avoid road
charges are the group most opposed to those charges).
318. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1166–67 (noting that “if government control over a particular
type of individual behavior is not usual or customary,” it is potentially more intrusive). Large
corporations may have fewer problems with these transition costs because they have expertise
and experience in dealing with government regulations, and can afford to hire specialized
personnel to manage the transition costs.
319. See supra Part II.G.
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regulatory system before the permit requirements are stiffened—
giving the public time to identify alternatives and adjust to the new
regulatory landscape. In this way, general permits also have political
benefits in managing the transition, by reducing regulatory burdens
on the general public that might otherwise prompt a political backlash
against the regulatory system.
Even if a general permit does impose some compliance burdens,
these can be made relatively minimal. For instance, permit
applications might simply require providing notice to the regulatory
agency at the commencement of a regulated activity. If the burden to
demand additional information then falls on the regulatory agency
before the activity can proceed, the agency can let the vast majority of
individuals proceed with no additional compliance requirements.
Although a permit system that for most individuals requires only
notice does not reduce the public’s costs to learn about the new
regulatory system, other transition costs will be greatly reduced or
minimized. A notice-only system means that most individuals can
continue their activities without being required to make any changes
or collect any more information—eliminating the costs to the public
of identifying alternative actions, paying for alternatives, or dealing
320
with the inconveniences of alternatives. More substantial permit
requirements impose greater burdens on the public—both because of
greater informational burdens to compile and produce information
for permit applications, and because the substantive restrictions of the
permit terms may be stricter. Again, however, these can be tailored to
reduce the transition costs as the public adjusts to the new regulatory
system.
C. Managing Social Norms
General permits overall make compliance with the law much
321
easier by reducing the paperwork needed to obtain a permit.
320. If the notice-only permit system imposes minimal penalties for failure to provide
notice, then even the costs of learning about the new regulatory system are reduced for the
public. For instance, warnings might be issued to first-time violators who do not provide notice,
combined with education and outreach.
321. Mandates that are not complied with can lead to socially suboptimal attempts at
evasion. For instance, restrictive garbage disposal laws may increase illegal dumping and
therefore increase environmental harm. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1244–45; see also Babcock,
supra note 286, at 130–31 (noting how effective regulatory design can be particularly difficult in
the environmental context, in which the harms and benefits from activities can be diffuse over
space and time). Significant amounts of evasion can lead law-abiding citizens to question
whether they should comply with the mandate. Id. at 152.
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Making a new behavior convenient is one of the most effective ways
322
to encourage changes in behavior. A very lax general permit system
(such as a notice-only system) does not necessarily cause a change in
the relevant environmental behavior. For instance, a notice-only
system that allows the filling of small wetlands for development will
make it easy for people to continue to fill wetlands for development,
an environmentally harmful behavior. But it does make compliance
with the new regulatory system easy, which may make the public
more accepting of the new regulatory system. Over time, that system
can be made more rigorous, encouraging greater compliance with the
new rule against filling small wetlands, and reducing the
environmentally harmful behavior. Of course, we might still want to
take other steps to make it easier for people to reduce the
environmentally harmful behavior or increase environmentally
beneficial behavior—for instance, a requirement for individuals to
recycle cans and bottles would best be combined with a curbside-pickup system that makes it easy and convenient for individuals to
recycle.
Making compliance with a permitting system convenient will also
decrease the willingness of people to violate the law. For instance,
allowing solo drivers to purchase the right to travel in high-occupancy
vehicle (HOV) lanes actually increased overall compliance with HOV
rules, perhaps because this made the less-congested HOV lanes easily
323
available for everyone who needed to travel quickly. Convenient
322. J. Stanley Black, Paul C. Stern & Julie T. Elworth, Personal and Contextual Influences
on Household Energy Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 17 (1985) (describing a study of
energy usage in late-1970s Massachusetts households); Carlson, supra note 310, at 1275–80
(providing evidence from studies of recycling that making recycling easier, such as through
curbside recycling, is one of the most effective ways to increase recycling rates); id. at 1296
(“Increasing convenience seems more effective than most persuasive techniques aimed at
increasing participation.”); Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and
Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 255 (2003) (“Making environmentally
responsible actions as apparent, easy, and satisfying as possible should encourage people to
undertake them.”); Gärling & Schuitema, supra note 316, at 150; Gregory A. Guagnano, Paul C.
Stern & Thomas Dietz, Influences on Attitude-Behavior Relationships: A Natural Experiment
with Curbside Recycling, 27 ENV’T & BEHAV. 699, 713–14 (1995) (describing a study of recycling
showing that making recycling easier made recycling more common); Knussen et al., supra note
313, at 245 (describing a survey of recycling behavior in Scotland that found that the perception
as to whether recycling was easy was an important factor in increasing an entity’s stated
willingness to recycle in the future). But see Carrus, et al., supra note 313, at 58–60 (describing a
survey that found that one’s perception as to whether recycling was feasible was not a strong
predictor of that individual’s likelihood of recycling in the future).
323. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1267 (2000) (“[B]y allowing
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permitting systems may even increase the social opprobrium that
324
violators face. Conversely, making compliance with a legal mandate
325
inconvenient can decrease its popularity.
The transition time that a general permit program establishes can
allow time for public education efforts to let individuals know why
regulations are necessary and socially beneficial. Regulatory
mandates often inspire more compliance to the extent that the public
326
perceives them as having clear benefits. Education efforts by the
government about the impacts of regulated individual actions on the
environment, or the benefits of alternative choices, may be effective
in increasing public awareness about the need for and the benefits of
327
regulation. Such educational efforts may also directly shape the

motorists to buy into the HOV lanes, FasTrak gives people a more attractive alternative to
breaking the law.”).
324. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1279–80 (“[I]t is one thing not to recycle when the costs of
doing so are quite high. It is quite another to flout the convention when compliance would take
little effort. Thus the commingled curbside recycling may both reduce the absolute cost of
engaging in the behavior and increase the opprobrium one may experience for failing to
comply.”); id. at 1257 (“During World War II the federal government undertook a massive
effort to engage the citizenry in recycling, with a particular emphasis on creating social norms in
favor of recycling for patriotic reasons.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 323, at 1264–67 (arguing that a
program allowing solo drivers to pay for access to less-congested HOV lanes increased overall
compliance with the law because solo-driver violators were now seen as avoiding an easy
compliance option—the ability to pay to use the HOV lanes).
325. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1138–39, 1147 (stating that “[i]mplementation burdens – the
cost and administrative burden of testing emissions from hundreds of thousands of vehicles –
appear to explain, at least in part, the difficulties encountered with respect to the CAA I/M
programs”).
326. Biber, supra note 234; Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What
Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 203–12 (1998) (arguing that one reason why mandates
to employers to reduce the number of trips by employees are politically unpopular is that it is
unclear whether trip reduction would produce significant air quality benefits); see also Gärling
& Schuitema, supra note 316, at 148 (summarizing literature from Europe that congestion tolls
are more accepted by the public when there is clear reduction in traffic congestion); Rienstra et
al., supra note 317, at 197 (describing a survey from the Netherlands indicating that pricing
measures were seen as ineffective in addressing environmental problems and were also less
popular). Some scholars have speculated that individuals may, consciously or not, believe that
policies that will have negative impacts on their lives will be ineffective, regardless of the
policy’s actual efficacy. See Steg et al., supra note 313, at 96.
327. See Tommy Gärling, Anders Biel & Mathias Gustafsson, The New Environmental
Psychology: The Human Interdependence Paradigm, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 85, 90 (Robert B. Bechtel & Arza Churchman eds., 2003); Linda Steg & Geertje
Schuitema, Behavioral Responses to Transport Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis, in THREATS
FROM CAR TRAFFIC TO THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE 347, 353–54, 356–57 (Tommy Gärling &
Linda Steg, eds., 2007); Steg et al., supra note 313, at 93–94 (summarizing the literature in the
energy and transport areas).
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norms of individuals and change individual behavior in ways that
328
reduce environmental impacts.
Educational efforts might eventually shift social norms in ways
that significantly reduce environmentally harmful behavior or
increase environmentally beneficial behavior. And the new regulation
itself might be an important educational mechanism for shifting social
329
norms. The new regulation can also communicate to society at large
that there is a consensus around a particular norm, and that the norm
330
should be followed. Communication may also provide an assurance

328. Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J.
105, 118 (2007) (describing the role of government and the law). There is a substantial
environmental-psychology literature on the role that information plays in shaping individual
behavior, generally finding mixed results. See, e.g., Wokje Abrahamse, Linda Steg, Charles Vlek
& Talib Rothengatter, A Review of Intervention Studies Aimed at Household Energy
Conservation, 25 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 273, 276–78 (2005) (survey of relevant literature in the
energy context finding mixed benefits from information in reducing energy consumption with
benefits more likely when information was tailored to particular individuals (for example, home
energy audits)); William O. Dwyer & Frank C. Leeming, Critical Review of Behavioral
Interventions to Preserve the Environment: Research Since 1980, 25 ENV’T & BEHAV. 275, 291–
93 (1993) (earlier survey also finding mixed results, with personal tailoring of information more
likely to be effective). Feedback to an individual about the impacts of her particular activities
(for example, feedback about the actual amount of energy used in the past hour or over the past
day) can have more substantial impacts on individual behavior. Abrahamse et al., supra, at 278–
80; Dwyer & Leeming, supra, at 297–302. For skepticism about the utility of information
provision in shaping behavior, see E.S. Geller, The Challenge of Increasing Proenvironment
Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 525, 530 (Robert B. Bechtel &
Arza Churchman eds., 2003).
Individuals may need both information about how adverse environmental
consequences flow from particular behaviors and also a belief that those who pursue those
behaviors have responsibility for the consequences of those behaviors. Information about harm
without responsibility may not lead to changes in behavior. A disconnect between information
and responsibility might exist, for instance, when individuals believe they have no ability to
change behavior despite adverse environmental impacts. See Gärling et al., supra note 327.
329. For general statements about how law can shape, sustain, or erode norms, see, for
example, Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 274; Babcock, supra note 286, at 145–49;
Czarnezki, supra note 286; Doremus, supra note 322, at 241; Green, supra note 328, at 118;
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338 (1997); Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 286.
330. Babcock, supra note 286, at 148 (“A law by itself can influence the social meaning of
actions and can influence what people think others might do.”); Carlson, supra note 310, at 1263
(“When jurisdictions impose mandatory recycling laws unaccompanied by real enforcement
efforts, they may attempt to make noncompliers feel more psychic pain from failing to
participate by signaling to their citizenry that recycling is important.”); Green, supra note 328, at
118; McAdams, supra note 329, at 400–07 (describing how law can signal a consensus).
The new regulation can also communicate that a particular mandate to do or not do
something is an appropriate application of an abstract norm that is widely accepted, and that the
public should comply with the mandate. McAdams, supra note 329, at 407–08. For instance, a
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to individuals that their socially beneficial actions are more likely to
be reciprocated by other individuals, and therefore, provide greater
331
impetus for the collective pursuit of higher benefits. A new
regulation may also ingrain an anti-cheating norm over time, with
respect to certain behaviors that “might ultimately engender still
332
higher levels of compliance with the law.”
Again, general permits can create a transition period during
which norms can be shaped by the new regulatory standard while
reducing the transition costs to the public and lessening the possible
political resistance to the new standard. Over time, as norms shift, the
permit system can be made stricter—though increased compliance
might be as much the result of changes in the norms as it is the result
333
of the stricter regulatory standards.
Indeed, the relatively lean, lower-stakes nature of a generalpermitting system may also make it more likely that members of the
public will independently adopt a new social norm. The relatively
mild sanctions or rewards associated with general permits may be
more effective in the long run in developing environmentally friendly
behavior because individuals have to partly rely on creating their own
personal justifications for compliance, rather than simply rely on the
sanction or reward. In contrast, strong sanctions or rewards might be
less effective in permanently changing behaviors (especially after the
334
sanction or reward is withdrawn).
There are other ways in which general permits can make a new
regulatory standard more effective and more politically sustainable
over the long run. General permits can involve mitigation fees; unlike
taxes, it may be more feasible (legally, administratively, and
politically) to earmark the mitigation fees from a general permit to a
particular environmental program, such as one that restores harm
caused by past individual actions. There is research indicating that
revenues from charges or fees on environmentally harmful behavior

prohibition on littering can be articulated as a particular application of the abstract norm to
“clean up after yourself.” A legal ban on littering can make this connection clearer for citizens.
331. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1263; see also Jakobsson et al., supra note 316 (survey
finding that drivers would drive less in response to road charges if they believed that others
would also drive less).
332. See Strahilevitz, supra note 323.
333. Regulations of individual behavior may be more useful “as a second order measure
after information and other regulatory instruments have had an influence on beliefs and
norms.” Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 600.
334. Geller, supra note 328, at 536–37.
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may be more acceptable if the revenues are dedicated to addressing
or remediating the particular environmental harms created by the
335
behavior, rather than used for general revenue purposes.
CONCLUSION
Our perspective on the permit power has fit together three
components. First, we have offered a framework for thinking about
the scope and design of regulatory permits, showing permitting to
constitute a far more flexible and contextual regulatory power than
Professor Epstein’s critique assumed. In particular, the general permit
model offers what might be considered a compromise between
Epstein’s preference for judicial injunctions and his feared world
represented by monolithic regimes of extreme specific permits.
Second, we identified key policy questions that are likely to inform
permit design decisions, and applied them to the spectrum of permit
types from general to specific. Third, we anticipated the kind of
challenges likely on the horizon of permitting, suggesting that general
permits may be most useful in handling policy problems arising from
the massive aggregation of thousands or millions of small harm
sources.
From these three analytical sources we now propose a set of
default rules and exceptions based on a harm-variance continuum.
The continuum captures the essence of the section 404 general permit
provision, which conditions that general permits be used only when
the risk of harm from a defined activity, both in individual instances
and from the cumulative impact of many instances, is low, and the
variance expected across instances of the defined activity is low. As
335. Steg et al., supra note 313, at 97–98; Steg & Schuitema, supra note 327, at 358–59. The
choice between imposing a simple prohibition (with a permitting exemption) on an
environmentally harmful activity versus allowing the environmentally harmful activity with a
charge or tax probably does not make a major difference for political acceptability. Charges and
taxes are often just as unpopular as sanctions and mandates. See, e.g., Jens Schade & Bernard
Schlag, Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing Strategies, 6 TRANSP. RES. PART F 45, 45–46
(2003) (noting that surveys indicate that road pricing and congestion fees are less popular with
drivers than regulation restricting parking or driving).
Unfortunately, overall there has been only limited research on the effectiveness of
sanctions and other regulations to change individual behavior in the environmental context.
Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 274; Dwyer & Leeming, supra note 328, at 295–96; Steg &
Vlek, supra note 313. Much of the research on increasing incentives for environmentally
friendly individual behavior focuses on providing incentives, rather than on imposing sanctions.
Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 280–81 (finding that incentives often have impacts on
individual behavior). A weakness of many of these studies is limited long-term follow-up on the
impacts of incentives. Id. at 282; Dwyer & Leeming, supra note 328, at 295–96, 314.
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Table 4 below shows, the strongest case for general permits exists
when both factors are very low, and the strongest case for specific
permits exists when both factors are very high. Intermediate models,
such as the Corps’ PCN mechanism, can be used to respond to
contexts between the extremes.
Table 4. The Harm-Variance Continuum Default Rules
Low Variance

High Variance

Low Risk Profile

General Permits

Intermediates

High Risk Profile

Intermediates

Specific Permits

Exceptions to these default rules may be justified, however,
when any or a combination of conditions identified in Part II are
336
present. Using specific permits as the default rule, moving toward
intermediate or general permits would be justified in the following
cases:
1. When using the specific permit model would place undesirably
disproportionate entry barriers on small businesses and other
interests deemed worthy of protection;
2. When there is no substantial need for new information about
instances of the activity;
3. When tailoring to specific circumstances of different instances
of the activity is not necessary or practicable;
4. When using the specific permit model for the class of activity
presents political obstacles that could undermine implementation of
any regulatory response;
5. When public participation and other mechanisms for
constraining agency discretion are either unnecessary or
impracticable; and
6. When using the specific permit model would impose undue
administrative burdens on the agency or regulated entities.

336. See supra Part II.
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Using this permit design framework, a wide range of
environmental problems plausibly might be better resolved by
general permits to address the challenges we identify in Part III. For
instance, as previously described, when confronted by the prospect of
regulating six million sources of carbon dioxide emissions under the
Clean Air Act, the EPA’s “tailoring rule” gave millions of smaller
sources what was in effect a temporary regulatory exemption to avoid
what the agency described would be an absurd result of strict
337
statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court agreed that regulating
six million sources would be “patently unreasonable,” but found that
the statute was ambiguous regarding the scope of authority and that
the strict interpretation the EPA was hoping to avoid was instead an
338
impermissible interpretation. What the Court failed to seriously
consider, however, was the possibility that regulating the small
sources through general permits could have fulfilled the intent of the
statute without leading to an absurd application of the permit power.
Using general permits might have provided an alternative that, for
the reasons discussed above, would be superior to an administrative
exemption from regulation—particularly in terms of collecting
information and even mitigating fees—while still reducing the
political and administrative costs of regulating so many individual
339
sources. The EPA and a number of states did explore a range of
streamlining alternatives to facilitate future permitting of greenhouse
340
gas sources under the Clean Air Act, including general permits, but
the government did not advance that prospect before the Court as
reason to support the extension of regulatory power over small

337. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516–22 (June 3, 2010) (explaining the factual and legal context for
greenhouse gas emissions regulation under the Clean Air Act).
338. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
339. The Clean Air Act explicitly authorizes general permits for its Title V permit program,
under which all major stationary sources regulated under the Act are supposed to have a single
permit that articulates all of their regulatory responsibilities under the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(d)
(2012); Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,279 (July 21, 1992) (codified at 40
C.F.R. part 70), and the EPA and state agencies already use general permits for a significant
amount of compliance with that program, see Thomson Reuters, Operating Permits under the
Clean Air Act Title V Permit Program, 0070 REGSURVEYS 12 (June 2013).
340. See PERMITS, NEW SOURCE REVIEWS AND TOXICS SUBCOMMITTEE, CLEAN AIR ACT
ADVISORY COMM., AIR PERMITTING STREAMLINING TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR
GREENHOUSE GASES (Sept. 14, 2012), available at www.epa.gov/air/caaac/pdfs/ghg-permitstreamlining-final-report.pdf; Alex Ritchie, Scattered and Dissonant: The Clean Air Act,
Greenhouse Gases, and Implications for the Oil and Gas Industry, 43 ENVTL. L. 461, 487–88
(2013) (describing a number of streamlining options).
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sources of carbon dioxide emissions. Apparently, however, that
would not have helped, as the Court conjectured, without analysis,
that “none of those techniques would address the more fundamental
problem of the EPA’s claiming regulatory authority over millions of
342
small entities.” Yet the fact of the matter is that the permit power in
its many manifestations already exercises authority over “millions of
343
small entities.” General permits are a way of balancing the reasons
for regulating at that scale with the reasons Epstein gave for caution.
Another example of a specific environmental challenge which
general permits might help resolve is addressing climate change under
the ESA. Climate change is already leading to the endangerment and
extinction of species around the world, including species protected
344
under the ESA. Climate change raises difficult questions about
what, if any, should be the regulatory response under the ESA to
345
these threats. For instance, the listing of the polar bear under the
ESA could plausibly trigger the regulation of all greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States by the ESA—raising the major policy
346
concerns we have discussed in this Article. Although specific
permits seem clearly infeasible—the FWS is not going to require all
individual drivers or all gas station owners to apply for permits under
the ESA to emit greenhouse gases that harm polar bears—general
permits again might allow the agency to reconcile the strict dictates of
the ESA with political and administrative realities, and perhaps also
to reduce or mitigate some of the worst harms climate change has
inflicted on endangered species. For both of these examples, much
more specific research is needed to explore the legality and feasibility

341. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 n.7 (2014) (“Nor have we been
given any information about the ability of other possible ‘streamlining’ techniques alluded to by
EPA—such as ‘general or ‘electronic’ permitting—to reduce the administrative problems.”).
Briefs by the EPA and environmental groups did mention streamlining, but only in a general
way. One amicus brief did discuss general permits in more detail as an option. See Eric Biber &
J.B. Ruhl, General Permits and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, LEGAL PLANET (July 26,
2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/07/26/general-permits-and-the-regulation-of-greenhousegases/.
342. Util. Air Reg. Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 n.7.
343. Id.
344. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–26 (2008) (examining the impacts of climate change on
species protected under the ESA).
345. See id. at 26–31 (identifying these challenges).
346. Id. at 39–49 (explaining the legal basis for, and administrative difficulty of, applying the
ESA to greenhouse gas emission sources).
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of general permits under the statutory scheme and the nature and
form of how general permits would best work.
Our focus in Part III was on environmental harms and how they
will increasingly involve the accumulation of small harms caused by
numerous individual activities. This Part noted how general permits
might be important tools in managing this problem. But, as alluded to
earlier, we do not think this dynamic is unique to environmental law.
Indeed, we can imagine a range of other areas in which there are
significant social harms or risks that are the result of widespread
individual activities. Some of these examples involve increased risks
caused by otherwise trivial actions. For instance, computer systems in
large organizations can be vulnerable to malware when individual
employees do something as simple as open an e-mail attachment or
visit an infected webpage. Other examples are products of increasing
interconnectedness in a globalizing world. For example, the global
financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the mortgage market
in the United States, a collapse that was the result of the decisions of
millions of individuals about mortgages and household finances.
Although considering how general permits might help address these
and other kinds of problems is beyond the scope of this project, we
think that general permits may well be an important part of any
international or national effort to address them.
There is another way that general permits might be important to
the future of the regulatory state: managing the rise of the sharing
economy. A number of high-profile startup companies such as Uber,
Lyft, and Airbnb have used the Internet to connect individual sellers
and buyers of services that historically were provided by large,
347
centralized businesses like taxi companies and hotels. Ride-sharing
services such as Uber and Lyft match individual drivers with
individual passengers who need lifts; Airbnb allows homeowners and
renters to offer a spare bedroom or an entire unit for rent to visitors
looking for a place to stay. These start-ups have prompted a wave of
legal disputes over whether and how they fit into existing regulations
348
for taxi companies, hotels, and local land use rules. The paperwork
347. See Zachary Karabell, Requiem for the Middleman: Why are governments so afraid of
Uber and Airbnb?, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
the_edgy_optimist/2014/04/airbnb_uber_tesla_why_are_governments_so_rattled_by_their_
business_models.html.
348. See Elizabeth A. Harris, The Airbnb Economy in New York: Lucrative but Often
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/nyregion/the-airbnbeconomy-in-new-york-lucrative-but-often-unlawful.html; David Streitfeld, Companies Built on
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and permitting that seem appropriate for a large-scale, centralized
business focused on taxi services or hospitality are a tremendous
mismatch with the compliance capabilities of individual drivers,
homeowners, and renters. On the other hand, a complete exemption
of ride-sharing or home-sharing activities from regulation seems
inappropriate because they may have important impacts on the public
(such as accidents caused by unlicensed ride-share providers), and
exemptions could turn into loopholes that might be exploited by
349
large-scale businesses. General permits might therefore be a useful
model for tailoring the regulation of individuals participating in these
activities—they would lower the compliance costs while minimizing
the harm to the public, and would also retain flexibility to ensure that
350
large-scale, centralized businesses do not escape regulation.
***
We are well past the halcyon days, if they ever existed, when
common law injunctions effectively managed all the large and small
harms people occasioned on each other and the environment. To fill
the breach, the modern administrative state has leaned heavily on the
permit—the
statutorily
authorized,
judicially
reviewable,
discretionary administrative granting of permission to do that which is
otherwise prohibited by statute. Permits are everywhere, they are
here to stay, and they are likely to grow in importance as a delivery
mechanism for regulation in the modern administrative state. The
permit power thus is an enormous power—of that there is no dispute.
But as we have shown, it is an enormously flexible power as well. A
robust theory of permits is needed to wisely and effectively calibrate
the permit power to its particular policy challenges, to ensure the
permit power gets the job done without falling into the traps
Professor Epstein identified as cause for alarm two decades ago. Our
hope is that we have begun to build that foundation in this Article,
and that this foundation will assist us, other legal scholars, and

Sharing Balk When It Comes to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comesto-regulators.html?_r=1.
349. The first fatal accident involving a ride-sharing driver occurred in San Francisco. See
Kale Williams & Kurtis Alexander, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death in S.F., S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 28,
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-5178921.php.
350. Flexibility may also be important because technological innovation in this area will only
accelerate, outpacing the ability of legislatures to devise new rules. General permits may allow
more rapid evolution of the relevant legal standards without unduly discouraging innovation.
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practitioners in further refinement of the theory and practice of
regulatory permits in the administrative state.

